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ABSTRACT
Student Search and Seizure Since T.L.O.
by
Darryl C. Wyatt
Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Examining Committee Chair
Professor o f Educational Leadership
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas

When students in public schools are searched or seized by school officials for any
reason, it can sometimes be a violation o f the their Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Two United States Supreme Court decisionsNew Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and Veroonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995),
have addressed student searches. T.L.O. dealt with the search o f a student’s purse after
she was caught breaking a school rule, smoking in the bathroom. Vemonia established
ground rules for dealing with drug-testing policies in the school environment. In both
cases the Supreme Court supported the authority o f the school. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that public schools are unique environments and cannot
operate effectively using the same standards as other government entities.
T.L.O., the earliest o f the two and heavily quoted from, spoke to the issue o f what
guidelines need to be followed when conducting a search of a student. V em onia, has
provided schools and school districts with guidance with respect to drug-testing policies.

Ill
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Courts have not been consistent with their rulings when dealing with drug-testing
policies. This has resulted in rulings that often raise more questions than are answered.
One case recently accepted by the United States Supreme Court for review. Earls v.
Tecumseh School District, 242 F. 3d 1264, also deals with a drug-testing policy in a
public school. School officials are hopeful that the decision the Supreme Court renders in
that case will clarify any current misconceptions and lead to more consistent rulings.
This study has targeted student search and seizure. In reviewing case law dealing with
this topic, the study reports how the various federal courts have interpreted the
T.L.O. landmark case over the past 17 years. The study investigates possible patterns in
the court’s rulings that provide guidance for today’s school administrators. This study can
be used as a guide for future policy making with respect to searches and seizures o f
students in public schools.

IV
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
School officials all over the country have faced the difficult task o f trying to keep
school children safe. The primary legal concept that determined the student-public school
relationship, doctrine o f ‘in loco parentis’, placed school officials “ in the shoes o f a
reasonable and prudent parent” (Kops, 1998). Before 1969, it was this doctrine that
formed the basis for reviewing student discipline invoked by school administrators. In
1969 the Supreme Court determined that public school students possessed limited
constitutional rights in the school setting. Freedom o f speech was protected in Tinker v
Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and due process was protected in Goss
v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The United States Supreme Court ruling in New Jersev v.
T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) concluded that the Fourth Amendment o f the United States
Constitution was applicable to searches o f students by public school administrators.
Incidents in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and Littleton, Colorado, have made communities
aware and concerned with respect to school safety. School administrators have an
obligation to protect the students for which they are responsible. Nearly every day
newspapers and televisions across the country report random acts o f violence in our
nation’s schools. These terrifying and frightening incidents have a devastating and longlasting impact on both students and staff. When threats o f violence exist students and
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educators become more vulnerable and the leaming process is disrupted (Burke &
Herbert, 1996).
Violence in schools harms children in different ways. “The most devastating
psychological effect o f violence in students’ lives is that it shrinks and distorts their
ability to participate in the implied promise o f future benefits for school work done
today” (Friedlander, pg. 11, 1993). These iimocent victims need to be protected. When
violence destroys their ability to foresee a decent future, it takes away their motivation
and their ability to prepare for it (Friedlander, 1993).
Public concem about school safety is well documented in many national studies. A
weapon in school is one concem that especially worries parents. Parents realize the
serious threat that weapons in school pose to their children. Just as importantly, parents
and educators both know that a safe environment is a critical factor in the
teaching/learning equation. The public is insisting that schools incorporate effective
means to prevent students from possessing instruments that are capable o f harming or
killing other students (Hooker, 1995). This may include more searches o f lockers,
personal effects, and students.
According to a U.S. News & World Report article, a survey that they conducted
indicated the crime that most Americans worried about was the bringing o f guns to
school by students (“Guns o f October”, 1996). Students need to be able to feel safe while
at school. Attendance improves when school violence declines and students feel safer.
(Fiester et al., 1996).
Janet Reno indicated in an interview with NEA Today that youth violence was the
single greatest crime problem in America (1997). Caudle (1994), a high school principal.
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indicated that al! schools are subject to violence and the key to solving the problem at her
school was prevention. The problem is expected to grow significantly over the next
decade. Reno said, “Unless we get control o f youth violence, it can become a much more
difficult problem” (NEA Today, 1997). Administrators and teachers are faced with this
gloomy reality and must find solutions. Reno contended that educators must be a major
part o f the solution (NEA Today, 1997).
There are more metal detectors in place now than ever before. Schools employ more
security personnel today than in the past. Yet, despite these security-based measures
violent acts continue to occur with increased frequency in our public schools (Friedland,
1999). According to the first annual School Safety Report (1998) by the U.S. Department
o f Education and the Justice Department more than 6,000 students were expelled from
school in 1997 for possession o f a weapon or for making threatening statements.
During the 1988 legislative session, 28 states introduced school safety legislation
(Halford, 1998). The proposals covered a wide range from prevention to punishment.
Some proposals never survived committee. Some states that were not willing to wait on
the federal government took it upon themselves to create their own measures. Kentucky
House Bill 330 established a state center for school safety to research violence prevention
efforts and to then disseminate results to school districts (Halford, 1998).
President Clinton had shown that he was passionate about finding a solution to solve
this problem. In a summit meeting in October 1997 he encouraged school decision
makers to support curfews, school uniforms, and to crack down on truancy (Halford,
1998). While relevant change takes time, many school districts have now begun to take
action to the rise in schoolyard violence incidents.
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Nevada is not immune from the problems facing school campuses all across the
country. With respect to the Clark County school District, the largest school district in the
state and the sixth largest in the country, violence and safety issues can be seen
throughout the district. High Schools, Middle Schools and Elementary Schools in Clark
County all experience situations that involve the safety o f the school’s student
population. As the num ber o f students has continued to rise, so have the number o f police
incidents within the Clark County School District. Incidents had increased by double
digit percentages between 1996 and 2001. According to statistics taken from logs o f cases
submitted to investigators for processing (8/12/99), matters concerning the safety of
students have grown at alarming rates. During the 1998-99 school year there were 667
incidents throughout the district that involved the possession o f guns, knives, or drugs.
These statistics indicate a need by administrators to be able to take whatever measures
necessary to protect the student population o f the school they are responsible for.
Lawmakers in Nevada addressed the issue o f school violence in the 1999 legislative
session. Two bills emerged that are intended to have significant impact on public schools
in the state o f Nevada. Bills AB14 and AB52I were passed by legislatures in 1999 and
signed by Governor Guinn into law. The first bill, A B 14, related to students who were
continually disruptive to the educational setting. The bill prescribed the conditions under
which a pupil shall be deemed suspended from school. In addition, it required schools to
notify parents before pupils are deemed habitual disciplinary problems. Per the bill,
schools are charged with the responsibility for developing a plan to handle students who
are continually disruptive. Teachers now have gained the authority to refuse to admit
severely disruptive students into their classroom. These students must be accounted for in
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some way, and some person needs to be responsible for them. The next bill, AB 521,
related to the authorization to create altemative programs o f education for students
labeled habitual discipline problems. Superintendents were mandated to create pilot
programs to teach students that were unable to be educated in a general school setting. In
addition to providing the funding for such a program, the bill also outlined guidelines that
the superintendent must follow.
What steps should be taken to combat violence in schools? Most commonly someone
will say metal detectors is what our schools need. Metal detectors have now been
installed at many secondary schools. According to Halford (1998), “recent research on
the effectiveness o f high-tech school safety measures, including metal detectors and
surveillance cameras, finds these approaches to be only marginally helpful in most
settings.
Coben, Weiss, Mulvey, and Dearwater indicated almost three million crimes occur on
or near campuses each year. In addition, an estimated 430,000 students took something to
school to protect themselves from harm or attack at least once during a six-month period
in 1988-1989 (U.S. Dept, o f Justice, 1991). A survey o f high school students conducted
in 1987 indicated 48% o f tenth grade boys and 34% o f eighth grade boys said they could
get a handgun if they wanted one. In 1990, one in 25 high school students carried guns to
school, and nationally, over 400,000 students were victims o f violent crime during a sixmonth period (American School Health Association, 1989). A 1993 national survey on
the opinions and experiences o f American teachers found that 11% o f public school
teachers and 23% o f students reported being victims in or around their school
(Metropolitan Life, 1993).
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Fiester, Nathanson, Visser, and Martin (1996) reported that every year 16,000 violent
incidents take place each school day, that is one every six seconds. In addition, ten
American teen-agers are killed in gun accidents, suicides, o r homicides each day
(National School Safety Center, 1993). In the four-year time span between 1987 and
1991 juvenile arrests for murder increased by 85 percent (National School Boards
Association, 1993). It has been reported that 160,000 students skip class each school day
due to their fear o f physical harm (Follman, 1993).
According to Buckner and Flanery (1996), elementary school students committed
violent incidents that accounted for one-fourth o f all suspensions from schools nationally.
In incidents that involved guns on school property, sixty-three percent o f the time junior
high school students were involved; twelve percent involved elementary school children;
and one percent involved pre-schoolers (National School Board Association, 1993).
Statistics from a 1993 study by the U.S. Justice Department revealed that 150,000
students carried guns to school each day. Persons under the age o f 18 accounted for
nearly one-fifth o f all violent crime in America in 1995-murders, rapes, robberies, and
aggravated assaults. The number o f youths arrested for these crimes was 86 percent
higher than the number arrested five years earlier when there were a million more
youngsters in this age group ( “Crime in the United States”, 1993).
These alarming statistics alert us to the fact that the possibility o f violence in
classrooms throughout the United States has increased dramatically. Some young people
believe that carrying a firearm is a symbol o f status among their peers. The fear o f being
guimed down should be the furthest thing fix>m the minds o f students sitting in class
trying to focus on their schoolwork. Even the nation’s best students are negatively
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affected when the concentration o f academic leaming is interrupted through fear and
concem for personal safety.
When school administrators deal with violence or acts o f disruption, they must be
careful not to trample the rights o f students. That leaves school officials wondering how
far they can go to protect the student population from harm without violating the rights’
o f the students. What legal consequences can school officials face when they fail to act
when injury results from serious misconduct? Essex (1999) wrote, “School officials have
a moral and legal duty to preserve the safety and well Dcing o f all students, while not
trampling on the constitutional rights o f students involved in disruptive behavior.” Have
courts allowed school leaders broad discretion in dealing with students whose behavior
poses a threat to the safety and well being o f others? This question is extremely relevant,
especially in school environments that had been inundated with incidents o f violence or
serious acts o f misconduct (Essex, 1999). School officials must always remember to act
responsibly. “They must resist the temptation to act too aggressively when the situation
does not warrant such a response” (Essex, p. 18, 1999).
The rash o f violent deaths in our schools in recent years has focused the country’s
attention on the issue o f weapons on schools campuses and just how safe are our schools.
No one can absolutely ensure that major acts o f violence will not occur on school
grounds. However, school officials must do whatever is necessary to try and protect the
children they are responsible for.
In recent years, there have been at least five planned shootings by students in U.S.
public schools and one incident in a private school in which more than three people were
shot. Beyond the loss o f life trauma that accompanies such violent acts, the fear that is
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imposed on students and educators is tremendous. I f weapons or the fear o f weapons are
present in the school environment, teachers are unable to teach the way they should and
the ability o f the students to learn is adversely affected. There are a seemingly endless
variety of inexpensive and readily available disguised weqx)ns, including knives
manufactured to look like such innocent items as ballpoint pens, lipstick cases,
hairbrushes and jewelry. In order to keep the schools safe, school officials must uncover
these objects before they cause serious harm. It s p e a r s that the more the media reports
these horrific acts o f violence, the more the seed is planted in the unstable minds o f
individuals. Administrators must not only be ready and willing to act, they must also
understand the limit of there authority.
An August 1998 article in The Police Chief identified specific counter measures that
needed to be done to combat school violence. The screening measures included; random
locker checks, surprise metal detector inspections o f purses and bookbags, visual
screening techniques, searches o f public areas for hidden weapons, surveillance o f
students entering and exiting campus, locker checks using gun or bomb detecting dogs,
and a full aggressive search when a weapon tip is received. These types o f preventive
measures could be helpful in preventing violent incidents at schools. W ould school
officials be within their authority according to the courts if they tried these actions?
It is known that most school-age children are law abiding, while a sm all percentage o f
offenders create havoc. These serious, habitual violators make up 6 percent o f all
juveniles and 18 percent o f all delinquent youth. They are responsible fo r 62 percent o f
all offenses and 66 percent o f all violent offenses (Bernard, 1995). How do school
officials identify and then deal with these individuals? What is the scope o f
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administrators legal capacity to take preventive measures in order to protect the integrity
of the school, and keep all students safe?
The task o f keeping students safe is a challenging one. Administrators must find ways
to protect students while at school, and make sure that the constitutional rights of the
students are not violated in the process. School leaders have attempted various ways to
keep their schools safe and secure. Installation o f video cameras, heightened security,
metal detectors, and locker searches are a few examples o f what administrators have tried
in order to protect the students they are responsible for. When making decisions about
what measures to take, administrators must remember to not violate the Fourth
.Amendment right o f the students. School officials must constantly be cognizant o f how
the laws o f the land impact the decisions they make for the benefit of the children in their
school.
The standard for school search was set in 1985 when the United States Supreme
Court ruled on New Jersey v. T.L.O 469 U.S. 325. This case involved the search o f a
high school student’s purse by a school administrator. The vice principal had reason to
believe the student had violated a school rule. Through the course o f the search some
incriminating items were discovered. The student was arrested and the search was
challenged as a violation of T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment protection. School leaders are
allowed to search students based on “ reasonable suspicion”, not “probable cause”.
Moreover, the actions of school officials are valid as long as they are “reasonable”
(Bernard, 1995). The Supreme Court case o f New Jersey v. T.L.O ruled that school
officials needed individual suspicion before searching students and the search be
reasonable in scope. A two-part test decided if a school search was reasonable. The
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search must be “justified at its inception”, and “reasonably related in scope to its initial
justification.” Reasonable actions are based on suspicion that the leaming environment is
threatened (Bernard, 1995). Looking at what is given up in the search and measuring that
against what is gained assesses the reasonableness o f the search. The text o f the Fourth
Amendment protects against “unreasonable” searches.
This study will view search and seizure o f students from different perspectives. .As
cases are reviewed in this study a great deal o f data will be provided for the reader.

Statement o f Problem
It has been 17 years since the United States Supreme Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment was ^p licab le to school searches. The ruling in T.L.O. (1985) set a standard
that has guided school officials when conducting searches. It is important to now look at
what has transpired in the federal court system since that ruling. It is time to assess the
current status o f the T.L.O. precedent and review application of the precedent to school
searches challenged since T.L.O. was rendered. It is that information that will provide the
much needed guidance to school officials who are responsible for determining policies
and rules that are intended to keep their students safe and free from harm.

Research Questions
During the review o f the decisions that dealt with search and seizure o f public school
students since T.L.O. (1985), this study sought answers to the following questions:
1.

How has T.L.O. been interpreted and applied?
A. What is meant by “reasonable suspicion” as referred to in T.L.O.?
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II
B. Does the “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated in T.L.O apply to
school police?
C. Has the Court’s interpretation o f T.L.O. changed over time? What is
the current status o f school search jurisprudence?
D. What guidelines should school officials’ follow regarding the search o f
students?
What, if any, impact does the Nevada State Constitution forbidding
unreasonable search and seizures have on school searches?

Rationale
School officials must take appropriate action to ensure that school campuses are safe
leaming environments. The rules o f procedure for conducting searches o f students permit
greater freedom o f action for the school official because the objectives are quite different.
Preseiwation o f the school environment is seen as requiring a more immediate response
because the risk o f delay could cause catastrophic results. School discipline is thus unique
in that it can be adapted to implement policies that are independent o f the more generic
concems o f local law enforcement agencies.
Since T.L.O v. New Jersev was decided in 1985 many other cases have required the
application o f the T.L.O. precedent regarding search and seizure. Each day school
administrators must balance the concems o f school safety with the constitutional rights o f
students. Administrators must be provided with appropriate and relevant guidance
regarding school searches. Knowledge o f case law will help the school official be better
prepared to make tough decisions in challenging situations.
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School administrators in Nevada are not exempt from problems that are facing school
officials in other parts o f the country. This study serves as an informational tool for
administrators who are seeking answers to student search questions or contemplating the
implementation o f policy regarding student search in some form. School Board officials.
Superintendents, Legislators, and other school authorities are able to review the
information provided in this document and decide if a policy that they are considering
implementing is a venture that they want to initiate at their school or schools. They are
now able to look at the legal facts that are involved and then make a more informed
decision. This study examined legal facts that were related to the many different types of
searches involving public school children. It now becomes a tool for administrators to use
in order to make quality decisions regarding search and seizure issues involving students.

Definition o f Terms
Common law:

1. The body o f law derived from judicial decisions, rather than

from statutes or constitutions. 2. The body o f law based on the English legal system, as
distinct from a civil-law system. 3. General law common to the country as a whole, as
opposed to special law that has only local application. Black’s law dictionary (7'*’ ed.,
1999).
Federal circuit court:

A court usually having jurisdiction over several counties,

districts, or states, and holding sessions in all those areas. Black’s law dictionary (7'*' ed.,
1999).
Federal district court:

A trial court having general jurisdiction within its judicial

district. Black’s law dictionary (7^ ed., 1999).
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Intrusion: n. I. Person’s entering without permission. 2. In an action for invasion o f
privacy, a highly offensive invasion o f another person’s seclusion or private life. Black’s
law dictionary (7* ed., 1999).
Probable cause: A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. Under
the Fourth Amendment, probable cause - which amounts to more than a bare suspicion
but less than evidence that would justify a conviction - must be shown before an arrest
warrant or search warrant may be issued. - Also termed reasonable cause; sufficient
cause; reasonable grounds. Black’s law dictionary (7* ed., 1999).
Publication: 1. Generally the act o f declaring or announcing to the public. 2.
Copyright. The distribution of copies o f a work to the public. Black’s law dictionary (7^
ed., 1999).
Reasonable suspicion: A particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and
articulable facts, for suspecting a person o f criminal activity. A police officer must have a
reasonable suspicion to stop a person in a public place. Black’s law dictionary (7*^ ed.,
1999).
Search:

n. 1. An examination o f a person’s body, property, or other area that the

person would reasonably be expected to consider as private, conducted by a lawenforcement officer for the purpose o f finding evidence o f a crime. Because the Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches (as well as seizures), a search cannot
ordinarily be conducted without a probable cause. Black’s law dictionary (7^ ed., 1999).
Seizure: The act or an instance o f taking possession o f a person or property by legal
right or process, especially, in constitutional law, a confiscation or arrest that may
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interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation o f privacy. Black’s law dictionary (7^
ed., 1999).
Strip Search: A search o f a person conducted after that person’s clothes have been
removed, the purpose usually being to find any contraband the person might be hiding.
Black’s law dictionary (7*^ ed., 1999).

Limitations
When reviewing this study, readers should consider the following limitations:
1.

The entire opinion o f the courts’ was not included. The details present are
case briefs that are included as part o f the data used for this study.

2.

The author is a public school administrator. While every attempt was
made to create this document free o f bias, some bias may exist.

3.

Scholarly comments was limited to law reviews.

4.

Inquiry for the study was limited to case law.

Delimitations
When reviewing the contents o f this study the reader must keep in mind the
following delimitations:
1

This study examined cases that were decided in federal courts. Many state
constitutions guarantee the same rights that are being questioned.

2

Only cases that were completed and accessible prior to June 5, 2001 were
included in this study.
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Significance o f the Study
There is a conflict between what administrators need to do (protect students), and
what they can legally do (student’s rights). For many years the doctrine o f in loco
parentis shielded administrators from legal disputes. In loco parentis, which requires
school officials to act as responsible parents would act, has not been a viable defense in
recent court cases. W e know “that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse gate” Tinker v. Des Moines. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Administrators must find
middle ground between providing a safe environment and not violating a student’s
constitutional rights.
With so much information needed to make qualified decisions, a document that
provides facts based on legal research can be very useful. A thorough search revealed that
there was no current document that had been published or available that contains that
valuable data. This study is a guide to assist school officials when dealing with searches
at school. The absence o f such a tool prior to this study made this study significant.
School leaders must have a firm foundation from which quality decisions can be
made regarding student search. In order for that foundation to be secure, administrators
need to know what has happened since T.L.O. was decided. Without information
regarding prior decisions, school officials will be forced to make decisions and
implement policies to protect students without the benefit o f much needed data. This
document serves as a guide with examples o f cases over the past 17 years and how the
various federal courts have mled in search and seizure cases. This document was needed
to provide a tool for administrators when they are forced to make crucial decisions that
involved the safety and security o f a school and it’s students.
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Summary
School violence has become a common occurrence throughout our nation. School
officials are faced with the tough challenge o f protecting the children that attend our
public schools. Statistics indicated that students were bringing weapons to school at an
alarming rate, and parents had great concern and fear for their child's safety while at
school. It is difficult for a child to focus and leam when they are concerned for their
safety.
Administrators need to have the authority to take precautions to prevent acts o f
violence and destruction. They must not be restricted in their attempts to protect students.
Preventive measures could include different options, some o f which may be seen as an
infringement on the rights o f the students. Locker searches, use o f metal detectors,
vehicle searches, and drug tests are occurring more often.
Administrators need to have guidance as to what is and is not permissible. The United
States Supreme Court by way o f New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) set the
standard for what is acceptable regarding Fourth Amendment rights o f students. Since
that case was decided 17 years ago, it was time now to see how the federal courts have
ruled since then regarding school searches.
This study reviewed many different cases that involved search and seizure. The cases
were analyzed in-depth. School leaders are now provided with a document that indicates
what has happened since the T.L.O. ruling. Administrators will be able to use the
information presented in this study as a guide for planning and implementing policy
designed to protect students at school, while being careful not to violate the Fourth
Amendment right o f those same students.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE CASE LAW AND LITERATURE
When examining the history o f student searches in public school it was important to
begin with the document that is the foundation for the laws o f the United States o f
America, The United States Constitution. Supreme Court Justices must review the United
States Constitution when determining if a person’s rights have been violated. The
Constitution is the legal document that guarantees the rights o f the people in the United
States. As policies are created throughout our country and laws are made they must not
contradict the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court Justices are assigned the
task o f determining the outcome o f a case when a person believes that one or more o f
their constitutional rights have been violated.

Origins o f the Fourth Amendment
In 1791 the Bill o f Rights was adopted as part o f the United States Constitution. The
Bill o f Rights contained ten amendments that stipulated specific rights that must be
guaranteed. The Fourth Amendment covered the issue o f search and seizure. It is rich
with historical background rooted in American, as well as English experience. The Fourth
Amendment is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that directly grew from
the events that preceded the Revolutionary War (LaFave, 1996). Those that created the
Fourth Amendment to the constitution designed the amendment to safeguard the privacy
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and security of private individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials by
protecting reasonable expectations o f privacy (Zane, 1987).
The struggle began in England where the authority to search was used as a way to
restrict freedom o f the press. Greater protection was sought due to the inappropriate
searches conducted by the English government. The people o f England were encouraged
by Parliament leaders who sought restrictions from “general warrant” searches (LaFave,
1996).
In the colonies across the Atlantic from England, important developments were
occurring. In an attempt to uncover smuggled goods, custom officials used writ o f
assistance to enter and search buildings. James Otis, Jr. represented 63 Boston merchants
in 1761 to fight for justice. He opposed the issuance o f writs in court. While he was
unsuccessful in his bid, his message was heard and had an impact on John Adams. John
Adams was a participant at the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
The draft constitution did not contain a bill o f rights, which caused considerable
opposition to the document’s ratification. “One o f the points emphasized in the
ratification debates was the need for a provision dealing with searches” (LaFave, 1996,
p.5). National criticism persuaded President Washington that the addition o f a bill o f
rights was needed. James Madison became the sponsor o f the movement in Congress.
After some discussion over the language regarding searches and warrants, the committee
draft was complete. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons o r things to be seized
(LaFave, 1996).

Early Case Law
For nearly one hundred years the Fourth Amendment remained an unexplored item. It
was not until 1886, when the case o f Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 became the first
United States Supreme Court case to examine search and seizure issues. Justice Goldberg
indicated in his opinion in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Commonwealth o f Peim., 380
US 693 (1965), that the Supreme Court acknowledged Boyd v. United States, as the
leading case on the subject o f search and seizure. The case involved action brought forth
by the federal government for the forfeiture o f goods believed to be illegally imported by
New York merchants George and Edward Boyd. The district judge in the case forced the
Boyds to produce documentation showing the quantity and value o f som e o f the goods.
Under protest, the Boyds complied with the judge’s orders, and the ju ry ruled for the
government and items seized by custom officials were forfeited. The case went to trial
and the jury ruled in favor o f the government. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
for the first time was asked to decide an issue that involved the violation o f the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court deemed the decision by the circuit court erroneous in
allowing the seizure o f the merchandise. The lower courts decision was reversed and a
new trial was ordered.
Justice Miller, who wrote an opinion in concurrence with the ruling, indicated that it
was the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution that grants protection fi’om unreasonable
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searches and seizures. Justice M iller voiced what he felt was the intentions o f those
individuals that created the Constitution:
While the framers o f the Constitution had their attention drawn, no doubt, to the
abuses o f this power o f searching private houses and seizing private papers, as
practice in England, it is obvious that they only intended to restrain the abuse, while
they did not abolish the power. Hence it is only unreasonable searches and seizures
that are forbidden, and the means o f securing this protection was by abolishing
searches under warrants, which were called general warrants, because they authorized
searches in any place, for any thing (p.614).

Public Schools and the Constitution
Prior to 1967, courts generally did not recognize the fact that students possessed
constitutional rights (Zane, 1987). The Supreme Court looked to end that notion in Tinker
V.

Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Supreme Court

concluded that students were persons under the Constitution in school and out o f school
and therefore deserved the Constitution’s protection. Prior to T.L.O., some courts held
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to school officials because these school
leaders act in a private capacity (Zane, 1987). It was believed that since school
administrators act in a private capacity no state action exists to trigger the Fourth
Amendment protection.
Due to the doctrine of in loco parentis, school officials had the responsibility to act as
a reasonable and prudent parent would when dealing with matters that involve students.
In court cases that questioned whether or not school administrators violated students'
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constitutional rights, la^^yers for school leaders often referred to the doctrine o f in loco
parentis. Lawyers would indicate that the constitution protects society ft-om government
agencies and school officials were not considered agents o f the state. In the I960's, it
became more prevalent for parents, on behalf o f their minor children, to challenge school
officials in court when they felt their child's rights were violated. In Tinker, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), the United States Supreme Court made a landmark ruling regarding the
constitutional rights of students.
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court made a landmark ruling regarding
constitutional rights o f students. The Supreme Court determined the constitution
applicable to school settings. The mling in Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969), made administrators aware o f the fact that students retain their
constitutional rights when at school. The case involved high school students who wore
armbands to school and were suspended for violating school policy. The students wore
the armbands in protest of actions surrounding the Viemam War. School officials
considered their action justified against the symbolic protest to prevent disturbance at
school. After an evidentiary hearing the district court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds the school worked within the guidelines o f the constitution to avoid disturbance
o f school discipline. The appellate court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court justices were asked to determine if school officials violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when they suspended the students for their
symbolic protest. The decision was a 5-4 ruling in favor o f the students. Justice Fortas,
who wrote the opinion o f the court, indicated that the school authorities appeared to have
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based their decision on the desire to avoid controversy. There were no disturbances at the
school that were caused by the wearing of these armbands. If a state agent wishes to
prohibit a particular expression o f opinion there must be substantial justification. In order
for school authorities to restrict students’ freedom o f expression, as they did when they
banned the wearing o f armbands, they needed to be able to forecast substantial disruption
o f or material interference with school activities. Despite the fact the armbands were
banned to prevent disruption to the school environment, the Justices did not believe
school leaders had any viable reason for the ban. This case was significant for school
leaders because they learned from the ruling and the opinion o f Justice Fortas that
students do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate. Justice Black
wTOte a strong dissent in which he indicated the ruling diminished the authority o f school
leaders.
The Tinker ruling had significant impact on how cases involving constitutional rights
o f students were decided. The United States Supreme Court as well as Federal and State
Courts were asked to determine if school administrators violated constitutional rights o f
students. Courts were asked to balance the doctrine o f in loco parentis with the
guaranteed rights of students. In order to have a foundation and understand o f the legal
facts involving search and seizure, it is important to see how federal and state courts ruled
when asked to render a decision regarding constitutional rights o f students.
In 1975, the issue o f the constitutional rights o f students was once again before the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court Justices were asked to decide if the
Fourteenth Amendment applied to school discipline. The Due Process Clause o f the
Fourteenth Amendment was reviewed in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). An Ohio
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statute empowered the principal o f an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for
misconduct for up to 10 days or to expel him; in either case the principal must notify the
student's parents within 24 hours and state the reasons for his action
After being suspended from school, students filed action claiming they were removed
from their educational setting without a hearing, which was a violation o f the due process
clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment. In an opinion by Justice White, it was held that the
Ohio statute, insofar as it permitted up to 10 days' suspension without notice or hearing,
either before or after the suspension, violated the due process clause.
The next time the United States Supreme Court reviewed a student constitutional
right case was in 1977. The Justices heard a case that involved the Eighth Amendment in
the school setting. The matter of Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), concerned
two students who brought suit against their school for violating their Eight Amendment
right. The students were paddled at school by administrators and contended that the
paddling was cruel and unusual punishment. The court mled that the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cmel and unusual punishment was inapplicable to school paddlings.
This case marked the third time that the Supreme Court had mled on cases involving the
constitutional rights o f students. This was the first mling that supported the position o f
school administration.

Federal Search Cases Prior to Supreme Court Review
In Picha v. W ielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (1976), a high school girl brought civil action
against a school principal after she was searched for dmgs. The principal received a
phone call that led him to believe three o f his students possessed dmgs. He contacted the
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police and the girls were searched. No drugs were found. Renee Picha, one o f the girls
searched, filed suit against the school officials and the police officers on the theory that in
the course of the incident her civil rights were violated. The fact that Illinois and many
other states had statutes that confer upon school officials the status o f in loco parentis
regarding their students was raised. Illinois held that this status created certain advantages
for school officials regarding the standard o f common law tort intent, which must be
applied in litigation brought against them by students. In this respect, Illinois equates the
nature o f tort liability o f teachers exactly with the common law tort liability that parents
may have toward their children. The court mled that the in loco parentis authority o f
school officials cannot transcend constitutional rights. Since the search was conducted at
the request of police officers, probable cause was needed. There was no probable cause
present, so school officials did conduct a search that violated Picha’s civil right.
One year later another federal case involving student search and seizure was heard in
Illinois. M.R.S. v. Board o f Education Ball-Chatham Community Unit School District
No. 5 .429 F. Supp. 288 (1977), involved a student that sued his school district because o f
a search he was subjected to. A high school administrator was approached by several
students and advised that plaintiff and two other subjects were exchanging dmgs during
study hall. The next day school officials escorted the plaintiff and the two other subjects
to a nearby kitchen area to be searched. The plaintiff was asked by one school official to
empty his pockets, which he eventually did. Dmgs and dmg paraphernalia were
discovered when plaintiff emptied his pockets. The student's parents were notified and he
was suspended for ten days and subsequently expelled from school. The plaintiff brought
action against school officials and the school board. He claimed that the search conducted
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by the school administrator violated his civil right and cited Picha v. Wielgos as
precedent. The court indicated that the student’s right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure must be balanced with the necessity for school officials to be able to maintain
order and discipline in their schools and to fulfill their duties under the in loco parentis
doctrine. This case differed from Picha v. Wielgos because police officers were not
involved in the search so a lesser standard o f suspicion applied. In addition the intrusion
was slight, requiring the plaintiff to merely empty his pockets. The judge ruled that the
search was reasonable.
Zamora v. Pomerov. 639 F 2d 662, (1981), involved the use o f drug-sniffing dogs to
search lockers for drugs. A student by the name of Vidal Zamora had his high school
locker searched without a warrant after a police dog detected the scent o f drugs.
Marijuana was found in the locker and the boy was suspended and sent to an alternative
school to complete the current school year. Despite the fact that no criminal action was
taken in this case, Zamora filed suit claiming that the search o f his locker violated his
Fourth Amendment right. The Tenth Circuit Appellate Court ruled the school had
maintained joint custody o f the locker and had the right and perhaps the duty to inspect
lockers. As seen in other search cases, the doctrine o f in loco parentis was reviewed by
the court. Justice Doyle, in writing the opinion, indicated that in loco parentis expands
the authority to school officials, even to the extent that it may conflict with the rules set
forth in the Fourth Amendment.
A drug and alcohol problem in Goose Creek Independent School District in the state
o f Texas prompted school officials to institute a policy that included having a security
service bring dogs to school campuses and randomly check students’ person, vehicles.
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and lockers. Many times students would be incorrectly identified by the dogs as being in
possession o f drugs or alcohol. An action was brought by a group o f students that sought
to have the school district discontinue the searches. Horton v. Goose Creek Independent
School District, 690 F 2d 470 (1982), was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals
when the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in getting the district court to force the school
district to ban the searches. The appellate court ruled that the searches o f the students
violated their constitutional protection but the searches o f lockers and vehicles did not.
The case o f Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F 2d 1462 (1982), takes place in the Ninth Circuit,
which is relevant to cases in Nevada since that is the circuit that Nevada is in. A bus
driver told the school principal that she believed Bilbrey was carrying drugs. The fifth
grade student was strip searched by the principal and a teacher who were looking for the
drugs. There were no drugs found on the student. The student, through his parents, sued
for being subjected to an illegal search. The district court ruled that the search was illegal,
but the jury found the administrator and teacher had immunity from monetary damages.
The trial court concluded that students are protected by the Fourth Amendment while at
school. In addition, school officials need at least reasonable cause to search yet they do
not need a warrant as long as the school is acting to preserve the integrity o f the
educational environment. While it was decided that reasonable cause to search did not
exist, it was believed that the search was conducted in good faith so monetary damages
were not awarded. The appellate court held that the decision to declare the search
violated the student's constitutional rights was correct. However, the appellate court
reversed the decision of the jury to not grant monetary damages. That part o f the decision
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was remanded back to the district court with instructions for a new trial. Court costs were
also awarded in favor o f the student.

State Courts' Application o f Fourth Amendment to School Searches
In the 1967 case of State o f New Yoric v. Overton. 301 N.Y.S. 2d 479, a high school
administrator, acting on the request o f local law enforcement, opened the locker o f a
student. The locker contained marijuana cigarettes. A motion was filed to suppress the
evidence, claiming it was obtained illegally. The trial court denied the motion. The
appellate court disagreed stating the search violated the students’ protection under the
Fourth Amendment. The New York Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision
indicating that reasonable suspicion did exist for a search to be conducted.
New York v. Overton, (1967) raised the issue o f constitutional rights o f students. The
court was asked to determine if the school administrator violated the student's
constitutional rights when he searched the locker. The ruling was in favor o f the school
administrator. The court reasoned that the Board o f Education, through Dr. Panitz (school
administrator), retained dominion over the use o f the lockers and therefore the search was
legal. The search o f the defendant's locker was good because the principal who had
general control of the school premises "consented" to the search. This case is significant
because it is an indication that student lockers are deemed property o f the Board o f
Education and students are not guaranteed a right o f privacy when using them.
A second case involving the constitutional rights o f students took place in California.
In the 1969 case of M ercer v. Donaldson. 269 C.A. 2d 509, the vice-principal o f a high
school, acting on a tip, conducted a warrantless search o f a student's locker. The school
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administrator found marijuana during the search. The student contended that the search
was illegal and the marijuana should not be considered evidence due to the unlawful
search and seizure.
The court was asked to decide if the school administrator acted unlawfully when he
conducted a search for drugs without a warrant. The court mled in favor o f the vice
principal. The court held that the vice-principal stands in loco parentis and has joint
control over the locker and also is a private person. This case was significant due to the
fact it reinforced the doctrine o f in loco parentis and mled that school officials are not
go\em m ent agents.
A case that was decided a short time after Tinker involved a search o f a student where
marijuana was uncovered. In Mercer v. State o f Texas, 450 SW 2d 715 (1970), a high
school principal acted on a tip that a student possessed marijuana. The principal was able
to convince the student to empty his pockets. The youth later claimed that the evidence
was obtained through an illegal search. The court m led that the administrator acted in
loco parentis and the search was not illegal.
The following year a search and seizure case was brought before the Superior Court
o f Delaware. In the case o f Delaware v. Baccino. 282 A 2d 869 (1971), a high school
vice principal took a jacket from a student and conducted a search for contraband. The
student was known to use and sell dmgs. The jacket contained a sizable amount o f illegal
dmgs so the police were notified. The student was arrested and claimed that his jacket
was illegally searched. The youth considered the school administrator a state agent and
concluded that probable cause was needed to conduct a search o f his jacket. The court
mled that the administrator was not a state agent. The vice principal acted in loco parentis
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so probable cause was not necessary. The court indicated that the school official did ha\ e
reasonable suspicion to search and the search was declared legal.
The case o f Beckley v. Christopher, 29 C.A. 3d 777 (1973), once again raised the
issue of in loco parentis. This was an appeals case that originated in juvenile court. A
school administrator received a tip that a school locker contained drugs. Upon opening
the locker a bag o f marijuana was found. The student was temporarily suspended and the
matter was turned over to local law enforcement. The student was able to return to school
after a day and a half and received a sentence ft-om juvenile court. The juvenile court case
was appealed on the basis that the search was illegal. The court indicated that the
constitution was not the only factor affecting the activities o f school persormel. While the
Constitution imposes a limit on their power, the doctrine o f in loco parentis expands their
authority. In his opinion. Justice Caldecott indicated that high school personnel are not
government officials for purposes o f the constitutional rules regulating police conduct.
The court indicated that the appropriate test for searches by high school officials was
two-pronged. The first requirement was that the search be within the scope o f the school
official's duties. The second requirement was that the action taken be reasonable under
the facts and circumstances of the case. Although in loco parentis applied, the Fourth
Amendment limits the power to acts that meet the above requirements. The court
indicated that the search was legal.
In a 1974 case New York v. Scott, 358 N.Y.S. 2d 403, a high school student was
searched by a teacher and found to possess illegal substances. The student had been under
suspicion for about six months for possibly dealing drugs. One morning a teacher noticed
the student acting suspiciously. The student was searched and later arrested for drug
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possession. It was believed the evidence against him should be suppressed on the grounds
that the search was illegal. The motion to suppress was denied by the lower court yet
reversed by the appellate court. The lower court advised that public school authorities
have special responsibilities, and therefore correspondingly broad powers, to control the
school precincts in order to protect the students in their charge. In reversing the lower
court’s denial to suppress evidence the appellate court indicated that in exercising their
authority and performing their duties, public school teachers act not as private individuals
but are agents o f the state. In order for arbitrary power to be avoided school officials must
have minimal basis for conducting a search. The court emphasized the undue risk o f
psychological harm was great if a school administrator searched a child unjustly.
In 1975, three state courts reviewed cases involving the constitutional rights o f
students. In the matter of Doe v. New Mexico, 88 NM 347 (1975), a student in possession
o f marijuana thought evidence against him should be suppressed because the search by
the principal without a warrant was illegal. The court ruled that school officials were
considered state agents. Thus, the standard that was adopted was that school officials may
conduct a search o f a student's person if they have reasonable suspicion that a crime is
being or has been committed or they have reasonable cause to believe that the search is
necessary in the aid o f maintaining school discipline.
In the 1975 Michigan court case o f People v. Ward, 62 Mich 46, a student suspected
o f selling drugs at school was summoned to the principal's office. In the presence o f the
principal and other school officials, including a security officer, the student was asked to
empty his pockets, which he did. During the search a bottle o f pills was revealed so the
police was notified. The student requested that the pills be suppressed as evidence due to
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an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion to suppress the
evidence and the appellate court affirmed that decision. The court held that students do
have substantive and procedural rights while at school. The court further indicated that
the law o f search and seizure, as applied to law enforcement agencies, does not apply to
Michigan's school system. It was noted that school officials stand in a unique position
with respect to their students. They possess many o f the powers and responsibilities o f
parents, which enable them to control conduct in their schools. At times, the powers and
responsibilities regarding discipline and the maintenance o f an educational atmosphere
may conflict with fundamental constitutional safeguards. A student cannot be subjected
to an unreasonable search and seizure. In striking a balance, the court adopted a
"reasonable suspicion" standard.
State

V.

Young, 234 GA 488 (1975), was a case about a high school student who was

searched by a school administrator and found to possess marijuana. The assistant
principal’s reasoning for conducting the search was because he saw a student with Young
try to hide something. He searched all the students and only Young possessed drugs.
Young asked that the evidence against him be suppressed because the search was illegal.
The suppression o f evidence motion was denied and the student confessed to the drug
possession charge. The case proceeded to the appellate court were the denial o f the
motion to suppress evidence was reversed. The opinion o f the court was that the school
official acted in a law enforcement capacity. In doing so, he would have needed probable
cause to justify the search. The court ruled that a search o f three students simply because
one student acts in a suspicious manner is unreasonable.
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The case o f State v. Young (1975) showed how the protection once offered to school
administrators by way o f in loco parentis had eroded over time. More and more states
viewed school officials as state agents. In this particular case, unlike most other cases
reviewed, school leaders were held to the same probable cause standard for searches as
law enforcement officers. The doctrine o f in loco parentis was no longer considered a
defense for violating a student’s constitutional right
In the case State o f Florida v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (1983), drug paraphernalia
and marijuana was uncovered in a student’s vehicle while an aide to the dean was
patrolling the parking lot. The aide noticed a partially covered object, which he believed
to be a bong, in D.T.W.'s car. The aide realized that a bong is typically associated with
drug use and the car was parked on school property so the dean was notified. The dean
summoned the student and asked him if he could search his car. The student eventually
turned his keys over to the dean and a search uncovered a bong and some marijuana
cigarettes. D.T.W. filed a motion in district court to suppress the evidence based on an
unreasonable search and seizure. The lower court indicated that a reasonable suspicion
needed to be present to search and a broad search o f a parking lot does not meet that
standard, therefore, the motion was granted. The State o f Florida appealed the decision
o f the motion to the ^ p e a ls court o f Florida. The appellate court agreed with the lower
court on the reasonable suspicion standard that was needed for a school official to
conduct a search, but found the search o f the parking lot and the student's car was
reasonable. The order granted to suppress the evidence was reversed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion o f the a p ellate court.
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W hen deciding whether a search o f a student was constitutional, federal and state
courts routinely applied the standard o f reasonable suspicion. This standard is less than
the probable cause standard needed by law enforcement. We have seen that when law
enforcement officials are present with school leaders during a search, the probable cause
standard is applicable. School officials have been deemed state agents and students are
protected by the Constitution while at school. The in loco parentis doctrine was not
considered a viable defense when violating a student's Fourth Amendment right. The
Florida appellate court indicated in State o f Florida v. D.T.W., (1983), that it was the
doctrine o f in loco parentis that allowed school personnel to conduct searches using the
lesser standard. Despite the many state and federal cases involving search and seizure of
students, the United States Supreme Court did not review the issue until 1985 when they
heard N ew Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325.

Supreme Court Addresses Fourth Amendment
Application to Public School Setting
W ith respect to searches directed at students at educational institutions. New Jersey v.
T.L.O. ( 1985) was the landmark United States Supreme Court case that set the precedent
and standard for school searches o f students. Prior to 1985, school officials operated
under the doctrine o f in loco parentis and did not consider their status to be a government
agency. This allowed them to handle matters as a reasonable parent would handle them
without regards for the child’s constitutional rights. Then in 1969 things began to change,
when the United States Supreme Court advised school officials that students “do not shed
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate” Tinker v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503.
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New Jersey v. T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
FACTS
A New Jersey high school teacher discovered a 14-year old freshman and her
companion smoking cigarettes in the school lavatory. Smoking in the lavatory was a
violation o f a school rule so the two girls were brought to the Principal’s office. The girls
met with Mr. Choplick, an assistant principal at the high school. When questioned by Mr.
Choplick one girl admitted violating the school rule by smoking in the lavatory, but the
other girl (T.L.O.) denied the allegations against her and said she did not smoke at all.
The administrator then demanded to see T.L.O.'s purse. Once the purse was opened he
found evidence that she had been untruthful to him. Mr. Choplick found a pack o f
cigarettes and noticed a package o f cigarette rolling papers that are commonly associated
with marijuana use. He then proceeded to do a thorough search o f the purse. Mr.
Choplick uncovered marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of money,
and two letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing. After notifying T.L.O's mother,
Mr. Choplick contacted the police and turned over the evidence to them. Thereafter, the
State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. A New Jersey juvenile court admitted
the evidence discovered in delinquency proceedings against the student. The respondent
filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming the search by Mr. Choplick violated her
right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Juvenile Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school
officials but that the search in questions was a reasonable one. The court determined that
school leaders may properly conduct a search o f a student's person if the official has a
reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has been or is being committed, or
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reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or
enforce school policy. In finding that the search was reasonable the motion to suppress
the evidence was denied and subsequently T.L.O. was adjudged to be delinquent.
The ruling o f the juvenile court was ^pealed. A divided appellate division affirmed
the trial court's findings that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but vacated
the adjudication o f delinquency and remanded for a determination o f whether T.L.O. had
knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.
The ap ellate court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment ^ p lie d to searches
conducted by school officials and the New Jersey Supreme Court agreed. The State
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that a warrantless search conducted by a school
official is permissible as long as the official has reasonable grounds to believe that a
student possessed evidence o f illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school
discipline and order. The State Supreme Court, with two justices dissenting, sharply
disagreed with the juvenile court's conclusion that the search of T.L.O's purse was
reasonable.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the order o f the trial court and ordered the
suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse, holding that the search o f the purse
by the school administrator was unreasonable.
HOLDING
On January 15,1985 the United States Supreme Court decided the case o f New
Jersey v. T.L.O. The decision concluded that the reasonableness standard described in the
case was a proper standard for determining legality o f searches conducted by public
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school officials. The case set a Supreme Court precedent for school officials to follow
regarding searches by public school leaders.
REASONING
Justice White, who wrote the opinion for the court, indicated that the Justices were
first faced with the question o f whether the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures ^ p lie d to searches conducted by public school
officials. They held that it does. During argument, the State o f New Jersey argued that the
Fourth Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by
law enforcement personnel. Although public school officials are concededly agents o f the
state, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
The High Court had never limited the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to operations conducted solely by law enforcement.
There reasoning was that for long time the Supreme Court has indicated the Fourth
Amendment's strictures as restraints imposed upon “governmental action”-that is, “upon
the activities o f sovereign authority” Burdeau v McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475 (1921).
The Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to activities o f
civil as well as criminal authorities. Building inspectors. Occupational Safety and Health
Act Inspectors, and even firemen entering privately owned buildings to battle a fire, are
all subject to the restrictions imposed by the Fourth Amendment.
The Supreme Court stated public school officials no longer merely exercise authority
voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents. They must act in compliance o f
publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies. As they c a n y out searches in
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conjunction with their duty as an official representative o f the State they cannot claim
immunity from Fourth Amendment strictures.
The issue o f whether or not the Fourth Amendment ^ p lie d to searches conducted by
school authorities was only one part of the problem the Supreme Court faced. While the
underlying premise o f the Fourth Amendment had always been that searches and seizures
be reasonable, what was reasonable depended on the context within which a search takes
place. The determination o f the standard o f reasonableness goveming any specific class
o f searches requires "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails Camara v. Municipal, at 536-537, 87 S Ct 1727. On one side o f the balance are the
individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security. The other side of
the scale contains the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches o f
public order.
Courts have recognized that even a limited search o f the person is a substantial
invasion of privacy Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 24-25, (1968). The State o f New Jersey
argued in T.L.O. that because o f the pervasive supervision to which children in the
schools are necessarily subjected to, a child has virtually no expectation o f privacy in
articles o f personal property unnecessarily carried onto school campus.
Justice White indicated that the Supreme Court has taken notice o f the difficulty o f
maintaining discipline in the public schools. However, the situation is not so dire that
students in the schools may claim no legitimate expectations o f privacy. The Court
recently recognized that the need to maintain order in a prison entitles prisoners to no
legitimate expectation to privacy in their cells. The prisoner and the school students are
certainly not to be considered equal for the purposes o f the Fourth Amendment. In
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addition, the State does not suggest that children have no legitimate need to bring
personal property onto the school grounds. Students at a minimum must bring to school
not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money, letters, photographs,
and the necessaries o f personal hygiene and grooming. Some students may have the
legitimate need to carry with them articles o f property that would be used in connection
with extracurricular or recreational activities. Schoolchildren may find it necessary to
carry with them a variety o f legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to
conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by
bringing them onto school grounds.
Measured against the child’s right to privacy must be the substantial interest o f
teachers and administrators to maintain discipline and order in the classroom and on
school grounds. Controlling classroom behavior has never been easy, but lately, school
disorder has often taken tragic forms. Drug use and violent crime in the schools have
become major social problems. The question then becomes how do school officials strike
a balance between the student’s legitimate expectations o f privacy and the school’s
equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place?
The Supreme Court Justices have held that the school setting requires some easing o f the
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The
requirement to have a warrant before conducting a search is one area where school
officials have had less restriction. The Supreme Court has recognized that school
officials can not be expected to obtain a warrant each time a student is suspected o f
violating a school rule.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

In the T.L.O case the Court officially modified the level of suspicion needed to
justify a search. Usually, a legal search must be based upon “probable cause” that a
violation o f the law has occurred. Through action o f the ruling in T.L.O. “reasonable
suspicion” o f a violation o f a law or school rule is considered valid cause to conduct a
search. The Supreme Court joined the majority o f courts with respect to reasonable
suspicion being a sufficient standard to use when deciding if a search by a school official
was legal. Courts that have examined this issue concluded that probable cause is not
necessary for school officials considering a search o f a student. Rather, the legality o f a
search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, o f the search. As learned fi-om facts in the T.L.O. case, the determination
o f the reasonableness o f any search involves a twofold inquiry. First, a person must
consider whether the search was justified at its inception. Then, it must be determined
whether or not the search was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the
intrusion in the first place. Usually, searches will be justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student
has violated or is violating either the law or the rules o f the school.
The Justices believed that the standard o f using reasonable suspicion instead o f
probable cause would neither unduly burden the efforts o f school authorities to maintain
order in their school nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy o f
schoolchildren. The lesser standard will save teachers and school administrators finm
becoming familiar with the issues surrounding probable cause. This will allow them to
regulate their behavior according to the dictates o f reason and common sense. At the
same time, the reasonableness standard should ensure that the interests o f students will be
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invaded no more than is necessary to achieve legitimate end o f preserving order in the
schools.
Justice WTiite, in his opinion o f the Court, wrote that it was the conclusion o f the
Supreme Court that Mr. Choplick’s decision to open T.L.O ’s purse was reasonable. That
then raised the question o f whether or not the further search for marijuana was
reasonable. The Court ruled that the suspicion upon which the search for marijuana was
found was provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package o f rolling papers in the purse
as he removed the pack o f cigarettes. T.L.O. did not dispute the reasonableness o f Mr.
Choplick’s belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence o f marijuana. She did
contend that the scope o f the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible
bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing.
According to the ruling in the case that argument was unpersuasive. Once the rolling
papers were discovered, Mr. Choplick had reasonable suspicion to believe that T.L.O.
was carrying marijuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. It was that suspicion that
justified further exploration o f T.L.O.’s purse. The extended search turned up more
evidence o f drug-related activities: a pipe, a number o f plastic bags o f the type used to
store marijuana, a small quantity o f marijuana, and a fairly substantial amount o f money.
Under those circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a separate
zippered compartment o f the purse; and when a search o f that compartment revealed an
index card containing a list o f people who owed T.L.O. money along with two letters, the
inference that T.L.O. was involved in marijuana trafficking was substantial enough to
justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they contained any
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further evidence. The Supreme Court held that the search for marijuana was
reasonable in every respect, and stated:
A school official may properly conduct a search of a student’s person if the official
has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process o f being
committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain
school discipline or enforce school policies.
Due to the fact that the search resulting in the discovery o f the evidence o f marijuana
dealing by T.L.O. was reasonable. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude
the evidence from T.L.O ’s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment
grounds was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court o f New Jersey
was reversed.
Justice Powell, who was joined by O'Connor concurred in the opinion and held that
greater emphasis needed to be placed on the unique characteristics o f elementary and
secondary schools that make it necessary to offer schoolchildren the same constitutional
protections granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting. He stated:
The primary duty o f school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the
education and training o f young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring
that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students (T.L.O., 1985).
Justice Powell indicated that students have a lesser expectation o f privacy due to the
large number o f hours they spend in close association with each other while at school. He
did not think that schoolchildren should be offered the same expectation o f privacy as the
general population. W hile confirming that students have constitutional rights at school.
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Justice Powell affirmed the authority o f school officials to take the necessary measures
needed to control the educational environment at school.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment and expressed that the special need for
an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety o f school children and
teachers or the educational environment itself justifies the court in exempting school
searches from the warrant and probable cause requirements, and in ^ p ly in g a standard
determined by balancing the relevant interests. He was critical o f the decision with
regards to the analysis used to determine if a search required probable cause or not. While
the Supreme Court has recognized limited exceptions to the probable cause requirement,
he did not feel the balancing test should have been used to help decide the T.L.O. case.
Justice Blackmun indicated, “The Court’s implication that the balancing test is the rule
rather than the exception is troubling for me because it is unnecessary in this (T.L.O.)
case”. He acknowledged how difficult it was for teachers and administrators to maintain
order and keep everyone safe on a daily basis. Because elementary and secondary schools
are unique settings. Justice Blackmun thought they should be except from warrant and
probable cause requirements.
DISSENT
Justice Brennan was joined by Marshall and concurred in part and dissented in part.
He expressed the view that teachers were like all government officials and must conform
their conduct to the Fourth Amendment's protections of personal privacy and personal
security. Fourth Amendment's language dictates that school searches, similar to the one
conducted in the case o f T.L.O., are only acceptable if supported by probable cause. He
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reasoned that by ^ p ly in g the constitutional probable cause standard to the facts o f this
case, the search o f T.L.O.’s purse violated the student's Fourth Amendment rights.
Justice Brennan was extremely critical o f the T.L.O. ruling. He advised the following:
Today’s decision sanctions school officials to conduct full-scale searches on a
“reasonableness” standard whose only definite content is that it is not the sam e test
as the “probable cause” standard found in the text o f the Fourth Amendment. In
adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure from generally
applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court carves out a broad exception to
standards that this Court has developed over years o f considering Fourth
Amendment problems.
Justice Brennan frequently referred to the balancing test used as arbitrary and
mentioned that the Framers o f the Constitution were exact in their identifying “probable
cause” as a prerequisite to a legal search. He did agree that school officials may conduct
searches without first obtaining a warrant as long as they are not acting as agents o f law
enforcement. Justice Brennen wrote, “Full-scale searches unaccompanied by probable
cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”
In a dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens, joined by Marshall, and joined also by
Brennan as to part one, concurred in part and dissented in part. He expressed the view
that (1) the court has misapplied the standard o f reasonableness embodied in the Fourth
Amendment; (2) that a standard better attuned to the concern for violence and unlawful
behavior in the schools would permit teachers and school administrators to search a
student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the
student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive o f school
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order, or the educational process; and (3) that the search in this case failed to meet this
standard. Justice Stevens indicated that the school administrator over reacted to a minor
infraction o f a school rule. He wrote, “ The search o f a young woman’s purse by a school
administrator is a serious invasion o f her legitimate expectations o f privacy”.

Scholarly Commentary on the T.L.O Decision
A review of what was being written regarding the Court’s decision in the T.L.O. case
was conducted. Many articles were redundant so only those that contained pertinent
pieces o f information were included in this review.
An article published in 1987 in the Cornell Law Review revealed one perspective o f
the ruling. While much o f what was written repeated the actual case itself, some o f the
information was worthy o f including in this study.
Dale Zane (1987) indicated how the United States Supreme Court had significantly
altered the “traditional view” (p. 368) o f the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. New
Jersey v. T.L.O. represents yet an even further departure from conventional analysis in
the context o f student searches by a school official. The article examined the Fourth
Amendment precedent the Court faced when deciding T.L.O. The author argued that the
Court misapplied precedent and reached an improper conclusion that created a new and
unnecessary ^proach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Zane wrote that the Supreme Court’s opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O. laid to rest the
theories formerly used by lower courts to justify intrusive searches o f students in the
school setting. He indicated that the Court failed to accord students conventional Fourth
Amendment protection. The Court carved out another exception to conventional Fourth
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Amendment jurisprudence based on the supposed special characteristics o f the school
environment. In so doing, the Court implied that probable cause is not required tor any
search that can later be deemed reasonable under the circumstances.
Zane indicated that the Court should employ a balancing test only when it finds that it
is impracticable to require a warrant or probable cause, to achieve a law enforcement
objective beyond gathering evidence o f criminal conduct and that the intrusion upon the
individual is limited in scope. The facts o f T.L.O. satisfied neither of these requirements.
The author concluded by saying, “Even if a balancing test was appropriate in T.L.O.,
the Court misapplied it. It is ill advised to treat students differently from the rest o f
society under the Fourth Amendment simply because they are students” (Zane, 1987, p.
396). Rights are for everyone and need to be cherished and protected. In closing Zane
wrote, “As Justice Jackson stated, ‘Fourth Amendment Rights are not mere second-class
rights but belong in the category o f indispensable freedoms. Among deprivation o f rights,
none is so effective in .. .crushing the spirit o f the individual and putting terror in every
heart’ Brinegar v. United States. 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) Jackson, J.,dissenting) (Zane,
pg.,396, 1987).”
A John Hogan (1985) article published in a spring edition of the Whittier Law
Review did a thorough job explaining T.L.O. v. New Jersey. The article analyzed the
case and examined different aspects involved. The doctrine o f in loco parentis was
examined, as well as, search and seizure standards and search warrant requirements.
Opinions o f the Justices were also included in the article.
The most compelling information contained in the article was the findings from a
survey. School districts from all over the country responded to various questions
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regarding the impact T.L.O. will have on schools. The responses were consistent and a
genuine interest existed among educators in obtaining information on the T.L.O. matter.
The responses indicated that there was just as much concern regarding T.L.O. in small
districts as there was in large metropolitan school districts. The responses were received
from various districts throughout the nation that ranged in size and location.
Information revealed in this article indicated that state departments o f education did
not issue any specific directive to local school boards regarding search and seizure. Local
boards have and will continue to have jurisdiction over policy regarding search and
seizure in public schools. In addition, all school boards that were surveyed indicated that
formal policy or guidelines for search and seizure did exist. “Reasonable suspicion” was
the standard identified in policies and/or guidelines across the nation as the minimal
requirement for conducting a search.
Hogan’s article stated, “none of the state departments o f education nor the school
districts suiv'eyed maintained statistical records o f the number o f students searched in
their schools” (p.542). Hogan stated that there was now good reason to keep such records
in the future. All respondents said that when school police officers were involved the
criminal code for search and seizure were applicable and took priority over school policy.
All districts reported having written policy, which permitted school personnel to open
and search student’s lockers.
In his analysis Hogan said that the doctrine in loco parentis is no longer appropriate in
modem society. School administrators represent the state, not the parent when they
conduct searches. Hogan’s final comment indicated that state courts could still require a
more demanding standard for school searches. In order to do this the decisions must be
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based on state constitutions and statutes, not the United States Constitution. That one
remark was the statement that is most relevant to this study.
Joe Grace (1986) was highly critical o f the Court’s decision. His article described the
major components o f the case and included opinions o f the Justices. The author said that
the new relaxed standard by the court assumes too much when it implies that all teachers
are conscientious and responsible persons. He advises that the potential abuse o f student
privacy for trivial rule violations demand the Court re-examine the issue o f student
searches. Hogan suggested that the Justices should either adopt the standard suggested by
Stevens, which requires conduct seriously disruptive o f school order, or use a traditional
application o f probable cause. Grace predicted, “Because of the Court’s failure to
distinguish between minor and serious violations, there will undoubtedly be increased
litigation involving the issue of a school official’s right to search a student for violation
o f school rule, even though the violation was not seriously disruptive o f school order or
educational process” (p. 487). This statement will have relevance to this study as the
cases are reviewed to see if this prediction was accurate.
Noticeably absent were any scholarly articles published in law reviews between 1985
and 1987 that reacted favorably to the ruling.
Two articles that were reviewed took a neutral position regarding the T.L.O. decision.
Swiger, Bittle, and Gregory, (1985) and Jarriel (1985) just passed on the facts o f the case.
There was not any wording in the articles that could be construed as negative or
unfavorable towards the ruling.
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Critical Review o f T.L.O
Charles Puricey (1987) claimed that the lack o f a clearly defined reasonable cause
standard combined with problems in its application created potential for discretionary
abuse by educators. The article went on to say that if children were subject to intrusive
and arguably unreasonable searches, more cases would end up in court. It was written
that educators sought fewer restrictions so they could have more control. The prediction
from this author was that students and parents would soon seek greater Fourth
Amendment protections against invasions o f students’ rights o f privacy.
Irene Merker published an article in the fall 1985 edition of the Familv Law Quarterly
that was critical o f the Justices’ decision in T.L.O. She was concerned that more
questions were left unanswered then answered. The Court did not indicate what standard
would be ^ p lic a b le when police officers were involved in the search. In addition,
Merker said the decision lacked an answer to the question of what expectation o f privacy
students had with respect to desks, lockers, and other personal property. The author
predicted that further rulings limiting the rights o f juveniles in the area o f the Fourth
Amendment would have an impact beyond the immediate holdings. Merker claimed that
the T.L.O. decision would dilute Fourth Amendment protection o f children. The author
made a statement that not only bears relevance to this study, but is also an unusual
forecast. “Permitting the state to invade privacy rights o f juveniles without adequate
cause is to invite youthful hostility to authority that may result in an increase in crime and
disobedience. At the same time we may well be conditioning our youth to accept
questionable governmental intrusions in their lives, a conditioning that may persist in
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adulthood and form the basis for the next generation’s legitimate expectation o f privacy”
(p.325).
An article by Gerald Reamey that was published in a fall 1985 edition o f St. M ary’s
Law Journal criticized several different components o f the decision. The author claimed
that the decision confused the legal parameters for searches o f students. It applauded the
Court for recognizing school officials as agents o f the state and dismissing in loco
parentis as a governing standard. The article indicated that the T.L.O. ruling held that
students had a lower expectation o f privacy simply because o f their status. Reamey was
critical o f the fact that the warrant requirement was abolished and that the level o f
suspicion for conducting a search was lowered. It was the author’s prediction that the
ruling would “inevitably increase the incidence o f mistake particularly in the absence o f
review by a magistrate. If suspected violation of trivial rules not subverting the
educational needs o f students may be the basis o f a full-blown search, the balance struck
by the Court accords privacy rights no weight in such cases” (p. 948). While the above
quote certainly shows why this review would be relevant to this study, the authors closing
message carries even more weight. “It is the result suggested by this skewed balance that
is the most alarming facet o f the decision in T.L.O. Balancing competing interests to
achieve reasonableness is often appropriate, but, like all fluid concepts, it requires great
care to avoid abuse, and whatever its virtue, it is likely to foster inconsistency o f
application and result”(p.949).
Articles by Janette Bertness published in Suffolk University Law Review in the
Winter 1985 edition and by Deborah Reperowitz published in the Seton Hall Law
Review in the Summer 1985 edition indicated that the ruling by the Supreme Court
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Justices created more problems than it solved. \\Tiile all the specific areas o f criticism
were mentioned in other reviews listed above, it was important to note that these two
authors also were highly critical o f the T.L.O. decision.

Summary
Search and seizure law in the United States dates back to the founding o f our country.
Search and seizure law regarding students in public schools is new. School administrators
have been governed by the doctrine o f in loco parentis, which means that they take the
place o f a reasonable and prudent parent when making decisions for children at their
school. A 1969, Supreme Court ruling. Tinker, advised school leaders that students retain
their constitutional rights while they attend school. Courts have had to find a reasonable
balance to allow school officials to make quality decisions regarding searching students
while at the same time safeguarding their constitutional rights. The United States
Supreme Court made a ruling in 1985, T.L.O., which has had tremendous effect on
school policy regarding search and seizure o f students. Law journal articles published
shortly after the ruling criticized the decision for allowing school administrators to much
power. While school leaders were regarded as state agents they were able to conduct a
search o f student using a standard less than probable cause. The reasonable cause
standard that was emphasized in the T.L.O. ruling was seen as arbitrary in many o f the
published articles.
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CHAPTERS

METHODOLOGY
A specific methodology was established to identify how the study was to gather,
analyze, and disseminate data. It was important to create a plan so that the information
being sought was collected in a structured manner. The data that was needed to complete
this document came from a variety o f sources.
This study involved legal research. Berring and Edinger (1999) indicated, “legal
research is a complex enterprise” (p.5). Legal research consists of three essential
components: (a) finding the law, (b) reading the law, and (c) updating the law (Cohen &
Olson, 1996). Legal research is the process o f finding the laws that govern most activities
in our lives and the materials that define or analyze these laws. Through legal research a
person can find the sources needed to predict how courts would act (Cohen & Olson,
1996). Nonlawyers perform legal research for a variety o f reasons, from settling a
boundaiy dispute to challenging a traffic ticket. The literature of the law is a central part
o f our history in this country so therefore legal research is also an important facet to
academic pursuits in law school and in universities in general.
In order to analyze T.L.O. v. New Jersev, 469 U.S. 325 (1985), a strong
understanding o f legal research was required. Identifying which law applied demanded
knowledge, resources and expertise in legal research. A lawyer or researcher should be
able to analyze any factual situation and apply legal doctrines developed in analogous or
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similar situations. These doctrines may conflict with one another from time to time,
making it necessaiy to measure their importance and relevance to a particular problem
(Cohen & Olson, 1996).
Legal research involves the use o f a variety o f printed and electronic sources. Berring
and Edinger ( 1999) have advised that the once uncomplicated process is now filled with
choices and alternatives. Court decisions, administrative documents, statutes, scholarly
commentaries, and practical manuals are among the types o f printed sources that exist.
Legal research is the process involved o f reviewing all the pertinent information and
conducting an intense analysis o f that data.
The relative authority associated with legal sources differs. Some authorities are
binding, others only persuasive, and some are used as tools for identifying other material.
These variations require that researchers evaluate the sources they study. According to
Cohen and Olson, (1996) there are three broad categories o f legal literature: (a) primary
source, (b) finding tools, and (c) secondary materials.
Primary sources are recorded rules that are enforced by the state. Cohen and Olson
(1996) indicate the following sources as primary:
1.

Constitutions

2.

Appellate Court decision

3.

Statutes passed by legislatures

4.

Executive decrees

5.

Regulations and rulings o f administrative agencies

6.

Law made by governmental agencies in a variety o f jurisdictions
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“One major category o f primary sources is judicial decisions. The United States is a
‘common law’ country. Its law is expressed in an evolving body of doctrine determined
by judges on the basis o f cases, which they must decide, rather than on a group o f
abstract principles. As established rules are tested and adapted to meet new situations, the
common law grows and changes over time” (Cohen & Olson, 1996, p.3). The judicial
system in our country consists o f hierarchies o f courts, which includes, in most
jurisdictions, a number o f trial courts. In addition, one or more intermediate appellate
courts are included, as well as a court of final reviews, usually the Supreme Court for the
specific jurisdiction. This format has incorporated within it the process o f appellate
review, in which higher courts review the decisions o f lower courts. In addition, a judicial
review is provided so that courts can determine the validity o f legislative and executive
actions.
Statutes, which are the products of legislative actions, are another major primary
source. Statutes have come to govern a great number o f different human activities.
Government agencies create regulations and make decisions, which becomes
administrative law. Administrative law is another important primary source. Federal and
state agencies develop regulations governing activities within their specific area o f
expertise. Federal and state agencies perform acts in a “quasi-judicial” capacity by
conducting hearings and issuing decisions to settle particular disputes.
Primary sources share a number of ingredients that have a pervasive importance to
legal research. They are issued in date order in either official or unofficial publications.
Therefore, the researcher requires some means o f subject access to find the law that
applies to a specific factual situation. The law is changing constantly as o f new
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regulations, statutes, and decisions are issued each and every year. Cohen & Olson (1996)
indicated a frequent updating o f legal resources is needed on a yearly basis due to all
these changes occurring.
In addition, the development o f the law involves a quest for certainty and stability, as
reflected in the doctrine stare decisis (Cohen & Olson, 1996). This gives primary sources
a long-lasting relevance even beyond their initial publication. They remain in effect until
they are expressly overruled or repealed.
The primary sources relevant to any problem may range from the earliest enactments
o f law-making bodies to the most recent decisions, statutes and rulings. A current
decision can rely on a precedent that was decided many years ago. An executive order
may be based on a statute from a different century. As mentioned, primary sources retain
their force and effect until expressly overruled or repealed, even the materials from the
earliest years must remain accessible. Since the law is constantly changing, access to the
most recent legal sources is also a prerequisite to effective legal research.
Finding Tools
Due to an overwhelming amount o f decisions and statutes being accumulated since
the begiiming o f legal history, a researcher needs to find tools to access this information
(Cohen & Olson, 1996). “Two o f the systems, WESTLAW and LEXIS now play a major
role in the research process” (Berring & Edinger, 1999, p.8). LEXIS is a computerized
database finding tool that provides the capability to search for cases and other documents
by using a word or combination o f words. Berring and Edinger (1999) advise, “The new
world o f legal research is rooted in electronic information” (p.8). Finding tools serve only
one purpose, the means o f locating primary sources. Those sources must then be read to
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determine their applicability to a specific situation. When conducting legal research the
researcher must use a highly developed sense o f relevance (Cohen & Olson, 1996). The
variety o f electronic databases has grown and the information, which they store, and the
search method for using them have improved enormously (Berring & Edinger, 1999).
Secondary Materials
Secondary materials are works that discuss or analyze legal doctrine. Treatises,
practice manuals, and law reviews were three sources o f secondary materials used for this
study. Secondary sources help analyze problems and their foomotes guide the researcher
to both primary sources and other secondary materials.
Secondary materials that are considered relevant can be found through law library
catalogs, legal periodical indexes, and other bibliogr^hic aids. Also, court decisions and
forms of secondary sources often provide citations to persuasive treatises and law review
articles. There are some treatises, periodicals and appellate records and briefs that can be
accessed via online databases or in CD-ROM format (Cohen & Olson, 1996).
This whole process is done in order to find relevant information and organize it in a
fashion suitable to the document being prepared. A citation identifies a legal authority or
reference work, such as a constitution, statute, court decision, administrative rule, or
treatise. In order to find the legal authority or precedent needed, it is important to know
how to read and understand citations. Citations play an essential role in legal research. A
standard case citation contains:
•

the name o f the case;

•

the published sources in which the case can be found;
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•

information in parentheses that indicates the year the decision was issued, and
the name o f the cited reporter volume and the court which issued the decision;

•

the prior or subsequent history, if any, o f the case.

Legal Research for Study
The volume o f published American case law contains many decisions that have long
since been overruled or limited to specific details. Before T.L.O. could be relied on as a
foundation for this study, its current validity had to be verified. According to Cohen and
Olson (p.70, 1996), “Shepard’s Citations is the most commonly used service for this
purpose.” Shepard’s Citations not only verifies the current status o f a case but it also lists
every subsequent case that cites the decision in issue. It is Shepard’s that allows a
researcher to track the development o f a legal doctrine from the original decision
forward. Shepardizing is a process that involves collecting law cases. It includes tracing
the subsequent treatment o f cases, statutes, and other legal authorities by referencing
works called Shepard’s Citations (often referred to as “citators”). Shepard’s Citations
make it possible for legal researchers to find out about a prior authority’s current status
(Cohen & Olson, p. 78, 1996).
The online databases WESTLAW and LEXIS provide computerized access to the text
decisions of Supreme Court cases. These two databases are sources o f information that
provide concise texts and opinions well before other publications can print and distribute
them (Berring & Edinger, 1999).
A researcher doing legal research must be able to track a case as it moves through
time. Such a source must be timely and reliable (Berring & Edinger, 1999). “Since 1873
that source has been Shepard’s Citations “ (Berring & Edinger, 1999, p. 63).
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Shepardizing accomplishes three major purposes. First, it traces a case’s judicial history.
It does this by providing parallel citations for the decision and references to other
proceedings. In addition, it verifies the current status o f a case to determine whether it is
still good law or has been overruled, limited in scope, or otherwise diminished. Finally, it
provides research leads to later cases, as well as periodical articles, attorney general
opinions, ALR annotations, and other resources (Cohen & Olson, p. 78, 1996).
Shepard’s publishes citators for the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, every
state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and each region o f the National Reporter
System. U.S. Supreme Court cases are covered in Shepard’s United States Citation,
which is published in three separate sets for the U.S. Reports, Lawyers’ Edition, and the
Supreme Court Reporter. Lower federal court decisions are covered in a large set o f
Shepard's Federal Citations. There are separate parts for decisions in the Federal
Reporter and Federal Cases and for decisions in Federal Supplement and specialized
reporters. “Updating cases through Shepard’s Citations is an essential part o f the legal
research process” (Cohen & Olson, p. 78,1996).
Cohen and Olson ( 1996) indicated that the hardest part o f any legal research process
is finding the first piece o f relevant information. One document often leads to other
crucial documents. Cases cite earlier cases as authority; a statute’s notes provide useful
leads to decisions, other statutes, legislative history, and secondary sources. A periodical
article may end up being cite to a number o f sources.
Wren and Wren (1983) wrote that a researcher must step back and study the problem
carefully before looking anywhere. It must be determined whether the jurisdictional focus
is federal or state (Wren & Wren, 1983). This study began, as indicated in chapter 2, by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

consulting a legal treatise for information surrounding early law on search and seizure.
Scholarly legal review articles were reviewed as well.
Primary sources by themselves often are not very straightforward. Secondary
materials try to explain and analyze the law. They offer easier access and summarize the
basic rules. In addition, they take the primary sources and place them into context,
allowing the legal researcher to select the most promising primary sources to pursue. It
must be noted that author bias could show through.
A research question that this study answered inquires as to how T.L.O has been
interpreted and applied. Since the Supreme Court ruling o f T.L.O. v. New Jersey is the
legal authority for which a current status was being sought, T.L.O. v. New Jersey is
called the cited authority. The entries in Shepard under the cited authority that were being
reviewed for consideration as part o f the data for this dissertation are called the citing
authorities. These authorities, such as cases and law review articles are cited (referenced)
to the item being reviewed (T.L.O. v. New Jersey). U.S. cases since 1985 were searched
and cases that have cited T.L.O. were listed. The specific cases used for this study were
derived from that list.
The first thing that was done was to use LEXIS to find the proper set o f Shepard’s
Citations. LEXIS is an important source for legal research involving federal court cases
because it provides full text coverage o f all federal court cases that appear in print back to
the earliest decisions in federal cases (Berring & Edinger, 1999). There are numerous sets
o f Shepard’s Citations; U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Federal Reporters, Federal
Supplement, each state, and West’s regional reporters. Initially, all cases settled within
the Federal Court svstem were reviewed.
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Since focus was K-12 education, cases that did not have anything to do with the
educational settings were discarded and not included as part o f this study. Additionally,
cases that involved issues in higher education were not included, only the K-12
environment was used. Furthermore, cases that did not involve the Fourth Amendment
rights o f students were removed from the list o f cases to consider for this review. That
left for consideration only the Unites States cases that were heard in the federal court
system that involved the Fourth Amendment rights o f students attending K-12 public
educational institutions that were decided after T.L.O. but prior to June 5, 2001.
Each o f the search and seizure cases that fit the criteria from above were reviewed
and a thorough analysis was completed. The facts o f the cases were extracted to
determine the court’s ruling and its rationale. Dissenting Justices opinions were included
in cases where that information was available. Legal research guides were used as a
reference so the dissemination o f data was consistent with current standards.
The cases were organized by geogr^hic region. The United States is divided into
thirteen circuit courts o f appeal. The cases were put into their respective region
depending upon where the case originated. Chapter 5 includes a United States map that
indicates the jurisdiction for each circuit. Each circuit was divided to show the specific
region that was represented.
In order to collect information for this study a variety o f sources were used. The
places where information was sought included the following;
1.

The Clark County Law Library and UNLV’s William S. Boyd Law School’s

library: Legal research guides and legal periodicals were used. Treaties were used to
provide valuable foundation information. The law has developed its own unique
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terminology over the centuries. For an understanding and mastery o f the language o f law,
a good law dictionary was a necessity. Black’s Law Dictionary was used to set a standard
definition on key terms and concepts.
2.

The case law and law journal databases on the Lexis service: The program

was accessed through the School o f Business at the University o f Nevada, Las Vegas.
3.

Law-based web sites on the Internet were searched for relevant information

that became part o f the study. The following web sites were reviewed:

4.

•

http://www.law.emory.edu/FEDCTS/

•

http://www.fmdlaw.com'

•

http ://www. law, indiana.edu law/

•

http://www.lectlaw.com/

•

http: /lawguru.com search'

•

http://www.Epo.ucop.edu/catalo2/supreme/

•

http://www.law.comell.edu/

Journal articles located through the search of the Internet or periodicals were

read with hopes that they would provide information that would become part o f the data
used for analysis in this study. Articles published between 1985 and 1987 were reviewed
to see what the scholarly mindset was at the time New Jersev v. T.L.O. was decided. To
do this a search o f LEGALTRAC at the Law Library at the University o f Nevada, Las
Vegas was conducted. LEGALTRAC is a computerized data-base that searches for
periodical articles. By inputting a specific topic (search and seizure) LEGALTRAC
located articles that were published during the time period requested (1985-1987). Once a
collection of articles was completed NEON was used to try and locate the articles.
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LEGALTRAC gave all the vital information needed to find an article, but NEON was
used to make sure the article was accessible.
5. The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) was also used to
thoroughly search articles that may have been relevant to the research topic that
had been selected.
Law reviews and articles found in journals that dealt with the search and seizure issue
o f K-12 public school students were closely analyzed. Published opinions and scholarly
comments were quoted in this study. Where appropriate, those opinions and
commentaries were cited. Education law and related textbooks were reviewed to
supplement current literature, and are listed with the references.
After Collection o f Data
Once the preliminary evaluation o f the facts was completed, the legal issues identified
were arranged in a logical order. Wren and Wren (1983) indicated that by doing so the
efficiency and effectiveness o f the study would be increased. A multi-issue problem, such
as the issue studied, mandated an orderly research approach.
In finding the law that applied, the ultimate goal was to locate primary authorities that
had a bearing on the legal problem. Search and seizure issues involving public school
students was the legal problem being studied. The 1985 Supreme Court decision in
T.L.O. V New Jersev had been identified as the primary source for this issue.
The next step of legal research was the reading o f the law (Wren & Wren, 1983).
Reading law is more that just using your eyes to identify printed words on a piece o f
paper. Significance must be attached to what is read. Once a case has been identified, it
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must be evaluated for its usefulness to the specific problem. Wren and Wren (1983)
identified two different types o f evaluations that need to be conducted.
The first analysis is called internal evaluation. This is done first to decide whether the
authority applies to the research problem.
•

How similar are the facts o f the court decision to those of the research
problem?

•

If the facts of the ruling differ, but the decision’s holding is helpful, can
the decision’s facts be re-characterized to increase the similarity to the
facts of the problem?

•

If the decision’s facts are sufficiently similar to those o f the research
problem to make the decided case relevant, is the decision’s holding
relevant to any legal issues present in the problem? (Wren and Wren,
1993)

The second type of analysis that must be conducted is called external evaluation. If
through internal evaluation it is determined that a case applies to the problem, an external
evaluation o f the authority will then be needed to determine its current status or validity
(Wren and Wren, 1993).
•

Has the case been overruled o r otherwise severely limited? Answering this
question involves the updating technique called Shepardizing, which allows
researchers to trace the judicial history of a case.

•

If the case has not been explicitly overruled, or otherwise invalidated, what is
its current status? (Wren and Wren, 1993)
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The taking o f notes is a necessary component while reading the law. The art o f taking
notes on court decisions has been refined over the years into a widely accepted technique
called “briefing”. Briefing serves both as an efficient means o f recording notes and as an
additional analytical tool (Wren and Wren, 1993).
Reading a case requires close attention in order to be able to extract all the
implications o f the court’s decision. Briefing assisted this study by allowing the research
to be focused on crucial aspects o f a case and sorting out its unhelpful points. Wren and
Wren (1983) suggest that briefing run no longer than a page, and contain the following
pieces o f information:
Name o f the case
Citation
Date the decision was rendered
Author o f the majority opinion
Author(s) of concurring opinion(s), if any
Author(s) o f dissenting opinion(s), if any
Procedural posture o f the case
Legal topic(s) covered by the case
Summary of the facts
Question(s) presented by the case
Answers to the question(s) presented
Summary of the court’s reasoning in reaching the answer(s)
Summary of significant concurring opinion(s), if any
Summary of significant dissenting opinion(s), if any
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•

Significance of the case (both in general and as it applies to the
problem being researched)

Analytically, the final step in doing legal research is updating the law (Wren & Wren,
1983). This step involves making sure the legal rules that have determined to apply to the
problem are still valid. For this study Shepardizing was used to review the current status
o f the problem. In addition, a computerized database program, LEXIS, was used to
search Shepard’s Citations.

SUMMARY
This study was legal research that included a thorough analysis o f legal cases. This
study found the law, read the law, and updated the law that applied to search and seizure
o f public school students. LEXIS, a computerized database, was searched to identify
Shepard’s Citations for cases that have cited T.L.O. v. New Jersey. The cases selected to
be part o f the data used in this study were retrieved fi-om Shepard’s Citations. Law
reviews, Treaties, and various other reference materials were used to gather as much
relevant data as possible in order to complete this study. Data used in this study was
retrieved fi-om computerized databases, on-line services, and an assortment o f printed
materials.
The process of “briefing” was used to analyze cases. Vital components fi-om relevant
cases were recorded in a fashion that allowed easy return access. Briefing allowed cases
to be summarized so that w ten a case was revisited it can be done more efficiently and
effectively. This process allowed relevant cases to be analyzed. Once that procedure was
completed, research questions were then answered.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
This study focused on cases in the federal court system dealing with search and
seizure in public schools in the years since the Supreme Court handed down the landmark
T.L.O. decision in 1985 until June 5, 2001. The study sought to answer the following
questions:
1. How has T.L.O. been interpreted and applied?
A. What is meant by “reasonable suspicion” as referred to in T.L.O.?
B. Does the “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated in T.L.O apply to
school police?
C. Has the Court’s interpretation o f T.L.O. changed over time? W hat is
the current status o f school search jurisprudence?
D. What guidelines should school officials follow regarding the search o f
students?
2. What, if any, impact does the Nevada State Constitution forbidding
unreasonable search and seizure have on school searches?
Each o f these questions will be examined thoroughly in the summary in Chapter five.
Case briefs o f the federal cases decided since T.L.O. are presented in this chapter.
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The United States Supreme Court revisited the ^plication o f the Fourth Amendment
to the public school settings in 1995. The Vemonia School District v. Acton case is
presented first. To simplify the presentation the lower court cases are arranged by federal
circuit and in chronological order \\ithin each circuit.
The federal judicial system is a three-tier structure. The trial courts are designated
district courts. Each state has at least one federal district court. Federal court decisions, if
published, are found in the Federal Supplement. The intermediate level o f this structure is
entitled the Federal Court of Appeals. Congress has divided the United States into 13
appellate circuits. Eleven of the circuits are numbered and the D C. circuit and the
Federal Circuit make up the remaining two.
Figure 1 illustrates geographical boundaries o f various federal circuit courts o f
appeal. It identifies for the reader the jurisdiction o f each federal circuit court.

n r i r t o s o F e d a r a l A id ta la l G brcullft

Figure 1. Geographical Boundaries o f the Federal Circuits
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United States Supreme Court
Since the United States Supreme Court decided T.L.O. in 1985 only one other case
involving search and seizure in public schools made it back to the Supreme Court. WTiile
many cases in the district courts and appellate courts involved Fourth Amendment issues
in the school context, only Vemonia v. Acton was heard and ruled upon by the Supreme
Court.
Vemonia School District v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
FACTS
Teachers and administrators in an Oregon public school district observed a sharp
increase in student drug use and disciplinary problems. Students began to openly discuss
their attraction to the drug culture, and boast that there was nothing the school could do
about it. An increase in disciplinary problems was also noticed, the number of
disciplinary referrals more than doubled from the early 1980’s to the late 1980’s.
Students became increasingly rude during class, and outbursts o f profane language
became common. The school district was particularly concerned with the fact that student
athletes were reported to be leaders o f the drug culture. They were also concerned in that
drug use increased the risk of sports-related injuries. Expert testimony at trial confirmed
the deleterious effects of drugs on motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordination,
and performance. The high school football and wrestling coach wimessed a severe
stemum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various omissions o f safety procedures and
misexecutions by football players, all attributable in his belief to the effects of drug use.
Initially, the District responded to the drug problem by offering special classes,
speakers, and presentations designed to deter drug use. A specially trained dog was even
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brought in to detect drugs. The problem persisted so officials o f the school district sought
other ways to deter drug use.
District officials prepared a policy providing for drug testing as a prerequisite for
participation in athletics. They presented the policy at a parent “input night” at which the
parents in attendance gave their unanimous approval to a proposed urinalysis drug testing
program for student athletes. The district’s school board adopted the policy.
The policy provided as follows: (1) all students wishing to participate in
interscholastic athletics had to sign a form consenting to the testing and had to obtain
their parents’ written consent to the testing, (2) athletes were tested at the beginning o f
the season for their spurt, and (3) random testing o f 10 percent o f the athletes was done
weekly during the season.
The student chosen to be tested had to complete a specimen control form, which
included an assigned number. Prescription medications that the student was taking had to
be identified and a copy o f the prescription or a doctor’s authorization had to be provided.
After the urine sample was produced and properly labeled it was sent to an independent
laboratory for testing.
A sample that tested positive was put through a second battery o f tests as soon as
possible to confirm the initial results. If the second test came back negative, no further
action was taken. If the second test produced positive results, the athlete’s parents were
notified, and the school administrator convened a meeting with the student and his
parents. During the meeting the student was given an opportunity to participate in a sixweek assistance program that included weekly urinalysis, or suffer the suspension of
athletics for the remainder o f the current athletic season and the next athletic season. The
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student was retested prior to the start of the next athletic season that he or she was
eligible. A second offense meant the student was suspended for the remainder o f the
current athletic season and the next athletic season. A third offense required suspension
o f the current athletic season and the next two athletic seasons.
In the fall o f 1991, a seventh grade student, James Acton, was denied participation in
the district’s football program because the student and his parents refused to sign the
testing consent forms. The student and his parents filed a suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from enforcement o f the drug testing policy on the grounds that the
policy violated the Federal Constitution’s Fourth Amendment and a similar provision of
the Oregon Constitution. After a bench trial, the district court entered an order denying
the claims on the merits and dismissed the action.
After the United States District Court for the District o f Oregon dismissed the suit,
the United States Court o f Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, expressing the view that the
policy violated the Fourth Amendment and the Oregon constitutional provision, reversed
the district court’s decision.
HOLDING
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. In an opinion
by Scalia, J., joined by Rehquist, Ch. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., the drug testing policy did not violate the student’s right, under the Fourth
Amendment, to be free from unreasonable searches
REASONING
The conclusion o f the majority was premised partially on the district court’s finding
that student drug problems in the school district, particularly with respect to students in
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interscholastic athletics, were severe enough to demonstrate a need to address such
problems. Justice Scalia also found the policy reasonable under the circumstances, faking
into account (1) the decreased expectation of privacy with regard to students, particularly
student athletes, (2) the relative unobtrusiveness o f the search, and (3) the severity o f the
need met by the search.
State compelled collection and testing o f urine constitutes a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 617. Where
there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type o f search at issue,
at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, the “reasonableness” o f a search is
judged by balancing the intrusion o f the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against
the promotion o f legitimate governmental interests.
The first factor to consider in determining the reasonableness is the nature o f the
privacy interest on which the search intrudes. Here, the subjects o f the drug testing policy
were children committed to the temporary custody o f the State, as school master. In that
role, the State has a right to exercise a degree of supervision and control greater than it
could over free adults. The requirements that public school children submit to physical
examinations and be vaccinated indicate that they possess a lesser privacy expectation
with regard to medical examinations and procedures than the general population. In
addition, student athletes have even less o f a legitimate privacy expectation, for an
element o f communal undress is inherent in athletic participation, and athletes are subject
to preseason physical exams and rules regulating their conduct.
The privacy interests compromised by the collection o f urine samples in the drug
testing policy are negligible, since the conditions o f collection are nearly identical to
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those commonly encountered in public restrooms. Furthermore, the tests look only for
standard drugs, not medical conditions, and the results were released to a limited group.
The nature and immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and the efficacy o f
this means for meeting it, also favors a finding o f reasonableness. The importance o f
deterring drug use by all this Nation’s schoolchildren caimot be doubted. Additionally,
the drug testing policy is directed more narrowly to drug use by athletes, where the risk
o f physical harm to the user and other players is high. The district court’s conclusion that
the school district’s concerns were immediate was correct. It was self evident that a drug
problem largely caused by athletes, and o f particular danger to athletes, was effectively
addressed by ensuring that athletes did not use drugs. The Fourth Amendment does not
require that the “least intrusive” search be conducted.
The court had previously addressed the issue o f a constitutional search unsupported
by probable cause or a warrant. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the Court
held that “special needs” beyond the normal need for law enforcement can make a search
legitimate when warrant and probable cause requirements are impracticable. The Court
found such “special needs” to exist in the public school context. The T.L.O. decision
advised that in that case the warrant requirement would “unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures that are needed” T.L.O.,
469 U.S., at 340. In addition, the T.L.O decision emphasized that the nature o f power
over school children is custodial and tutelary, which allowed a level o f power and control
that would not be acceptable over fi-ee adults.
Taking into consideration all the factors considered by the Court—the decreased
expectation o f privacy (as previously seen in T.L.O.), the relative unobtrusiveness o f the
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search, and the severity o f the need met by the search—the Court concluded V em onia's
drug testing policy was reasonable and therefore, constitutional.
DISSENT
O ’Connor, J.. joined by Stevens, and Souter, JJ, dissented. Justice O ’Connor
expressed the view that suspicionless drug testing in this case was not justified on the
facts presented. The general view o f the Supreme Court was that mass suspicionless
searches were unreasonable w ithin the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme
Court would only allow such searches where it was clear that a suspicion-based regime
would be ineffectual. Justice O ’Connor did not believe that was the circumstance in this
case. The dissent argued the drug-testing policy contained two flaws; 1) there was
virtually no evidence in the record o f a drug problem at the grade school that the student
attended when the litigation began, and 2) even as to the school district’s high school, the
choice of student athletes as the class to subject to suspicionless testing was
unreasonable.
In her dissent. Justice O ’Connor rebutted the argument o f physical exams and
vaccinations being in the same category as drug testing. Physical examinations and
vaccinations were not searches fo r the purpose o f finding wrongdoing, and so were
wholly nonaccusatory and had no consequences that could be considered punitive. That
might explain Fourth Amendment challenges to those searches. Justice O ’ Connor did not
feel the facts presented justified suspicionless drug testing. There was not one shred o f
evidence that the grade school in the district, where Acton attended, possessed a drug
problem. All the evidence reflected a drug problem taking place at the high school.
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Justice O ’Connor believed the school district’s suspicionless policy o f testing all
student athletes was too broad o f a sweep. In addition, it was too imprecise to be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
Vemonia v. Acton is a precedent case that has been cited many times since the
1995 Supreme Court ruling. It has served as a landmark case with respect to drug-testing
policies enacted in public schools. T.L.O involved search o f students in regular school
setting. The United States Supreme Court established a separate standard for searches o f
students involved in athletic activities.

Lower Federal Court Decisions Arranged by Circuit
The following cases were heard in federal courts in their respective circuits. Each
case involved a Fourth Amendment issue in the context o f a public school. Some circuits
were richer with cases than others, but each o f the eleven circuits reported on had at least
one case that applied to the context o f this study.

First Circuit
1st circuit trial courts involving Fourth Amendment issues have reported just two
cases. One was the search of the person by a school administrator and the other involved
a search of one’s belongings. The cases were in two different states, decided one year
apart, and neither case was appealed.
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Brousseau v. Town o f Westerly, II F. Supp. 2d 177 (D.R.I. 1998)
FACTS
After several students at a middle school ate pizza for lunch in the school cafeteria,
one o f the cafeteria workers was unable to find a knife that was used to cut the pizza. The
missing knife was approximately 13 16 inches long and had a nine-inch serrated metal
blade. Cafeteria workers and administrators searched the cafeteria for the knife. A patdown search o f students present in the cafeteria was conducted when they were unable to
locate the knife. Male and female students were assembled in separate lines. Two female
lunchroom aides patted-down the female students.
Sarah, who was then ten years old, was one o f the students searched. Sarah’s search
took only a few seconds and consisted o f patting the area in the vicinity o f her front and
back pockets and around her ankles. Sarah claimed that the search o f her person was
unreasonable and, therefore, it violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
HOLDING
The district court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment.
REASONING
The missing knife and the impending danger created by it resulted in reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search. The purpose o f the search was to find the missing knife
and restore the school setting to a safe environment. The justification was that the knife in
question had a nine inch serrated blade e n a b le o f inflicting serious bodily harm or even
fatal injury. In addition, school officials believed students had taken the knife. The court
concluded that the pat-down was reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose o f the
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search. The court considered the relatively limited nature o f the intrusion and the
compelling safety concerns that the missing knife created. In the absence o f any effective
alternative for addressing the concern, it was clear to the court that the search conducted
was reasonable under the circumstances.

Greenleaf v. Cote. 77 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D .M e.l999)
F.ACTS
This case began when a female student overheard two eighth-grade female students
talk about how, earlier in that day, they had been drinking beer in the girls’ locker room.
In the course of this overheard conversation, one o f the students disclosed the names o f
the two other students with whom they had been drinking beer. One o f the students
named was Jennifer Greenleaf. A short time after the overheard conversation took place,
the student that heard the conversation reported the incident to school officials. Since the
student-informant was a trustworthy student who had previously provided school officials
with accurate information regarding student conduct, the administrator had reason to trust
the report. While they had no basis to suspect that the named students had previously
consumed alcohol on school grounds, the student-informant’s report did lend credence to
growing concerns about drinking and drug use in school.
Prior to the report, members o f the community had informed the school
administration of drinking and drug use by students. In addition, administrators and
teachers themselves had overheard students discussing this problem. Although they had
not caught any student using drugs or alcohol at school, they had in the past uncovered
drug paraphernalia in the student bathrooms. The administrators believed they had

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

reasonable suspicion to search the four students for evidence o f beer drinking. Evidence
might include beer cans and bottles, as well as bottle caps and openers.
The girls to be searched were the four identified as drinking at school during the
overheard conversation. Jennifer Greenleaf, the plaintiff, was one o f the girls searched.
The principal, Mr. Cote, and the assistant principal, Ms. McCue searched the students and
their belongings. Jennifer was brought into a vacant hallway and asked to open her
locker, and remove the items in her pockets and backpack. Greenleaf complied with the
request o f administrators and nothing incriminating was uncovered. Greenleaf was never
touched by either administrator. She brought action in district court claiming that her
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure had been violated.
HOLDING
The district court concluded that the search was reasonable.
REASONING
Judge Brody wrote that the search was justified at its inception because there was
reasonable suspicion for suspecting that the search would turn up evidence that the
student had violated a school rule. The district court concluded that the administrator had
reasonable suspicion because o f the report of the trustworthy student and the previous
drug paraphernalia that was found. He indicated that the principal had reasonable grounds
based on the fact that the school-informant was a reliable source and the person whose
conversation was overheard had first hand knowledge o f the issue because she was one o f
the students drinking. The court concluded that Mr. Cote’s search of Jennifer did not
violate the Fourth Amendment, as construed in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
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There were no other cases from the 1^ circuit that were relevant to this study. Next,
the study reviews cases from the 2"*^ circuit.

2"“ Circuit
The 2"** circuit had only one reported case that was applicable to this study. This case
was heard at the trial court level. This 1999 case was unique because it involved a field
trip.

Ricci

V.

Guarricino. 54 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y.1999)

FACTS
This case involved a search by a high school principal that took place in a hotel room
while on a field trip. The senior class o f O ’Neil High School in New York took a field
trip to Disney World in Florida. Before the field trip, Mr. Guarricino, the principal,
advised the students that drugs and alcohol were not permitted and room searches would
be conducted to make sure all students abided by the rules. In addition, information
advising students they would be sent home if they seriously violated a school rule was
provided verbally and in writing. Parents also received the information and were asked to
sign a permission slip. All students that went on the voluntary field trip had permission
slips signed by their parent or guardian. Mr. Guarricino was one o f the chaperones on the
trip.
Upon returning to his hotel room, Mr. Guarricino noticed a large group o f students
outside one o f the hotel rooms and a strong marijuana odor emanating from the room.
With the assistance o f hotel security, the principal checked the rooms o f all the students.
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In one of the rooms he found a bottle o f alcohol and in a different room he found
marijuana. The two students who occupied the rooms were sent home and suspended
from school for three days because drugs and alcohol were uncovered during the search
o f their rooms. Brian Ricci, one o f the students involved, was sent home because an
undisclosed amount o f marijuana was found in the safe in his room. Ricci brought action
against Mr. Guarricino on the grounds that he felt the search violated his Fourth
Amendment protection.
HOLDING
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and plaintiffs’ complaint was
dismissed.
REASONING
District Court Justice Conner used the T.L.O precedent even though the incident took
place off school campus.
The attorney for the plaintiff claimed that there had been no prior court decision
addressing Fourth Amendment standards as they apply off campus. Judge Conner
indicated that the same standards apply for o ff campus searches as they do for on campus
searches as long as the activity is a school-sponsored event. He indicated that o ff campus
events have a greater need for appropriate supervision and action. The court rejected the
suggestion that the location o f the search and seizure should somehow have relaxed
fourth amendment standards applicable to school searches and seizures. Justice Connor
wrote that school field trips present a greater challenge to school officials trying to
maintain order and discipline.
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The issue o f “individualized suspicion” was also addressed. The court indicated that
the issue o f “individualized suspicion” had no bearing on the final decision. Since T.L.O..
the Supreme Court has held that individualized suspicion was not required for a search to
be deemed reasonable. In making that determination, the court looked to Vemonia, 515
U.S. 646. The court indicated that application o f Vemonia by the various circuits,
involving cases where individualized suspicion did not exist, showed that they supported
searches more intrusive than this one, even when there was less o f a need for an
immediate search. Cases that were cited as support that will be discussed later included;
Desroches v. Caprio, 156 F 3d. 571 ( 1998), Todd v. Rush, 133 F. 3d 984 ( 1997), and
Thompson v. Carthage School District, 87 F. 3d. 979 (1996).
The court concluded suspicion occurred entirely in a public hallway. A group o f boys
gathered in the hallway outside Ricci’s room was sufficient to arouse suspicion. Add to
that the odor o f marijuana and any reasonable person would have come to the same
conclusion. The search was justified at its inception and conducted within reasonable
scope. Therefore, Mr. Guarricino committed no constitutional violation.

This 2"“^ circuit case was the first in this study to review an issue that dealt with an
off-campus Fourth Amendment issue. Other reported cases involving field trips are
included later in this study. Presented next are cases fi-om the 3^ circuit.

3"* Circuit
The 3"^ circuit courts have decided three cases that were relevant to this study. One
trial court case involved the strip search o f a student to try and prove drug-use. The
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appellate court decided two cases in 2000 that were relevant to this study. One case
involved a student being forced to submit to a drug test and the other case dealt with a
student athlete that was required to submit to a pregnancy test.

Sostarecz v. Misko, Docket No. 97-CV-2112 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1999)
While this case was not recommended for publication in federal court, the case is
relevant to this study. It was published in Lexis-Nexis, which is how the information was
made available for this study.
FACTS
Plaintiff Sostarecz alleged that while in health class she was ordered to report to the
school nurse for a drug test because o f her inappropriate behavior in class. The nurse
checked her pupils, temperature, blood pressure, and pulse. All tests were normal and no
signs o f drug use were noted. Defendant, Mr. Perry, Vice-Principal, ordered the nurse to
take the student into the bathroom and strip-search her for signs o f drug use. Plaintiff was
forced to unbutton and remove her pants. The nurse supposedly inspected and touched
Plaintiff s arms, legs, and private areas for evidence o f drug use. No evidence o f drug use
was observed by the school nurse. The student brought action against the nurse and the
administrator claiming that she was subjected to a search that violated her Fourth
Amendment right. The defendants claimed qualified immunity.
HOLDING
The court held that the search was unreasonable and the defendants were not entitled
to qualified immunity
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REASONING
The court relied on the standard set forth in T.L.O. when deciding this case. The court
ruled that examining the Plaintiffs pupils and vital signs was probably warranted because
o f her behavior in class and she was suspected o f being under the influence o f a
controlled substance. The court held the removal o f Plaintiff s pants to be unreasonable
because the inappropriate classroom behavior did not justify a strip search. The check o f
the vital signs, which was a reasonable search, indicated normal results. Therefore, a
further search was not justified and the court concluded that the defendant’s actions were
not reasonable. Once the tests o f the pupils and vital signs produced normal results, a
reasonable person would not have forced the student to remove her pants so that her legs
could be checked for signs o f drug use. The court determined that neither defendant, the
Vice-Principal or the school nurse, could have reasonably believed that the actions they
took were reasonable under the circumstances.

Gruenke v. Sein. 225 F. 3d. 290 (3"* Cir. 2000)
FACTS
Micheal Seip, Leah Gruenke’s swim coach, began to have suspicions that she was
pregnant when she became nauseated at practice and had to take numerous bathroom
breaks. He had several o f her friends and his female coaches speak to her to try and get
her to consent to taking a pregnancy test. She refused and insisted she was not pregnant.
As time progressed the school nurse and counselor also had informal conversations with
the Plaintiff to discuss pregnancy, she continued to deny that she was pregnant. Gruenke
finally agreed to take a pregnancy test to clear up any misconceptions about her being
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pregnant. The test came back positive. The coaches and a swimmer friend who were with
her convinced her to take another test. Gruenke took two more tests that produced
negative results. Later, after a visit to a doctor, it was confirmed that she was in fact five
or six months pregnant. She concealed that information so she could continue to compete
in swim meets. She continued to compete despite being five or six months pregnant.
During the next school year, and after the birth o f her child, Gruenke was pulled from
several swim meets. She felt that she was pulled from those meets as a means o f
retaliation although she was never removed from the team.
Action was brought by Gruenke against the swim coach for violating her Fourth
Amendment right by forcing her to take a pregnancy test. The district court held that the
defendant’s conduct was questionable and had he not been entitled to qualified immunity
might have found that material facts did exist to show that plaintiffs Fourth Amendment
rights had been violated. However, as a matter o f law, the district court was unable to say
that the law on the issue had been clearly established, and therefore held that the
defendant’s conduct of insisting on a pregnancy test was entitled to qualified immunity
on the fourth amendment claim.
HOLDING
The third circuit appellate court indicated that Seip should have known that his
conduct would violate a clearly established right, thus abolishing qualified immunity as a
defense. Therefore the court reversed the lower court’s grant o f summary judgm ent with
respect to Gruenke’s Fourth Amendment claim and remanded the case back to the district
court.
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REASONING
The appellate court indicated that the conclusion that the district court came to was
wrong. In his opinion. Appellate Justice Roth stated that just because the Supreme Court
had not yet ruled on a case similar to this one, it did not mean the right was not clearly
established. He advised that a review o f current Fourth Amendment law in public school
context revealed that the right was clearly established and Seip’s conduct was
unreasonable. He indicated that the standard set forth in Vemonia clearly established that
a school official’s administration of a pregnancy test to a student athlete would constitute
an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
The appellate court noted that the pregnancy test o f a student by a school official is
clearly a search. The court held that even though the case was one o f first impression, the
law was clearly established. The court pointed to the Fourth Amendment o f the
Constitution, which protects individuals from unreasonable search and seizure. The court
next applied T.L.O.. which extended that protection from state public school officials as
well. The court then held that the Vemonia decision addressed the issue o f how intrusive
a urinalysis test is. A urinalysis test is clearly intrusive because it reveals personal
information.
The court did not think that the coach’s conduct was reasonable. A swim coach,
without any medical background, allegedly forced a swimmer to take a pregnancy test.
The court indicated that Seip’s responsibilities could be reasonably construed to teaching
and training. They cannot be extended to requiring a pregnancy test. In addition, a
reasonable swim coach would have realized that his swimmer’s condition was not
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suitable for public speculation. Seip, offered no explanation that could justify his failure
to respect the boundaries o f reasonableness.
Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded back to the district court.

Hedges v. Musco. 204 F. 3d 109 (3"* Cir. 2000)
FACTS
A high school student, Tara Hedges, showed up for class behaving oddly, her face
was flushed, and her eyes were glossy and red. The teacher asked that she go see the
nurse but she refused. School policy indicated that staff members who thought a student
to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol shall report the matter as soon as possible to
school officials. In addition, the policy indicated that when school officials had
reasonable suspicion to believe that a student was under the influence o f drugs or alcohol
the principal or his designee could conduct a search. Following school policy, the teacher
contacted an administrator and had a security guard escort the student to the nurse’s
office. At first glance Nurse Kiely thought Hedges was “high.” The nurse checked vital
signs and noted that while pulse and respiration were normal her blood pressure was
elevated. Believing that the student was under the influence o f drugs or alcohol
administration advised the security guard to search Hedges’ locker and bookbag. Some
small white pills and one large brown pill were uncovered during the search. The student
identified the pills as diet pills. Mr. Musco, the principal, contacted the parent and had
him come to the school. The pills were turned over to the parent and the principal advised
him that his daughter must undergo a drug test before returning to school. The student
was taken by her father to a clinic the school recommended and tested for drugs. The pills
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were reviewed by a pharmacist and turned out to be diet pills and vitamins. The drug test
showed that the student did not have illicit drugs or alcohol in her blood. The morning
after the incident took place the school was notified o f the test results and the student
returned to school. The student sued the principal on the grounds that her Fourth
Amendments rights were violated.
The district court denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted
summary judgment for defendants. The district court held the search was reasonable. The
decision in favor o f the defendants was appealed by Hedges.
HOLDING
The appellate court concluded that the search o f the student was reasonable under all
circumstances and affirmed the judgment o f the district court.
REASONING
In reaching the decision, the court relied on T.L.O. to justify the escalation o f the
search once discovery o f the pills warranted it. In addition, the district court relied on
Vemonia to determine the constitutionality o f drug-testing. The court ruled that the
student’s abnormal appearance, and behavior gave school officials the reasonable
suspicion they needed to conduct a search. The abnormal appearance was the plaintiffs
flushed face, dilated pupils, and glassy red eyes. The odd behavior was the fact that the
student was described as uncharacteristically talkative and outgoing. The search was
ruled reasonable at its inception and within ^propriate scope o f authority.
The appellate court indicated, based on Vemonia, the urinalysis on Hedges was not
excessively intrusive given the age and sex o f the student and the nature o f the infraction.
The appellate court relied on the standard set forth in T.L.O. to hold that that the search
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conducted need not be the least intrusive way o f achieving its objective. The search must
not be excessively intrusive, which it was not in this case.
With the decision o f Seventh Circuit case Bridgman v. New Trier High School as
reference, the appellate court indicated that if a teacher’s suspicion is based on objective
facts that suggest a student may be under the influence o f drugs or alcohol, an
examination o f the kind performed in this case is permissible. The Third Circuit panel
confirmed that the search was reasonable at its inception and reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances, which justified the search in the first place. Summary judgment in
favor o f the school defendants on unreasonable search claims was appropriate.

The cases fi-om the 3"* circuit provided pertinent information for this study and one
unique case, Seip, gives insight on forcing a person to submit to a pregnancy test. The
cases next to be presented are fix)m the 4'*' circuit.

4^**Circuit
The 4^ circuit had four applicable cases. Only one o f the four cases was heard in the
appellate court. That case was unique because it involved a situation where a student was
suspended for not allowing a search o f his backpack after it was suspected that the
backpack contained a pair o f stolen shoes. The three other cases, heard only at the district
court level, involved a strip search, a search o f one’s belongings, and a seizure case.
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Burnham v. W est 681 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Va. 1987)
FACTS
In Burnham students claimed that on three occasions Roy West, the principal,
conducted unreasonable searches against them. The first incident occurred shortly after it
was discovered that school property was defaced. West directed teachers to search
students’ bookbags, pockets, and pocketbooks for magic makers. Possession o f magic
markers was a violation o f a school rule. There was no evidence to indicate that any
student was physically touched during the search.
The second search occurred a few weeks later when a teacher reported to West that
several students were seen leaving the school bus with Walkmen or radios. Possession o f
Walkmen or like items was a violation o f a school rule. Without any inquiry. West
ordered a search o f all students’ bookbags and pocketbooks for Walkmen or similar
devices. A search was conducted by the teachers pursuant to W est’s instructions.
A third incident occurred a short time later. A teacher reported that she had smelled
marijuana smoke in the hallway. West went to the hallway and acknowledged that a
smell o f marijuana did exist. He looked for physical evidence and found none. West
asked several teachers in the area if they had allowed any students out of the classroom
recently. When his efforts produced no suspects, he ordered teachers to search all
student’s pocketbooks, bookbags, and pockets o f male students. One teacher sniffed the
hands o f a student to determine if they smelled like marijuana. Students were required to
turn their pockets inside out and place the contents on tops o f desks. In each case the
searches failed to produce any evidence o f wrongdoing or school violations.
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HOLDING
The district court held that unconstitutional searches did occur. The plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment was granted
REASONING
The district court concluded that the underlying command o f the Fourth Amendment
is always that searches and seizures be reasonable. All the searches in question were
conducted without individualized suspicion. Because the searches were unjustified for
lack o f individualized suspicion, the court ruled in favor o f the students.
The court indicated that the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided whether
individualized suspicion was a necessary component to a reasonable search. District
Judge Spencer indicated that the searches that were conducted at the middle school were
similar to the general searches that prompted the Fourth Amendment protection. The
searches in question were all conducted in an atmosphere devoid o f individualized
suspicion, which Justice Spencer said made the searches unjustified.

Caviness v. Durham Public Schools. Docket No. 95-C V -00878
(M.D.N.C. 1996)
This unpublished case contains data relevant to this study so was included despite the
fact it was found only in Lexis-Nexis.
FACTS
Plaintiffs, Terrell Caviness and Dante Caviness, were reported, by a fellow student, to
be in possession o f marijuana while at school. A school counselor and assistant principal
summoned the Plaintiffs to the office o f the school principal. They were put into separate
rooms and detained for the entire school day, six hours. During their detention. Plaintiffs
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belongings were searched out o f their presence and a police officer questioned them about
the use and possession o f marijuana. Defendants found no drugs or other contraband
during the six hour detention o f the Plaintiffs. The two students brought action claiming
that their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. The Defendants filed motion to
dismiss.
HOLDING
The court denied the defendant’s motion for dismissal and allowed the case to move
forward to discovery.
REASONING
In applying the standard established in T.L.O., the court found that the search and six
hour seizure o f the students could be considered excessive. The court indicated that the
issue whether the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures o f school
children (as opposed to merely searches) had not been addressed by the Supreme Court or
the Fourth Circuit. The opinion stated that other federal courts have extended the T.L.O.
framework to the context o f student seizure. Edwards v. Rees. 883 F. 2d 882 (10^ Cir.
1989), which is documented later in this c h u ter, was used as an example.
In a similar case to the one here, the Tenth Circuit Court o f Appeals found that
statements made to a vice-principal by two students implicating the plaintiff in making
bomb threats to an elementary school were justifiable grounds for the seizure o f the
plaintiff. In that case, Edwards v. Rees, the court held the statements led the vice-principal
to believe that questioning the plaintiff about the incident might turn up evidence that the
plaintiff had violated either the law or rules o f the school. In that case the plaintiff was
detained a mere twenty minutes and the concern was a bomb threat.
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The reasoning here contended that detaining the plaintiffs for six hours for the
possible possession of drugs was not reasonable. Thus, the plaintiffs were given the
opportunity to proceed with their case to explore the reasonableness o f their detention.

Desroches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571 (4* Cir. 1998)
FACTS
James DesRoches was a ninth-grade student at a public high school. He attended an
art class that met for half an hour before lunch and h alf an hour after lunch. One day a
girl in his class placed her tennis shoes on top o f her desk and left them there while she
and the other students went to lunch. When she returned the shoes were gone. She
reported the matter to the appropriate school official, James Lee, who conducted an
investigation. Mr. Lee interviewed several students in trying to find the missing shoes.
During lunch, the classroom remained unlocked. The teacher stayed in the classroom the
entire time except for a short period during which she was in a closet in the classroom.
The teacher stated that she never saw any student in the classroom that she did not know.
Another student claimed that one student that did not belong in the class did enter the
room during lunch.
Through the course o f his investigation, Mr. Lee determined that it was necessary to
search the personal belongings o f all nineteen students in the class. Only DesRoches
objected to the search. When the searches o f the other students’ bags and backpacks
failed to produce the missing tennis shoes Desroches was taken to the principal’s office.
The principal was unsuccessful in his attempt to get the student to consent to a search o f
his backpack. DesRoches was then suspended for ten days.
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The student, by way o f his father, filed action in district court. He claimed that his
Fourth Amendment right was violated.
The district court found that the school’s action constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. School officials filed an appeal that claimed the
search was reasonable under the circumstances.
HOLDING
The appellate court held that the search o f DesRoches’s backpack was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. The judgment o f the district court was, therefore, reversed.
REASONING
The a p ellate court was faced with the issue of what constituted reasonable suspicion
at “inception” o f the search. The appellate court concluded that the inception o f the
search was not when the search o f the class was first announced, as claimed by the
district court, but instead when DesRoches was actually punished. After the search o f the
other eighteen students failed to produce the missing tennis shoes, suspicion turned to
DesRoches, which created individualized suspicion. Once school officials had
individualized suspicion and DesRoches failed to consent to a search, a suspension was
an appropriate consequence.
This 1998 case indicates that the fourth circuit was looking for individualized
suspicion.

Austin

V.

Lambert, Docket No. 97-0465-R (W.D. Va. 1998)

This unpublished case contains data relevant to this study so was included despite the
fact it was found only in Lexis-Nexis.
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FACTS
David Austin was a high school student when he was subjected to a strip search by
two assistant principals who searched him because they believed he was in possession o f
drugs. Administrator, Carl Linstrom had been informed that Austin was in possession o f
drugs. Austin was taken from class by two assistant principals, Harold Lambert and
Lindstrom. As the three were walking down the hall, Austin was observed removing
something from his pant pocket and placing the item into his waistband. He was taken to
Lindstrom’s office and required to remove his shirt, empty his pockets, and take o ff his
shoes and socks. As he removed his shoes and socks, a small brass pipe fitting fell to the
floor where Lindstrom retrieved it. Believing that he was in possession of marijuana,
Lindstrom told Austin to remove his pants. Lindstrom then ran his hands under the elastic
band o f Austin’s underwear touching his hips, lower back, lower stomach, genital area and
penis in the process. Austin contends that the search took place while he was standing in
front o f a floor-to-ceiling length window in Lindstrom’s first floor office. Blinds were
positioned in such a way that persons from the outside could see in. Austin brought action
claiming that his Fourth Amendment right was violated.
HOLDING
The district court held that the student’s constitutional rights were violated. The court
also granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgm ent on the qualified immunity
defense.
REASONING
The court assumed, without deciding, that the defendants’ actions violated Austin’s
constitutional rights. The court, nevertheless, found that at the time o f the incident the law
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was insufficiently established regarding the legality of the methods and location o f the
search. Plaintiff did not allege that the contact was improperly motivated. Instead, he
acknowledged that the contact was incidental as the defendants conducted a waistband and
patdown search while he was wearing a tee shirt and boxer shorts. The court found that,
given the absence of case law defining the parameters o f how far a school administrator
may go in searching a student for drugs, the defendants could not have reasonably known
their waistband search violated Austin’s constitutional rights. Nor does the court find that
the actions o f the defendants in this case were so obviously illegal that any reasonable
observer would have known that they constituted a constitutional violation.

All o f the cases reviewed from the 4'*’ circuit are included because they contain
information relevant to this study. One case in particular, Desroches, is especially helpful
due to the fact it helps define when a search originates.

5"* Circuit
The two cases in the 5'*' circuit were both heard at the district court level only and
decided nine years apart. The earlier case involved a drug-testing policy and was decided
prior to Vemonia. The second case involved a strip search o f a student to try and find
missing money.
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Brooks y. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District,
730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex. 1989)
FACTS
In 1988 the East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District, at the urging o f
students and parents in the community, instituted a urinalysis drug-testing program for all
students in grades six though twelve that wanted to participate in extra-curricular
activities. The parents and students petitioned the school board to provide a more
concerted effort to combat drug and alcohol use. The families that s p e a re d before the
board had children that recently imdergone substance abuse treatment and they did not
think the school was dealing with the drug problem effectively. The school board then
advised the principal o f the high school to investigate the situation and make
recommendations to the board as to what measures could be taken.
The principal’s investigation consisted o f having three students who had appeared
before the school board go through a high school yearbook. After reviewing the
yearbook, the boys collectively answered four questions the principal asked them. Their
responses indicated that they had seen ^proxim ately one-third of the high school student
body use drugs other than alcohol and they estimated that 97% of the high school
population used alcohol.
The principal reported the finding o f his investigation to the school board along with
options that included urinalysis testing. The drug-testing policy enacted by the school
board called for the mandatory testing o f all students prior to participating in
extracurricular activities. The students were then tested again randomly throughout the
school year.
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According to the provisions o f the drug testing program all participants in sports were
to be tested at the beginning o f the semester, then again be tested randomly throughout
the school year, at the rate o f thirty students per month. The policy required that an initial
test be performed on participants in all extra-curricular activities. Students were required
to report to the principal’s office upon demand and produce a urine sample. The penalty
for refusing to submit to the test was exclusion from extra-curricular activities until the
student agreed to be tested. Students that tested positive and any time were excluded from
activities until they submitted a subsequent test, which proved negative.
One student, Brent Brooks, was denied an opportunity to participate in an extra
curricular activity because he refused to take the drug test. He filed suit against the school
district and claimed that the policy was a violation to his Fourth Amendment right.
HOLDING
The decision was rendered in favor o f the student. The district court indicated that the
school board’s drug-testing program was unreasonable.
REASONING
In the ruling, which was prior to Vemonia, the court held that the drug testing was a
governmental action and the Fourth Amendment applies to officials o f public schools.
The urinalysis was considered a search under the Fourth Amendment because the
analysis or urine is capable o f disclosing facts about which an ordinary citizen has a
reasonable expectation o f privacy. In his opinion. Justice Gibson indicated that the facts
o f this particular case were unique, but the standard that applied was well known. The
same T.L.O. standard that would apply to any other search applied here. Was the action
justified reasonable suspicion at its inception, and was it reasonably related in scope to
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the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place? It was believed that the
Constitution specified that under ordinary circumstances individualized suspicion that the
search will discover evidence o f wrongdoing is needed in order for a search to be legal.
The court cited a case by another court, which s p e a rs later in this study, that held drug
testing o f the general student body o f a public school was unconstitutional Anabel v.
Ford. 653 F. Supp. 22 (W. Ark, 1985). The drug program in question brought a very
private function under the rigid scrutiny o f school authorities, without any individualized
suspicion. Justice Gibson indicated the policy the school board approved was, “an across
the board eagle eye examination o f personal information o f almost every child in the
school district.” 730 F. Supp. 759, 765. In addition, he said “h is difficult to imagine any
search o f school children more intrusive. The defendant’s drug testing program is further
unreasonable because it is not likely to accomplish its ostensible goals.” Id.. 766.
The school district’s goal to prevent substance abuse was too global. According to the
opinion, the program was not supported by the compelling interest that school officials
must have before a warrantless search is permissible. The invasion on the personal
privacy of the students outweighed the unrealistic outcome that the school was trying to
accomplish, which was to prevent substance abuse. A permanent injunction was granted
to prevent school officials from continuing with the unconstitutional urinalysis program.

Kelly

V.

Orleans Parish School B o ard Docket No. 97-1696(E.D.La. 1998)

This unpublished case contains data relevant to this study so was included despite the
fact it was found only in Lexis-Nexis.
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FACT
This incident began when a student reported to school personnel that her S42.00 for a
band trip was missing. Cherrie Kelly, a high school student, was strip searched by a
female vice-principal in search o f the S42.00 that was reported stolen. Teacher. Julie
Pertuit, originally did a cursory search o f her students and the classroom as soon as she
was notified o f the missing money. When her search failed to discover the money she
contacted Security Officer Rhome, who searched the student’s bookbags, desks, and
personal property. A fter this search failed to produce the money Vice-Principal
Goudreaux was notified so he could search the male students and Vice-Principal Braden
was called to search the female students. The female students were taken into the
women’s restroom and told to remove their clothes. An observational only search was
conducted, the girls were not touched in any way. Plaintiff, Kelly, brought action
claiming that her Fourth Amendment right had been violated.
HOLDING
The search was found to be reasonable and the judge ruled in favor o f the defendants.
REASONING
As held by the Supreme Court in T.L.O., the district court concluded that the
reasonableness o f any search involves a twofold inquiry: was the search justified at its
inception; and, was the search actually conducted reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which originally justified the interference. Searches o f students are
ordinarily justified at inception when there is reasonable suspicion for suspecting the
search will turn up evidence the student has violated or is violating either the law or a
school rule. In this case it was reasonable to believe that the search o f the students would
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uncover the missing money. In the Court’s opinion. Justice Fallon indicated, “This
Circuit recognized that no individualized suspicion is required in school search
situations”. He held that the search was reasonable and ruled in favor o f the defendants.

The cases from the S'** circuit were helpful in providing data that was relevant to this
study. Next, is a review o f cases from the 6* circuit.

6* Circuit
O f the four cases from the 6* circuit that were included in this study, two were
decided by the appellate court. The two cases that were heard in the district court were
seven years apart and both involved a strip search by a school official that was trying to
locate drugs. The two cases that were decided at the a p e lla te level were quite different.
One involved a search that took place during a field trip and the other involved a strip
search to locate drugs.

Cales

V.

Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985)

FACTS
Plaintiff Ruth Cales was 15 years o f age and a 10* grade student at Howell High
School. At the time o f the incident Cales was observed by a school security guard
ducking behind a parked car at a time she was scheduled to be in class. When asked by
the security officer to identify herself Cales gave a false name. She was subsequently
taken to the office o f assistant principal Daniel McCarthy where she was asked to empty
the contents o f her purse on a desk. Her purse contained Howell High School
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“readmittance slips” which she possessed improperly. Knowing that she had violated a
school rule, Mr. McCarthy then instructed Cales to turn her jean pockets inside-out. She
subsequently completely removed her jeans. A dispute existed as to why she removed her
jeans. A female assistant principal, Mary Steinhelper, asked the Plaintiff to bend over so
the contents o f her brassiere could be visually examined. The basis o f the search was the
belief of assistant principal McCarthy that Cales was in possession o f illegal drugs.
During the search the only persons present were Mary Steinhelper and Colleen Wise,
who was a secretary to assistant principal McCarthy. At no time was the Plaintiffs body
touched in any maimer.
HOLDING
Justice Newblatt indicated that the facts o f the case indicated that the search was
unreasonable because it was not reasonable at its inception. The Judge ordered that the
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be granted. In addition, Mr. McCarthy was not
granted qualified immunity.
REASONING
The court indicated that by removing her jeans it did not make the search any more
intrusive. In addressing the first prong of the test to see if the search was reasonable, the
district court had to decide if the search w as reasonable at its inception. The student was
observed ducking behind a parked car at a time she should have been in class and when a
security guard questioned her, she gave a bogus name. Based on her conduct, McCarthy
concluded that Cales was involved in drugs and should be searched. While it is clear that
the student violated a school rule, no basis for a body search was created. The question
presented was whether the violation created reasonable suspicion for a search involving
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drug usage. In his opinion, District Court Justice Newblatt indicated that the student’s
ambiguous behavior could have meant that she was truant, stealing h u b c ^ s, or that she
had left class to meet a boyfriend. It could have signified that the plaintiff had violated
any of an infinite number o f laws or school rules. He went on to say:
This Court does not read T.L.O. so broadly as to allow a school administrator the
right to search a student because that student acts in such a way so as to create
reasonable suspicion that the student has violated some rule or law. Rather, the
burden is on the administrator to establish that the student’s conduct is such that it
creates reasonable suspicion that a specific rule or law has been violated and that a
search could reasonably be expected to produce evidence o f that violation, (p. 457)
Administration was directed through this decision to make sure there is a coiuiection
between the search and the expected wrongdoing. If school officials fail to carry that
burden o f proof the search necessarily fall beyond the parameters o f the Fourth
Amendment. Due to the fact that the first prong did not past the TLO test, the second
prong was unnecessary.

Webb

V.

McCullough. 828 F. 2d 1151 (6* Cir. 1987)

FACTS
Wendy Webb took a school trip to Hawaii as a member o f the high school band. The
school principal, Thomas McCullough, and his wife were two o f the chaperones on the
trip. Prior to departure, McCullough advised all members o f the band that if anyone used
alcohol or illegal drugs they would be sent home. Defendant McCullough had been
advised by another chaperone that some students had used an unoccupied room adjacent
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to, and sharing a balcony with, W ebb’s room the previous night. McCullough contacted
hotel security and asked to gain access to the room adjacent to Webb’s. When the hotel
security guard opened the door a teenage boy jumped over the barrier that separated the
vacant room with Webb’s room. McCullough then entered Webb’s room and saw the boy
jump back over the barrier onto the balcony o f the vacant room. The boy was
apprehended by hotel security and McCullough told Webb and the other girls in the room
they were being sent home because they had a boy in their room. While he was telling the
girls they were being sent home, another chaperone found a six-pack o f beer and a quart
of wine in the unoccupied room. Webb and the other girls were then sent home. W ebb
brought action against McCullough claiming that he violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches.
The district court granted Defendant McCullough’s motion for summary judgment
indicating that the search was reasonable. Webb then appealed.
HOLDING
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
REASONING
Justice Boggs, who wrote the opinion for the appellate court, indicated the court
relied heavily on the doctrine o f in loco parentis when deciding this matter. While the
court acknowledged that in loco parentis doctrine is no longer recognized as a source o f
school officials’ general authority over pupils, they indicated that because this was a trip
far away from school, it applied in this case. Justice Boggs wrote:
It must be remembered that this case arose in the context o f a “spring break” trip and
that the school officials present were charged with the care and safety o f the
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plaintiffs while they were more than 5,000 miles from home. More so than in an
ordinary situation, the school officials were standing in loco parentis. They were
faced with the difficult task o f supervising the students in an unstmctured
environment far different from that present within the confines o f the schoolhouse.
(p. 457)
The court determined that T.L.O. was applicable to searches conducted during field
trips. .Administrators were expected to use the same standards set forth in T.L.O. with
respect to searches whether it is at school or on field trips. Several crucial facts that
explained why in loco parentis applied in this case and not in the T.L.O. case were
described in the opinion. One difference noted was because this case did not involve
mandated education. It was a voluntary undertaking and parents had to sign a permission
slip, which transferred parental authority to school officials. McCullough was not merely
acting as an agent of the state in his role as principal, he was also acting in loco parentis.
The opinion indicated that the in loco parentis doctrine was no longer recognized as the
source o f school officials’ general authority over pupils, but it does retain some vitality in
appropriate circumstances. In all actuality, this search would be the equivalent o f a
parent’s search o f a child’s room.
Second, greater ranges o f activities occur during extracurricular activities than during
school, which would require a greater degree of administrative intervention. In addition,
there are many more ways for a student to be injured or to transgress school rules or laws
during a non-curricular field trip than during relatively orderly school hours. The court
advised that parents would be reluctant to permit their children to go on field trips if
school official’s authority to impose supervision were subject to the same Fourth
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Amendment limitations as apply to police officers. We learned from T.L.O. that school
officials have a lesser standard than police officials with respect to searches. The opinion
also indicated that it would be inappropriate to expose school districts and administrators
to increased tort liability while denying them the authority necessary to lessen the
likelihood o f student injury. In conclusion. Justice Boggs wrote:
Although we understand Webb’s alleged discomfort at being intruded upon, such
embarrassment alone simply does not rise to the level o f a constitutional claim,
because W ebb’s factual allegations do not show that the searches exceeded the in
loco parentis aspect o f McCullough’s hybrid authority. Thus, there is no genuine
issue o f material fact on the question o f the reasonableness of the searches, and the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of the searches is affirmed.
(p. 1157)

Williams v. Elington, 936 F. 2d 881 (6* Cir. 1991)
FACTS
Principal Ellington received a phone call from the parent of a student advising him
that a student offered drugs to her daughter. Ellington interviewed the student and
discovered that during typing class two girls, Michelle and Angela, produced a clear
white vial that contained a white powder. The girls placed the powder on their fingers,
sniffed it, and offered it to Ginger who refused it. After talking to the typing teacher,
Ellington learned that a letter was found the previous semester under the desk o f Angela
that indicated she was involved with friends who attend parties that offer the “rich m an’s
drug.” Ellington discussed the matter with Angela’s’ aunt who was the school guidance
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counselor. A few days after the incident began. G inger went to Ellington’s office to
report that the girls who were doing drugs before were once again using a w hite powdery
substance. Ellington contacted the two assistant principals and the three o f them removed
Angela and Michelle from class. The girls were taken to Ellington’s office where
Michelle produced a small brown vial that contained a substance called “rush” . While
possession o f “rush” was not illegal, it was illegal to inhale it. Both girls denied
possession o f any drugs. Ellington wanted to search the girls’ lockers because the brown
vial did not match the description given by Ginger. Assistant Principal Jones searched the
locker assigned to Angela and the locker she used to house her belongings. N o drugs
were found in either locker. Likewise a search o f A ngela’s books and purse conducted by
female Assistant Principal Easley produced no evidence o f drugs. Finally, Ellington
asked Easley to take Angela into her office and search her person, in the presence o f a
female secretary. Inside Easley’s office Angela was asked to empty her pockets which
she promptly did. Easley then asked the girl to remove her T-shirt and lower her jeans to
her knees. Finally, Angela was told to remove her shoes and socks. Easley found no
evidence o f drugs as a result o f the search. Angela filed suit claiming violation o f the
fourth amendment seeking a declaration that the search conducted was unconstitutional.
The district court ruled in favor of the Defendants. The ruling was ^ p e a le d .
HOLDING
The district court’s granting of summary judgm ent in favor of Defendants was
affirmed.
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REASONING
The district court reasoned that Angela had not established the search was
unconstitutional as a matter o f law. On appeal, Angela alleged that the Defendants’
conduct violated her right to be free from unconstitutional searches pursuant to the fourth
amendment. In addition, .Angela claimed that the district court emed in ruling that the
warrantless strip search was not unreasonable.
The a p e lla te court was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds to conduct the
search. Ellington’s decision to search the student and her possessions for drugs was based
upon the information that was provided to him through the course o f the week. Another
student twice told Ellington that Angela was using drugs in school and told by a teacher
that an incriminating note regarding drug use had been previously found under Angela’s
desk. The tips Ellington received were unverified yet reliable.
The appellate court reasoned that Ellington was not unreasonable to suspect that
based on the information he received a search o f the student and/or her belongings would
produce drugs. The search was justified at its inception and conducted reasonably within
the scope o f the circumstances that led to the initial interference. The search was
conducted by someone of the same sex and had a wimess that was the same sex. In
addition, the fact that the student was being searched for drugs that could be contained in
a small vial and concealed in many place on the body the search was not unreasonable.
The a p e lla te court indicated that due to the small size o f the vial and the ease to which it
could be concealed, the strip search was not excessively intrusive.
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Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
FACTS
Terry Widener was a high school student. One day one o f Widener’s teachers noticed
a strong odor o f marijuana emanating from him. The teacher contacted an administrator
and a security guard was sent to the classroom to escort the student to the Dean’s office.
The security guard indicated that Widener had dilated pupils, was acting sluggish, and
smelled o f marijuana. Widener gave the security guard permission to search his jacket
and bag. Widener was questioned by the security guard about the use and possession of
marijuana. After the initial search failed to turn up evidence of wrongdoing, a pat-down
search was conducted and the student complied with security’s request to empty his
pockets. Still no evidence o f marijuana was produced. Widener was then asked to lift his
shirt and remove his shoes and socks, which he did. The security guard then asked the
student if he was wearing gym shorts, which he responded affirmatively. Widener
lowered his pants and was asked to pull the shorts tight aroimd his crotch area to permit
the security guard an opportunity to observe whether he was concealing any drugs. Like
the previous searches, this produced no evidence o f drug possession. Widener confirmed
that he never felt threatened, nor was he touched while his pants were lowered. He
contended that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated.
HOLDING
The district court held that based on the material facts as presented by both parties the
search was reasonable. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted by
Justice Spiegel.
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REASONING
First, the search was deemed to be reasonable at its inception. The odor o f marijuana
coupled with dilated pupils was reasonable suspicion to believe that the student had
violated the school rule forbidding use or possession o f a controlled substance. Second,
the search was considered to be reasonably related in scope to circumstances that led to
the search in the first place. Since it was marijuana that was being searched for the court
concluded that it was reasonable to have the student remove his clothing and visually
observe if he was “crotching” drugs. The search was reasonable in scope in light o f the
age and sex of the student involved, and the nature o f the rule violation. The Plaintiff was
removed from the classroom and the presence of his classmates. In addition, the Plaintiff
was only asked to remove his jeans, not his undergarments, and, only in the presence o f
two security guards o f the same sex. Widener was never threatened in any way, touched
inappropriately, or touched at all while his pants were down.

Three o f the four cases from the 6* circuit involved searches where the students were
required to remove clothing. The fourth case once again reviewed a search that took place
during a school sponsored field trip.

7* Circuit
The eleven cases that were ^ p lic a b le to this study from the 7* circuit were by far the
most from any one circuit. The cases ranged from 1985-2000 and covered a variety o f
Fourth Amendment issues. Five o f the cases were heard only in district court while six
cases were decided at the appellate level.
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Martens v. District No. 220 Board o f Education, 620 F. Supp. 29 (D.C.Ill. 1985)
FACTS
Responding to two anonymous phone tips alleging two students were in possession o f
drugs and drug par^hem alia, an administrator at Reavis High School conducted a locker
search o f one student and brought a second student (Martens) to her office. Martens was
confronted with the allegations o f the phone call. He denied he had a controlled substance
in his possession and refused to consent to a search. A S h eriffs deputy, at school on
another matter, came by the administrator’s office and spoke to Martens. At the urging o f
the Sheriff, Marten emptied his pockets. A pipe with marijuana residue was found on
M arten’s possession. Martens was suspended from school pending a hearing before the
Board o f Education. At the conclusion o f the hearing the Board decided to expel Martens
for the remainder of the school year. The expulsion was not entered on Marten’s
permanent school record. Marten claimed that the expulsion kept him from graduating a
semester early. He brought action against the district claiming that the search violated his
Fourth Amendment right.
HOLDING
The court held in favor o f the school district and agreed that the search was
reasonable.
REASONING
This case originated prior to the Supreme Court ruling in T.L.O. being handed down.
The court waited and used the standard set in T.L.O. for determining if the search o f the
student was reasonable. Martens did not believe that school personnel had reason to
search him based solely on an anonymous phone tip. The court indicated that not only did
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school officials have reasonable suspicion to conduct a search but probably probable
cause to search Martens.
School personnel have “reasonable suspicion” when they believe that a student has
violated or was violating a law or school rule. The court concluded that school officials
had reasonable suspicion to believe that Martens violated a school rule when they
received the anonymous phone calls. This made the search reasonable at its inception.
Justice Moran indicated in his opinion, that reasonable suspicion led to measures
reasonably related to the objectives o f the search and were not excessively intrusive. The
measures consisted of a high school junior being asked in a school office during school
hours and in light of specific information relating to marijuana, to empty his pockets.
Martens reluctantly complied and that is when incriminating evidence against him was
uncovered.

Schaill

V.

Tippecanoe School District, 864 F 2d 1309 (7* Cir. 1988)

FACTS
Based on drug use by high school baseball players, the board o f trustees instituted a
drug testing policy in 1986 for all athletes and cheerleaders. The policy originated when
baseball coaches, acting on information regarding possible drug use by their players, had
sixteen o f their players submit urine samples. O f the samples provided, five o f the
students tested positive for marijuana use. Due to these results, other reports o f drug use
among athletes, and concern over the general high incidence rate o f drug abuse among
high school students nationwide, the school board decided to institute a random urine
testing policy for all athletes and cheerleaders.
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All students and parents/guardians o f students desiring to participate in interscholastic
athletics within the Tippecanoe School District were required to sign a consent form
agreeing to submit to urinalysis if chosen on a random basis. Failure to sign the consent
form or failing to take a drug test would result in the individual not being allowed to
participate in interscholastic athletics. Each student that participated on an athletic team
was assigned a number. School officials were authorized to conduct random urine tests
during the sports season. In order to select a student to be tested, the numbers assigned to
each student was placed in a box, and a single number was drawn.
The athlete chosen to be tested was escorted by a school official o f the same sex to a
bathroom, where the student was supplied with an empty specimen bottle. The student
was then required to enter a lavatory stall and close the door in order to produce a sample.
The student was not under direct visual observation while producing the sample, but the
water in the toilet bowl was tinted to prevent the student from providing a false sample.
The monitor was instructed to stand outside the stall to listen for normal sounds o f
urination and then check the warmth o f the sample by hand to verify genuineness.
The procedure set up for handling and analyzing the sample was designed to insure
accuracy and anonymity. The sample was then sent to a private testing facility, where it
was tested for the presence of controlled substances or performance-enhancing drugs.
Any sample that tested positive the first time was ran through a second completely
different battery o f tests. If a sample test still came out positive, the student and his/her
parent/guardian were informed o f the results. They then had the opportunity to have the
sample tested again at a laboratory o f their choice. In addition, they had the chance to
present to school officials any evidence that suggests an iimocent explanation o f the
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positive results. Factors such as legally taken prescriptions or over-the-counter
medication that could have impacted the results.
Absent a satisfactory explanation, the athlete was banned from participating in a
portion of the competition events during the athletic season. The first positive urinalysis
test resulted in a suspension from 30% o f the athletic contests, a second resulted in
suspension in 50% o f the contests. A third event resulted in the student being barred from
competition for a full calendar year. A fourth occurrence resulted in the athlete being
barred from all interscholastic competition for the remainder o f his/her high school
career. No other penalties were imposed, and the student could decrease the specified
punishment by participating in an approved drug-counseling program.
Darcy Shaill and Shelly Johnson brought action in district court alleging that the
urinalysis program was a violation of the Fourth Amendment right.
The district court ruled that the urinalysis was a “search” but the program was not a
violation to any person’s Fourth Amendment right. The girls appealed.
HOLDING
The judgment o f the district court was affirmed by the appellate court.
REASONING
The court relied on T.L.O. when then decided the search in this case was reasonable.
They concluded that probable cause was not a prerequisite to a search in the setting o f a
school, as explained in the T.L.O. decision. To determine the level o f suspicion required
before a search could be conducted meant balancing the nature and quality o f the search,
that is how intrusive the search was against the person, with the importance the search is
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to the government. It was decided in this case that the minimal intrusion o f the student
was outweighed by the school’s desire to keep the students free o f drug use.
The appellate court agreed that the urinalysis was indeed a search. In his opinion.
Justice Cudahy said:
We recognize that, if students are to be educated at all, an environment conducive to
learning must be maintained. The plague o f illicit drug use which currently threatens
our nation’s school adds a major dimension to the difficulties the schools face in
fulfilling their purpose -the education o f our children. If the schools are to survive
and prosper, school administrators must have reasonable means at their disposal to
deter conduct which substantially disrupts the school environment. In this case, we
believe that the Tippecanoe County School Corporation has chosen a reasonable and
limited response to a serious evil. In formulating its urinalysis program, the school
district has been sensitive to the privacy rights o f its students, and has sought to
emphasize rehabilitation over punishment. We cannot conclude that this approach is
inconsistent with the mandates o f the constitution. (P. 1324)
This case was decided eight years prior to Vemonia and served as a precursor to the
drug testing policy ruling that the United States Supreme Court handed down in 1996.

Cornfield v. Consolidated High School District No. 230,
991 F. 2d. 1316 (7* Cir. 1993)
FACTS
Brian Cornfield was a student in a behavioral disorder program at Sandburg High
School. One day, a teacher aide found him outside the school building during instruction
time, in violation o f a school rule. The aide left the student alone and reported the
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incident to Cornfield’s teacher and an administrator. The aide told them o f her suspicion
that Cornfield appeared “too well-endowed.” Another teacher and teacher aide
corroborated the story and indicated that there appeared to be an unusual bulge in
Cornfield’s crotch area. No action was taken on the day o f the incident.
One o f Cornfield’s teachers reported that previously the student had indicated to him
that he was dealing drugs. In addition, the student tested positive for marijuana and was
assigned to a drug rehabilitation program, which he did not successfully complete. A few
months prior to this incident Cornfield was found to be in possession o f a live bullet. The
day after initially suspecting Cornfield o f crotching drugs. Cornfield’s teacher suspected
him again o f being in possession of marijuana. This time Mr. Frye, and the Dean, Mr.
Spencer, prevented him from boarding the school bus at the end o f the day. Spencer had
also observed the unusual bulge in Cornfield’s crotch area. On that day they believed the
sixteen-year-old to be “crotching” drugs, and Spencer and Frye asked him to accompany
them to the administration office. When confironted with their suspicion. Cornfield grew
agitated and began yelling obscenities. Frye telephoned the student’s mother to seek
consent to search. She refused. The two school officials escorted Cornfield to the boys’
locker room, made sure that there were no other persons in the room, and locked the
door. They had him remove his street clothes and put on a gym uniform. Spencer and
Frye visually inspected his naked body and physically inspected his clothes. There was
no evidence o f drugs or any other contraband produced during the search. Afterwards the
school bus returned to the school and took Cornfield home. Alleging that the search
violated his Fourth Amendment right. Cornfield brought an action against the School
District.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor o f the Defendants.
HOLDING
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
REASONING
School officials filed affidavits that reported several reasons that they suspected
Cornfield to be involved with drug activities. According to Spencer, Cornfield once
stated that he was dealing drugs, and it was believed that he did not successfully complete
a drug rehabilitation program. The bus driver had reported the smell o f marijuana from
where Cornfield was sitting on the bus and one student reported having observed
Cornfield smoking marijuana on one occasion on the bus. In addition, Spencer was told
by a student that Cornfield possessed drugs while on school grounds and Cornfield
himself had related to Spencer that he constantly thought o f drugs.
The district court ruled that the prior incidents coupled with the suspicion o f
crotching drugs provided reasonable suspicion for Cornfield to be searched. The a p e lla te
court indicated that in order to overcome the district court’s summary judgment.
Cornfield would need to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Spencer and Frye
relied on a number o f relatively recent events reported by various teachers and aides as
well as their owm personal observations.
The appellate court was presented with a number o f incidents that allegedly served as
a foundation for reasonable suspicion; therefore, the search was reasonable based on the
two-prong test identified in TLO. The search was deemed reasonable in scope because
Cornfield was sixteen-years-old, the search was conducted in a private area by two adults
o f the same sex, and Spencer and Frye believed the strip search was the least intrusive act
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that they could conduct to confirm or deny their suspicions. In addition. Cornfield was
never touched during the strip search only examined visually from a distance.
As the facts of this case indicated, Frye and Spencer relied on a number o f recent
events, (as described earlier) and reports by various teachers and aides as well as their
personal observations when they decided to conduct a search. The court concluded that
the cumulative effect was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion that Cornfield was
crotching drugs.

Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D Ind. 1995)
FACTS
On March 4, 1994, immediately following their physical education class, two female
students reported to their gym teacher that four dollars and fifty cents was missing fi*om
the locker room. The teacher notified Kevin McClung, the principal, o f the allegations.
McClung, with the assistance o f two female staff members, Janice Miller and Diana
Stewart, decided to conduct a search o f the students and their lockers. The girls were
taken into the locker room where their lockers and book bags were searched. The girls
were also advised to remove their shoes and socks. McClung instructed Miller and
Stewart to take the girls to another part o f the locker room and see if the money was
hidden in the girls’ bras. All o f the strip searches were conducted in the same fashion,
although the specific details o f each one vary somewhat. O nce the girls were searched
they were permitted to go on to their next class.
At some point during that day, McClung concluded that the search had been a
mistake. He spent that evening and the rest o f the weekend contacting the parents o f the
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students to report what had happened. Six o f the girls filed suit, claiming that their Fourth
Amendment right had been violated. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants filed motions
for summary judgment.
HOLDING
The district court granted the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgm ent and held that
the searches were unreasonable. The court was then asked to decide if the Plaintiffs
should be awarded monetary damages. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment
on the issue o f qualified immunity. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the
issue o f qualified immunity as to McClung, Miller, and Stewart was denied. The case did
not provide information regarding whether or not damages were awarded.
REASONING
District Court Judge Lee, who presided over the case, cited Justice Stevens’ opinion
in T.L.O. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) as a factor having significant impact
on his decision. Stevens indicated that it does not matter what standard is applied,
shocking strip searches have no place in the schoolhouse. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325,382.
Stevens said, “Deeply intrusive searches outside the custodial context are only reasonable
to prevent imminent and serious harm.” Id., at 382. Since it was merely four dollars and
fifty cents that was missing, there were no serious grounds for a search as intrusive as the
one conducted. Having ruled the search unreasonable the court was then asked to decide
if McClung, Miller, and Stewart were immune fit)m monetary damages. The court found
that the Plaintiffs had met their burden o f establishing that the Defendants violated
constitutional rights that a reasonable person would have known. In fact, McClung, by his
own admission during testimony indicated that he felt the search had gone too far. A
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reasonable person would have known that the strip search was a violation o f the students’
Fourth Amendment right; therefore McClung was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
seventh circuit addressed the issue o f strip searches in Doe v. Renfrow. 631 F.2d 91
(1980), which predates T.L.O. so was not included in the study. The court in that case
specifically concluded that a nude search o f a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion and a
violation o f human decency. With respect to Miller and Stewart, they argued that they
should receive qualified immunity because they were simply employees following orders
from a superior. The court held that there is no precedent to indicate that teachers and
other school personnel are to be held to a lesser standard than the official that actually
orders an illegal search, for the purposes o f determining the issue o f qualified immunity.
The evidence presented indicated that both Miller and Stewart were both active
participants in the search, and not mere observers. Therefore, they were denied qualified
immunity.

Wallace v. The Batavia School District 101.68 F. 3d. 1010 (7* Cir. 1995)
FACTS

When business teacher James Cliffe walked into his classroom he observed two
female students screaming at each other and calling each other vulgar names. He ordered
both girls to be seated and quiet down. That tactic did not work and both girls. Heather
Wallace and Kim Fairbanks, continued to be verbally abusive to one another. The matter
became so aggressive that Cliffe ordered Wallace to get her books and leave the
classroom. Wallace failed to respond to Cliffe's instruction so he grabbed her left wrist to
help expedite her exit. Cliffe told Wallace to hurry up and grasped her right elbow to
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move her out of the room. Wallace discontinued all movement toward the door and told
Cliffe to let go, which he did, and Wallace then proceeded to exit the classroom. Wallace
claimed the contact with Cliffe caused injury to her elbow. She sued Cliffe and the school
district alleging violations o f her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable seizure.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. Wallace then
appealed that ruling.
HOLDING
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision.
REASONING
Wallace theorized that Cliffe violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizures when he grabbed her elbow and wrist. The appellate court
recognized the fact that immediate and effective action is sometimes needed to deal with
events that call for discipline. Justice Kaime, writing for a unanimous Seventh Circuit
panel, indicated in his opinion:
The diminished protection o f the Fourth Amendment for public schoolchildren is
proper, the Court reasoned in T.L.O., because classroom discipline and order are
crucial to effective education, and, moreover, the infusion o f schools with drugs and
the related escalation o f violence make order and discipline all the harder to
maintain. (P. 1012)
Justice Kanne mentioned that T.L.O. specifically dealt with searches, but several
circuit courts have relied upon that ruling to find that seizures o f students by teachers also
come within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. "While in school or under the
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supervision o f school authorities, public school students are in a unique constitutional
position enjoying less than the full constitutional liberty protection afforded those persons
not in school” (P. 1013). The court did not find any indication that W allace's civil rights
were violated in any way. Justice Kanne said:
She was deprived of liberty to some degree fit>m the moment she entered the school,
and no one could suggest constitutional infringement based on that basic deprivation.
And if, as the Supreme Court recognized in T.L.O., discipline is crucial to education
and education, as Epictetus wrote in the DISCOURSES, is necessary for freedom,
depriving students o f liberty is linked to the ultimate liberation o f the student.
Moreover, flexibility in discipline is necessary to preserve the informality o f the
student-teacher relationship, (p. 1013)
The court held that, in the context o f the public school, a school official who seizes a
student is not in violation o f the Fourth Amendment when the restriction o f liberty is
reasonable under the circumstances then existing and apparent. A teacher or administrator
is entitled to take reasonable actions to maintain the goals o f achieving order and
discipline. Depending on the circumstances, reasonable action may certainly include the
seizure o f a student in the face o f provocation or disruptive behavior. Justice Kanne
indicated that Wallace did not present a viable claim that her Fourth Amendment right
was violated. He ruled that Cliffe's conduct was not unreasonable. Kanne went on to say,
"In fact, the only thing unreasonable in this scenario is that Wallace has made a federal
case out o f a routine school disciplinary matter” (p. 1015). Kanne concluded by
responding, "This type o f litigation denigrates the Constitution and is a disservice to
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school systems, the federal courts, and the public they serve” (p. 1016). The district court
decision was affirmed.

Bills

V.

Homer Consolidated School District 959 F. Supp. 507 (N.D.lll. 1997)

FACTS
One day, a fire was found burning in a locker at Schilling Elementary School.
Principal Jolas and Police Officer Kamarauskas began investigating the incident
immediately. During their investigation they discovered a hand-held propane torch in a
locker close to where the fire took place.
Plaintiff, Robert Bills, was a student at the school and was questioned several times
by Jolas, Kamarauskas, and other school officials. He was questioned every day
regarding his involvement with the fire, for five consecutive days, sometimes without the
presence of his parents.
On February 8, 1996, a student that was an acquaintance o f Bills, admitted to starting
the fire with matches. Notwithstanding this confession on February 9, 1996, Officer
Kamarauskas pulled plaintiff out o f class, questioned him in a coercive manner, and
extracted a signed confession wherein he admitted bringing the torch to school and giving
it to the boy that admitted starting the fire. Bills was suspended from school and later
expelled for his bringing o f a torch to school. His expulsion was later overturned in state
court and he returned to school. Following his return to school Bills brought action
against Jolas and Kamarauskas claiming that they violated his Fourth Amendment rights
by unreasonable seizures and interrogations.
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HOLDING
The court held that Bill’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure was violated.
REASONING
In his opinion. Justice Zagel indicated that school officials may only search and seize
students when it is reasonable to do so under the circumstances. He said:
Although plaintiff’s factual allegations are scant in this regard, I conclude that his
assertions that Jolas repeatedly pulled him out o f class and interrogated him on a
daily basis for at least five days and continued to interrogate him after another boy
admitted starting the fire at Schilling school sufficiently allege a degree o f
unreasonableness to withstand a motion to dismiss, (p. 513)
The decision of the court was made without trial and purely on the pleadings o f the
litigants. The threshold inquiry regarding the qualified immunity defense as Justice Zagel
saw it was did Jolas violate any o f plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights? He
concluded that the fact that school officials repeatedly pulled Bills from class and
interrogated him, even after another boy claimed responsibility for the fire, was
unreasonable enough to withstand the motion to dismiss. The motion for qualified
immunity was denied.

Bridgman v. New Trier High School District NO. 203.
128 F. 3d 1146 (7“’ Cir. 1997)
FACTS
Andrew Bridgman was a freshman student at New Trier Township High School. On
February 27, 1995 he was required to attend an after-school smoking cessation program
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as a result o f being caught smoking cigarettes at school. Mary Dailey was the supervisor
o f the program that Bridgman attended. Upon Bridgman's arrival at the program, Dailey
noticed that Bridgman was giggling and acting unruly. Dailey indicated that throughout
the program Bridgman behaved inappropriately, had dilated pupils, bloodshot eyes, and
erratic handwriting. As a result of her observations, Dailey became suspicious that
Bridgman had been using marijuana.
Bridgman was taken by Dailey into an adjoining room and accused o f being under the
influence of drugs, which he denied. The student asked, and was granted permission, to
phone his mother. After his phone conversation with his mother Bridgman was taken into
another adjoining room where he was examined by the school's Health Services
Coordinator, Joanne Swanson. Swanson noticed that the student's blood pressure and
pulse were considerably higher than what was recorded during a physical examination
earlier in the year. She also noted that the student’s eyes were not bloodshot but his
pupils were dilated. Swanson did not regard Bridgman's behavior as strange or believe he
was under the influence o f drugs.
After the examination, Dailey told Bridgman to remove his outer jersey and hat and
empty his pockets so that she could conduct a search. His shoes and socks were removed
as well. Dailey searched all his garments along with the contents o f his pockets.
Bridgman continued to wear his undershirt and pants at all times.
The student's mother arrived and she escorted him into another room for a private
conversation. Upon their return, Ms. Bridgman was asked to grant perm ission for a
reactivity test. A reactivity test shows how eyes react to light. Ms. Bridgm an refused to
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authorize a reactivity test and opted instead to take her son to a pediatrician for a drug
test. The drug test indicated that Bridgman had not been using marijuana.
Bridgman filed action alleging that his Fourth Amendment right had been violated by
the alleged unreasonable search conducted by Dailey.
The district court held that the search was not unreasonable and granted summary
judgment to the defendant. Bridgman argued that the surmnary judgment was
inappropriate and appealed the lower court's ruling.
HOLDING
The a p ellate court affirmed the grant o f summary judgment handed down by the
district court.
REASONING
Justice Cummings wrote the opinion o f the co u rt The question that needed to be
answered was whether or not Dailey's actions in ordering the medical assessment and
conducting the search were appropriate. Cummings indicated in his opinion that:
Dailey's own expertise as a certified drug addiction counselor, along with medical
publications she produced suggesting that a respectable segment o f medical opinion
supports both her interpretation of Bridgman's alleged symptoms and her use o f the
medical assessment as an investigative tool, indicate that her suspicions and further
actions, based upon the symptoms she alleges, were not unreasonable. The
symptoms were sufficient to ground Dailey's suspicion, and the medical assessment
was reasonably calculated to uncover further evidence o f the suspected drug use.
(p. 1149)
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In reviewing the district court's summary judgment ruling the appellate court had to
decide whether Bridgman's challenges to Dailey's alleged observations created a genuine
issue of material fact. Swanson's account o f what took place did not support all the details
o f Dailey’s and Bridgman denied he was unruly. Cummings said, "a plaintiffs own
uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgm ent” (p.
1150). Thus the student's denial o f behaving disruptively does not create a genuine issue
as to Dailey's claim. What behavior counts as "unruly" is a matter o f judgment and the
person responsible for the smoking cessation program was empowered to make that
judgment. The observations o f Swanson and Bridgman's mother occurred some time after
Dailey formulated her suspicion that Bridgman was using marijuana. The fact that
Bridgman's eyes were not noticeably bloodshot by the time Swanson and Ms. Bridgman
saw him does not mean they were not bloodshot at the time that Dailey says they were.
For these reasons, Bridgman has not demonstrated a genuine issue o f material fact, and
the challenged search was both justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to
its objectives. The appellate court agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that the search
was not excessively intrusive in relation to its purpose.

Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F. 3d 984

Cir. 1998)

FACTS
John Wilson, Athletic Director o f the High School in Rush County came to believe
that there was a growing drug problem at the school. He indicated that recent events in
the county had caused school officials to become concerned about the well being o f all
students and they initiated a drug-testing program to prevent an epidemic o f drug.
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alcohol, and tobacco problems in the county. A fact o f the case revealed that Wilson and
an assistant superintendent had a subjective perception that drug-use was growing among
students in Rush County. They were only able to provide a few discrete examples o f
incidents. In the 1970s a senior on the track team drowned on a school trip due to
suspected alcohol use. More recently, an automobile crash that involved Rush County
High School students occurred during summer vacation when students in the car were
“huffing”.
Wilson began to collect information from other school systems in order to develop a
proposed drug-testing program at the High School. The Rush County School Board
reviewed the drug-testing program proposed publicly and there was minimal opposition
to it. They approved the program and it became effective in October 1996. The terms o f
the program prohibited a High School student fit>m participating in any extracurricular
activity or driving to school unless the student and parent or guardian consented to a test
for drugs, alcohol, or tobacco in random, unannounced urinalysis exams. Extracurricular
activities were defined to include all sport activities and all clubs including Student
Council. The program also covered students who wished to drive to school. Once consent
was given, participation in these organizations was allowed, and students could be
subjected to testing at any time. The motivation for the implementation o f the program
was the concern about the use of drugs, alcohol, and tobacco by students. Todd, a
freshman, was denied the opportunity to videotape the football team as an extracurricular
activity because his father, a retired Rush County Sheriff, refused to sign the consent
form.
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Todd indicated that extracurricular programs are a valuable school experience, and
participation may assist a student in getting into college. He brought action against the
district on the grounds that the policy violated his Fourth Amendment right. He claimed
the incidents that school officials cited as reasons for instituting the drug-testing program
were not reason enough to claim that the county had a drug problem and therefore the
drug-testing policy was unnecessary. Todd brought suit against the Rush County School
District.
The district court ruled in favor o f the school. P laintiffs motion for summary
judgm ent was denied, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment was granted
HOLDING
The case was appealed where the judgment o f the district court was affirmed.
REASONING
Judge Cummings wrote the opinion for the appellate decision. The outcome o f the
case was govemed by Vemonia v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 and Schaill v. Tipppenanoe 864 F
2d. 1309 (7'^' Cir. 1988). Those two cases upheld random urinalysis requirements for
students that participated in interscholastic athletics. Similar to those cases, the drug
policy at Rush County was undertaken in conjunction with the district’s responsibilities
as a guardian and tutor o f children entrusted to its care. In Vemonia the Supreme Court
determined that deterring drug use by students was a compelling interest.
The opinion stated that participation in interscholastic athletics was a benefit that
carried enhanced prestige within the community, therefore, it was not unreasonable to
couple those benefits with the obligation o f a drug test. The emphasis o f the drug-testing
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program was to protect the health o f the students involved. The a p e lla te court viewed
the policy as non-punitive and more o f an early prevention mechanism.
District court Judge Tinder stated that there was no significant opposition to the
drug-testing program by the community during its planning phrases. In his opinion
Justice Tinder indicated that there is no minimum triggering point o f substance abuse that
must be met to justify the “important enough” interest on the part o f the school system.
Some use o f these prohibited substances by youth may give rise to legitimate concern
about the potential for a rapid increase in abuse, if unchecked. He concluded by saying:
Being elected class president may put a student in a venerated position, much like
that o f a star athlete. In fact, the same could be said o f any student who participates
and excels in extracurricular activity. Thus, the school has an interest in the conduct
o f those who may serve as an example to others. In the final analysis, the reasoning
o f Vemonia seems to hold true for any student who is a member o f an
extracurricular activity. The Court simply pointed out these reasons were especially
applicable to student athletes, (p. 989)
The district court reasoned that extracurricular activities, like sports, are voluntary
activities. Participation in these programs is a privilege; any student joining these
activities would be subject to regulation beyond that o f a non-participant. Therefore, the
drug-testing policy was constitutional.
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Willis V. Anderson Community School Corporation,
158 F. 3d
3, 415 (7^ Cir. 1998)
FACTS
In 1996, officials from two high schools met to discuss growing disciplinary
problems and their perception o f increased drug and alcohol use among students. In an
attempt to address the problems a drug testing policy was established. Students were to
be tested on an individualized suspicion basis. The policy called for drug testing students
who: possessed or used tobacco products; was suspended for three or more days for
fighting; is habitually truant; or violated any other school rule that resulted in at least a
three-day suspension.
The purpose o f the policy was to identify students that were involved with drugs as
early as possible so that they could receive the help they needed. Students that tested
positive were not given any additional punishment. The results o f the drug-test were
disclosed only to parents and a designated school official. However, students who tested
positive could be expelled from school if they failed to complete a drug education
program. In addition, as evident in this case, a student who refused to undergo a test
would be considered to have admitted unlawful substance use.
James Willis was suspended for fighting and was required to take a drug test upon his
return to school. He refused to provide a urine sample and was again suspended from
school and advised that if he refused to submit to the test upon his return, he would be
deemed to having admitted unlawful drug use and would be suspended a third time
pending expulsion proceedings. Willis filed suit claiming that the policy violated his
Fourth Amendment right.
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The district court ruled in favor o f the school district supporting the policy. Willis
then filed an appeal.
HOLDING
The appellate court reversed the lower court’s ruling.
REASONING
The appellate court indicated that the policy addressed a concern that could be tackled
by means of a traditional, suspicion-based approach. Justice Cudahy wrote in his opinion:
The foregoing analysis indicates, while the nature and immediacy o f the
government’s concern is analogous to that in Vemonia, both the efficacy o f the
policy and the privacy interest of the individual are different. Particularly because
the Corporation has not demonstrated that a suspicion-based system would be
unsuitable, in fact would not be highly suitable, (p. 424)
The school tried to prove that a “causal nexus” relationship existed between fighting
and illegal drug use. They provided various literatures to help prove their point. However,
the data presented fi-om their own drug tests results proved that only a small percentage
o f students suspended for fighting actually tested positive for drug use.
Justice Cudahy stated that a prudent person could reasonably conclude that statistics
suggest some relationship does exist between fighting and drug use. That relationship is
by no means conclusive and does not prove that fighting and drug uses are consistently
connected. The appellate court was therefore unable to find that the school’s data was
sufficient enough to establish reasonable suspicion when a student was suspended for
fighting.
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The appellate court indicated that it was important to establish some boundaries so as
not to sanction “routine drug testing.” Because a suspicion-based system could easily
address the Corporation’s concern, the appellate court reversed the district court’s ruling.

Hilton

V.

Lincoln-Way High School, Docket No. 97 C 3872 (E.D.Ill. 1998)

This civil rights action was brought in district court in Illinois. The decision o f the
court was not published. However, the data was retrieved and used for this study through
its Lexis number.
FACTS
Kimberly Hilton auditioned for and became a member o f the Lincoln-Way Band. In
May 1996, she auditioned for and was accepted to participate in the Marching Knights,
which is a segment o f the Lincoln-Way Band. As a member o f the Marching Knights,
Hilton was required to attend a weeklong retreat.
During the retreat members o f the Marching Knights were required to attend what
Hilton described as a “mandatory pizza party” which was held in the locker room with
the exits barred by chaperones. Eventually, the members o f the band were escorted out to
a football field and all but the first year members, including Hilton, were told that they
could leave. After being required to perform humiliating acts, first year members were
then escorted to their rooms and told they could not leave. Plaintiff contended that the
actions o f the school officials responsible for the retreat violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free fi-om unreasonable seizure.
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HOLDING
The district court held that facts presented were sufficient to move forward with the
case. The defendant’s motion to dismiss the case was denied.
RE.A.SONING
Relying on the facts o f the case as described by the plaintiff the district court found
that Hilton had sufficiently alleged a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. School
officials argued that even if a seizure did exist it was reasonable under the circumstances.
The district court confirmed that a determination as to whether a seizure was reasonable
required a close examination o f the factual circumstances.
The district court concluded that students do not forfeit their constitutional rights at
the schoolhouse gate and the Fourth Amendment protects students from unreasonable
searches and seizures by public school officials. Therefore, the district court denied the
school official’s motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed.

Joy

V.

Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, 212 F. 3d 1052 (7'*' Cir. 2000)

FACTS
Perm-Harris-Madison School Corporation created a drug testing policy for students
because of the serious health risks associated with alcohol, drugs, and tobacco.
Several high school students brought suit against the school system because o f the drug
testing policy that was initiated in 1998. The policy focused on five groups and defined
them as follows:
1. All students that participate in extracurricular activities. Activities will include
all athletic teams, music groups, academic competitions, clubs and
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organizations. These students will be part o f a pool o f students that will be
randomly selected for testing.
2. All students who drive to school.
3. All students and staff that volunteer to be part o f the random pool.
4. All students who are suspended from school for three consecutive days for
student misconduct or substantial disobedience. These students must submit to
a drug test before being allowed to return to school.
5. All students for which there is reasonable suspicion o f being under the
influence o f drugs or alcohol must submit to a mandatory test.
The fourth prong o f the policy, regarding suspended students, was not enforced
pursuant to seventh circuit’s opinion in Willis v. Anderson, 158 F. 3d 415 (7* Cir. 1998).
In its policy the school officials stated that extracurricular activities were a privilege
not a right. The school leaders went on to explain that students participating in those
activities assume greater responsibility and make certain sacrifices. Tire policy mandates
that students in extracurricular activities submit to random testing for drugs, alcohol, and
tobacco. In addition, all students participating in extracurricular activities must have
attended at least one drug education session. Also, each participant and their parent or
guardian had to sign and return a form that indicated consent to testing. Failure to return
the consent form resulted in nonparticipation in the activity.
Students who refused to take the test were deemed to have admitted drug use and
were subject to the terms o f the policy, which follows. Students that
soldzprovided/transmitted/manufactured/used/possessed/purchased alcohol and other
drugs or possession o f drug paraphemalia would result in the following:
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1. Notification o f parents/guardians
2. An inunediate student/principal due process hearing as prescribed by law prior
to any recommendation for suspension/expulsion.
3. A report to local law enforcement officials by the school’s administration as
required by law.
4. A report to the local Child Welfare/protection Service as required by law.
5. If disciplinary due process provisions result in a recommendation for
suspension/expulsion, it will be recommended that documented proof o f an
interview assessment by a certified drug treatment expert be provided to the
principal prior to readmittance to school.
6. Provisions to benefit the student readmitted after expulsion will include a
conference with the parent/guardian, building principal, and the at-risk
counselor.
The policy states:
Smoking by students or possession o f tobacco products was not permitted on school
property at any time. Use o f or possession o f tobacco products would result in the
following:
a.

First offense— a three day suspension from school.

b.

Second offense— a five day suspension from school.

c.

Third offense— a five day suspension from school and a recommendation
for expulsion.

Another section o f the policy indicated that student athletes and those participating in
activities would be expelled from the team if they committed a drug or alcohol offense
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during the season. If the offense occurred out-of-season a meeting would take place that
would outline the consequences for future offenses. A second violation, in-season or outof-season. would result in expulsion from all extracurricular activities for one school
year.

As for tobacco, the first offense during the season would result in probation for one
school year in all extracurricular activities the student participated in. The second inseason offense would result in expulsion from all activities for the remainder o f the
season. No consequences were listed for tobacco violations during the off-season.
Several students at Penn High School claimed that the policy violated their Fourth
Amendment rights. The drug testing policy allowed for random, suspicionsless drug
testing for alcohol, drugs, and tobacco o f students involved in extracurricular activities
and of students driving to school. This action was brought forth by a group o f five
students that either drove to school and/or participated in extracurricular activities.
Using the seventh circuit decision in Willis as a guide, the district had the school
system remove the testing o f suspended students from the policy. The district court then
granted summary judgment for the school prompting the Plaintiffs to appeal their case to
the circuit court.
HOLDING
Based on the Todd precedent the circuit court upheld the lower court’s decision
regarding the drug testing policy in part and reversed in part. Drug testing student drivers
and extracurricular activity participants for drugs and alcohol was affirmed, but the
judgment o f the district court insofar as it sanctioned the random testing o f student
drivers for nicotine was reversed.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135
REASONING
The drug testing policy in question required all students involved in extracurricular
activities to sign and return a consent form that allowed the school to conduct a drug test.
The consent form had to be signed by the student and by a parent or guardian and then
returned to the school prior to the student’s participation in the extracurricular activities.
Failure to return the form resulted in nonparticipation in the activity. The policy also
indicated that all students who drove to school would have to be part o f the random pool
to be tested. In addition, students suspended for three consecutive days for student
misconduct or substantial disobedience would have to be tested before returning to
school. All students for which there was reasonable suspicion o f being under the
influence o f drugs or alcohol would be required to submit to a mandatory test.
In deciding the case the court looked primarily at Vemonia for guidance, but also
referred to Todd, which was also a seventh circuit case. In his opinion. Justice Ripple
indicated that when the circuit court allows suspicionless drug testing based on a special
need the court engages in a balancing test between the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment right and the search’s promotion o f legitimate governmental
interests. The appellate court concluded that the school system had demonstrated a
sufficient government need to overcome the students’ Fourth Amendment rights and to
allow the administration o f random drug test to students who chose to drive on school
property. The appellate court described the danger as well-defined and indicated that to
test purely on individualized suspicion would diminish the possibility o f real and
immediate injury. In contrast, the school system had not demonstrated a sufficient
government need to test student drivers for nicotine. The appellate court, using Vemonia
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as its guide, stated that there had been an inadequate showing that such an intrusion was
justified.
The justices on the panel that decided this case were bound by the ruling in Todd to
render this ruling. The judges clearly thought that students involved in extracurricular
activities should not be subject to random, suspicionless drug testing as a condition for
participation. However, because the Todd case was not substantially different, and the
decision was handed down by the same circuit court, this panel o f judges felt obligated to
render the decision they did. Due to the decision o f this same appellate court in Todd this
panel ruled as indicated and stated until the United States Supreme Court addresses this
matter they must adhere to the holdings in Todd.

The 7*^ circuit was rich with data for this study. Eleven cases were included because
they were relevant to the topic o f this dissertation.

8* Circuit
The 8'*' circuit provided five cases that were applicable to this study. Two o f the cases
questioned the constitutionality o f drug-testing policies. One o f those cases was decided
at the district court level while the second case, fourteen years later, rose to the level o f
appellate court. O f the remaining three cases one was settled in district court and the
other two went to a p ellate court before being resolved.
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Anabel. Balch. and Pless v. Ford. 653 F. Supp. 22 (\V''.D. Ark. 1985)
FACTS (Balch)
This case involved action brought by three individuals challenging a drug-abuse
policy that was instituted by an Arkansas public school system. Plaintiffs, Dan Pless, was
a student, and Benson Anable and Laura Balch were former students within the school
system. Each incident involved different scenarios with different rulings and different
reasoning. The policy contained the following provisions:
Sale, distribution, use or possession o f alcoholic beverages, controlled substances,
(illegal drugs), marijuana, or other materials expressly prohibited by federal, state,
or local laws is not permitted by students in school buildings, on school property, or
at school functions. Also, the sale, distribution or abusive use o f prescription, patent
or imitation drugs is not permitted. A trace o f illegal drugs/ alcohol in one’s body is
a violation o f this policy.
Violation o f this policy will result in the following consequences;
1. When possible, the parent/guardian will be notified.
2. The law enforcement agency will be notified o f any criminal activity and school
officials will cooperate fully.
3. The student may be required to submit to any or all o f the following tests;
a. Blood
b. Breath
c. Urinalysis
d. Polygraph
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A student may be searched where there is reasonable suspicion that the student may
be hiding evidence o f a wrongdoing.
One day, during class. Plaintiff Balch went to the girls’ bathroom. A couple o f girls,
that were in the bathroom at the same time as Balch, reported to school officials that
Balch smoked marijuana while in the bathroom. Principal Green questioned Balch and
although she did not exhibit any physical signs o f having smoked marijuana, advised her
that she was suspected o f violating the drug-abuse policy and could prove her innocence
by undergoing a urinalysis test. Balch claimed that she was told she had to take the test.
Because the incident happened on a Friday afternoon the test was not conducted until
Tuesday o f the following week. Results from Balch’s urinalysis test came back positive
and she voluntarily withdrew from school rather than being expelled.
Her lawsuit stemmed from the fact that she believed the urinalysis was unreasonable
because the principal lacked individualized suspicion and had no probable cause to
believe she had smoked marijuana.
HOLDING (Balch)
The court held that the test reached beyond the boundaries permissible o f school
officials. The court ruled in favor of Balch regarding her claim that the urinalysis violated
her Fourth Amendment right. Balch was awarded $1.00 as nominal damages and $500.00
as compensatory damages.
REASONING (Balch)
The district court relied on T.L.O when deciding this case. The court concluded that
reasonable grounds did exist to believe Balch had at least possessed marijuana, which
was a violation o f a school rule. There was sufficient “individualized suspicion” to
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warrant school officials in calling upon Balch to make an explanation. School officials
would have then had an opportunity to observe her conduct and demeanor and formulate
a belief as to the credibility o f her explanation. School officials could have then taken
other “less intrusive” steps to try and justify a drug test. No search o f person, locker, car,
or purse was done or even considered. School officials immediately chose to have Balch
consent to a urinalysis.
Justice Waters wrote:
With regard to plaintiff Balch, the court finds and concludes that she did not
voluntarily consent to the urinalysis and that school officials were not warranted in
concluding that there was a high probability and clear indication that significant
evidence would be disclosed by the Emit immunoassay urine test. The court further
finds and concludes that the use of the Emit immunoassay urine test is an effort by
school officials to impermissibly regulate and control activities o f students unrelated
to the school environment or legitimate goals o f school officials, and is not
sufficiently probative o f guilt or innocence o f the student to justify its use. (p. 44)
The court found that the urine tests, as applied by the school system, was uimecessary
and excessively intrusive in light o f the age and sex o f the students and the lack o f the
need. The use o f such tests, as applied, was banned.
FACTS (Anabel)
Anable and his stepbrother were referred to the principal for being disruptive and
being in the bathroom without a hall pass. Due to his conduct, it was evident that
Anable’s stepbrother had been drinking. Superintendent Ford indicated that both students
smelled o f alcohol. A Seven-Up bottle smelling o f liquor had been found in the vehicle in
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which the boys rode to school. Ford determined that the boys were in violation o f the
school’s drug-abuse policy and told the students that they needed to take a breathalyzer
test or they could withdraw or be expelled from school. They took the test and Anable’s
results indicated that his blood alcohol level was .06. The policy called for any student
with a measurable amount o f alcohol in their blood to be withdrawn or expelled from
school. Anable then withdrew from school.
Plaintiff Anable argued that the blood, breath, urine, and polygraph tests outlined in
the drug-abuse policy were unreasonable, and if they were permissible the appropriate
standard for utilizing the tests is one o f probable cause plus a clear indication that further
evidence will be found. Because Anable was subjected to only the breathalyzer test, the
court confined its focus to that test.
HOLDING (Anabel)
The district court found that reasonable suspicion did exist to warrant a breathalyzer
test and ruled in favor o f the school.
REASONING (Anabel)
The court was unaware o f any case involving breathalyzer tests, in which any court
had determined the appropriate standard governing under what circumstances an accused
could be required to submit to such a test. The court applied the same standard that was
handed down in T.L.O. The court indicated that school officials had sufficient evidence
to support their claim that Anable was in violation o f a school policy. Further, because
Anable registered .06 blood alcohol content when tested, it is clear that the test foimd
more than a mere trace present The court believed that the breathalyzer was not an
exceptionally invasive procedure. Therefore, the court ruled in favor o f the defendants
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and indicated that A nable’s taking of the breathalyzer test was not unconstitutional.
School officials were entitled to believe that there was a clear indication that alcohol in a
significant amount w ould be found in Anable’s breath and blood.
FACTS (Pless)
The third plaintiff, Matthew Pless, alleged that despite the fact he had never been
accused of violating the drug-abuse policy, he felt threatened by the policy because he
had engaged in activities that would subject him to the sanctions o f the drug-abuse
policy. Matthew and his parents argued that Matthew often drinks one glass o f watereddown wine at home w ith meals. Matthew alleged that his conduct had been and will be in
violation o f the policy. He indicated that the policy was unconstitutionally vague,
impermissibly overbroad, and that the tests involved are incompatible with the Fourth
Amendment.
HOLDING (Pless)
The suit brought forth by the third plaintiff, Matthew Pless, was dismissed.
REASONING (Pless)
The opinion o f C h ief Justice Waters indicated:
Matthew does not have a personal stake in the outcome o f this controversy. He
stands to lose nothing, even should the court uphold the challenged policy in toto.
There is no actual o r threatened injury to Matthew resulting from this policy. Any
injury is purely speculative and hypothetical. With regard to Matthew, there is no
necessity for the court to rule on the issue. Accordingly, the court concludes that
Matthew Pless does not have standing to challenge the policy at issue, (p. 34)
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Since Matthew did not have any justifiable reason to bring action against the school
regarding the policy. He was not harmed in any way by the policy so he had no basis for
which to bring action.

Cason

V.

Cook. 810 F. 2d 188 (8"" Cir. 1987)

FACTS
A student approached Connie Cook, the vice-principal o f North High School, and told
her that her gym locker had been broken into and that she was missing a pair of
sweatpants and a duffle bag. She also reported that a friend was missing a pair o f
sweatpants. A few minutes later, another student approached Ms. Cook and reported that
her wallet and coin purse had been taken from her gym locker. The student reported that
the wallet contained $65 along with several credit cards.
Wanda Jones, a police officer who had been assigned to North High School as a
liaison officer was standing with Ms. Cook when these reports were made. The liaison
officer was instructed to cooperate with the school officials. Ms. Cook interviewed
several students in the locker room and was supplied with the names o f four students who
had been seen in the locker area around the time o f the thefts; Shy Cason was one o f the
students identified and then interviewed.
Cason was removed from her classroom and taken into an empty restroom. Cason
testified that Ms. Cook and Ms. Jones took her into a restroom and the door was locked.
Ms. Jones did not participate in the questioning. Ms. Cook informed Cason why she was
being questioned and allowed her an opportunity to respond. After Cason admitted being
in the locker room but denied having any o f the missing items, Ms. Cook told her that she
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was going to search her purse. Ms. Cook then took Cason’s purse and dumped the
contents onto a shelf in the restroom. In her purse was a coin purse that matched exactly
the description o f the missing coin purse. Cason was then patted-down and escorted to
her locker and asked to open it. The remaining missing items were not found in the
locker. Ms. Cook then took Cason to her office and questioned her further. Cason
admitted that she did take part in the thefts.
Ms. Jones did participate in a joint interview with Cason. Ms. Jones presented Cason
with a Juvenile Appearance Card. Liaison officers in lieu o f arrests issue these cards. The
card required that Cason and a parent report to Ms. Jones office at the police station.
Cason contended that the search violated her Fourth Amendment right because Jones
represented law enforcement and would have needed probable cause, not reasonable
suspicion, to conduct a search.
The district court held that the police involvement aspect distinguished this case from
T.L.O., and relied on the Marten’s 620 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. 111. 1985) decision for guidance.
Due to the fact that school personnel asked for and conducted the initial search, Jones’
involvement with a law enforcement agency was not a sufficient enough issue to raise the
search standard in this case to probable cause. After careful review o f the details o f the
case the district court found that the reasonableness standard was the correct standard, as
opposed to the probable cause standard, and that the Cook had met this standard and thus
there was no violation o f Cason’s constitutional rights.
HOLDING
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held agreeing with the lower court that
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, was the appropriate standard to ^ p ly .
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REASONING
The district court indicated that no evidence was presented that supported the
proposition that the activities were at the behest o f a law enforcement agency. Ms. Jones’
involvement was limited to the pat-down search only after evidence connecting Cason to
violation of a school rule or criminal law had been uncovered. At most, then, this case
represents a police officer working in conjunction with school officials. In addition, the
appellate court decided that the initial search o f the purse was based on reasonable
suspicion, because Cason was identified as a suspect in the thefts. The subsequent patdown search was made only after physical evidence was found on her possession that
linked her to the locker thefts.
Due to the fact that school officials had cause to suspect Cason of violating a school
rule or criminal act, the initial search o f her purse was justified at the inception. Once the
item associated with the reported thefts, the coin purse, was recovered on Cason’s
possession, the scope of the search was entitled to be broadened. These two aspects were
consistent with standards that were established to conduct a search as set forth in the
T.L.O. decision.

Thompson v. Carthage School District, 87 F. 3d 979 (8^ Cir. 1996)
FACTS
On the morning o f October 26, 1993, a school bus driver for Carthage High School
told Norma Bartel, the principal, that there were ft-esh cuts on seats of her bus. Concerned
that a knife or other cutting weapon was on school grounds, Bartel decided that all male
students should be searched. After the search began, students told Bartel that there was a
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gun at school that morning. Bartel and the science teacher Ralph Malone conducted the
search by bringing each class o f students to Malone’s classroom. The students were told
to remove their jackets, shoes, socks, and empty their pockets. All items were placed on a
large table. The students were then checked for concealed w e^jons with a metal detector.
A pat-down search was conducted on students that activated the metal detector.
Lea was a ninth grade student at the time o f the search. His class was one o f the last
to be searched. Neither Bartel nor Malone had reason to suspect that Lea had cut the
school bus seats or had brought a weapon to school that morning. During the course o f
the search, Malone searched Lea’s coat pockets and discovered a used book o f matches, a
match box, and a cigarette package. These items were considered to have been
contraband so they were shown to the principal. A search o f the match box uncovered “a
white substance”. The white substance was turned over to law enforcement, who tested it
and reported that it was crack cocaine. After a hearing. Lea was expelled for the
remainder of the school year. Lea brought action claiming that the search conducted on
him violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The district court held that Lea’s expulsion was wrongful because the search was in
violation o f the student’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court awarded Lea attorney fees
and S10,000 in compensatory damages against defendants Bartel, Malone, the
Superintendent, and school board members who voted for the expulsion.
An appeal followed.
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HOLDING
The a p e lla te court held that the search conducted by Bartel was reasonable under
standards set forth in T.L.O. The judgment o f the district court was reversed and the case
was remanded for entry o f judgment in favor o f defendants.
REASONINGS
The district court indicated that the school officials had no individualized suspicion
that Lea was carrying a weapon and there was no justification in the first place to search
all the boys. In addition, the court reasoned, Bartel and Malone seized the matchbox
containing the drugs after they knew Lea did not possess a gun or knife.
Appellate Court Justice Loken, who wrote the opinion, indicated that the lower court
erred in declaring the search unreasonable. The lower court reasoned that Bartel needed
individualized suspicion to conduct the search. The appellate court stated that in T.L.O.
the Supreme Court left open the issue whether individualized suspicion is always
required for school searches. The lower court concluded that the broad search was not
justified at its inception but the appellate court disagreed. Justice Loken stated:
Though she had no basis for suspecting any particular student, this was a risk to
student safety and school discipline that no “reasonable guardian and tutor” could ignore.
Bartel’s response was to issue a sweeping, but minimally intrusive command, “Children,
take off your shoes and socks and empty your pockets” (p. 983).
The appellate court held Bartel’s minimally intrusive search for dangerous weapons
was constitutionally reasonable. The lower court further concluded that the scope o f the
search was not reasonably related to its original purpose because Lea’s pockets were
searched after the metal detector revealed that he did not possess a gun or knife. The
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appellate court reasoned that in a school setting. Fourth Amendment reasonableness does
not turn on “hairsplitting argumentation.”

Konop

V.

Northwestern School District, 26 F. Supp 2d I I 89 (D.S.D. 1998)

FACTS
This case involved two eighth grade girls who were strip searched by a teacher. The
incident began when a student reported to Principal Sauerwein that S200 had been stolen
from her locker. Sauerwein proceeded to the place where the incident occurred and he
locked the locker room door. Later it developed either $57.00 or $59.00 missing, not
$200 as first reported. Sauerwein began his investigation by having the girls empty the
contents o f their pockets onto a table. The initial search failed to produce the missing
money so the principal decided to have two teachers take the girls into the bathroom and
search them further. The Plaintiffs were taken into the bathroom and told to strip. One
Plaintiff only dropped her pants to her knees. The Plaintiffs were told to remove their
underwear, but they refused to do so. One teacher then pulled their underwear away from
the Plaintiff s bodies causing them to become quite embarrassed. No money was found
on the Plaintiffs and when they left the locker room they were crying. Konop and Genzler
brought action claiming that their Fourth Amendment right had been violated. The
teachers and the principal claimed the searches were not unreasonable, and if the searches
were found to be unreasonable they were protected by qualified immunity.
HOLDING
The district court held in favor o f the Plaintiff and held school officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity.
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REASONING
The court concluded that school officials did not act reasonably when they conducted
the strip search without a reasonable basis to believe a particular student committed a
crime. The school officials possessed no specific information that any particular student
had stolen the money. Since the locker room was unlocked at the time o f the theft every
adult and student had access to entry. Sauerwein had testified at his deposition that
anyone could have entered the locker room and taken the money. The court determined
that the search was not justified at its inception. In order for a search to be justified there
must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence o f
wrongdoing. In addition, the search was not reasonably related in scope. Once the
defendants failed to locate the money in the pockets, shoes or socks, they did not have
reasonable suspicion to search the bra. Further, failure to uncover the money in the bras
certainly did not justify extending the search to the underwear. The searches were ruled a
violation of the Plaintiffs constitutional right to be ft’ee from unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The court looked at a case decided prior to T.L.O. for guidance with the issue o f a
strip search. Doe v. Renfi~ow, 631 F. 2d. 91 (7^ Cir. 1980) held that strip searches were
generally not reasonable. United States Supreme Court Justice Stevens, in his separate
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in T.L.O. wrote, “one thing is clear
under any standard, the shocking strip searches that are described in some cases have no
place in the schoolhouse.” 469 U.S. 325, 382. Stevens said, “Outside the custodial
context, deeply intrusive searches are only reasonable when they are to prevent imminent
and serious harm” (p. 382).
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The next question was whether or not the defendants could claim qualified immunity
as a defense. The court ruled that the law was clearly established and a reasonable person
should have known that the strip searches that were conducted violated a person’s
constitutional right. Searches o f the magnitude that was conducted in this case should be
reserved for situations where students’ safety is at risk.

Miller v. Wilkes. 172 F.3d 574 (8* Cir. 1999)
FACTS
This case involved an action brought by Plaintiff, Pathe Miller, against Cave City
Schools because of a drug-testing policy they instituted. The policy provided that
students in grades seven through twelve that wanted to participate in any school activity
outside the regular curriculum must have a parent or guardian sign parental consent to
allow random drug-testing. The absence o f a signed parental consent form or the refusal
of the student to be tested would result in the student being barred from participation in
any school activity outside the regular curriculum. In addition, a student’s refusal to
submit to the test when randomly selected would result in the student being barred from
participating in any school activity for the rest o f the school year.
The policy stipulated that a positive test would result in the student being on
probation for twenty days. Also, the parent or legal guardian o f the student would be
notified and counseling or rehabilitation would be recommended. After the twenty day
period the student would be tested again, this time at the student’s expense. If the results
are once again positive the student is baimed from participation in any extracurricular
school activity for one calendar year. After the calendar year, the student would be
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allowed to participate in school activities only upon testing negative for prohibited
substances. Test results were retained by the superintendent or his designee, secured in a
locked file and maintained separate from students’ regular school files. The files would
then be destroyed two years after termination of enrollment or upon graduation.
Miller indicated that he would participate in various school events if he was not
prevented from doing so by his parents’ refusal to consent to random drug testing.
M iller’s parents refused to sign the consent to test form which prohibited his participation
in all extracurricular activities. It was argued that random collection and analysis o f a
urine sample without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion was
unconstitutional. The action brought by Miller alleged that the random testing required by
the drug testing policy violated his constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment for the school district. The case was
then appealed.
HOLDING
The appellate court upheld the district court’s judgment.
REASONING
The appellate court relied heavily relied upon the Vemonia ruling when deciding this
case. The standard that was set by the Supreme Court in Vem onia was to weigh the
intrusiveness of the search against the expected governmental benefit produced by the
search. Does the expected benefit o f a lesser drug problem in the school and community
outweigh the intrusive violation o f being forced to undergo a urinalysis? The appellate
court reiterated the Supreme Court’s conclusion that public school children have a lower
expectation o f privacy than do ordinary citizens.
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Justice Bowman, in his opinion for the court wrote:
The essence o f a public school’s power over children is custodial and tutelary,
permitting a degree o f supervision and control that could not be exercised over free
adults, and the reasonableness inquiry cannot ignore this fact o f life. For the
Vemonia Court, in fact, student status was fundamental to its conclusions
concerning the diminished expectation o f privacy, (p. 578)
Public school students are subjected to various screenings for hearing and vision, are
required to be vaccinated against disease, and in some cases required to take physical
examinations. Therefore, all students have a limited expectation o f privacy in the public
school environment, especially with respect to medical examinations and procedures. The
appellate court did not feel that the Vemonia ruling meant that only student athletes could
be subjected to random drug testing.
The High Court did indicate that legitimate expectations o f privacy are even less with
student athletes, but the appellate court did not interpret that to mean that only students
who engage in extracurricular sports could be found to have a lesser expectation o f
privacy.
One other issue that makes this case different from Vemonia is the fact that there was
no immediate concern o f a drug problem by school officials. Justice Bowman responded
to that matter by saying:
We must acknowledge, however, that there is not the same “immediacy” here as
there was in Vemonia, and this is where the facts before us differ most significantly
from those the Supreme Court faced when declaring V em onia's dmg testing policy
to be constitutional. We do not believe, however, that this difference must
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necessarily push the Cave City policy into unconstitutional territory, as it does not
mean that the need for deterrence is not imperative, (p. 580)
The appellate court recognized the fact that drug and alcohol abuse in public schools
is a serious social problem in all parts o f the country. The opinion indicated that the Court
did not think that a school district had to wait until there was a demonstrable problem
with substance abuse before they could take measures to help protects its schools against
the problems often associated with drug use. The appellate court determined that Cave
City public school students who participated in extracurricular activities had a lowered
expectation o f privacy and that the random testing’s intrusion upon that expectation was
not significant. In addition, the School District had an immediate interest in discouraging
drug and alcohol use by its students and that the random testing serves to promote that
interest. Therefore, the judgment o f the district court was affirmed.

The five cases from the 8“*circuit revolved around three issues. Two o f the cases
involved drug-testing policies, two o f the cases included a search o f one’s person, and
one case dealt with a strip search. Now on to the cases from the 9* circuit.

9* Circuit
The 9^ circuit provided four cases for this study. Two o f the cases were ultimately
decided at the a p e lla te court level. One case involved an unreasonable seizure, two cases
dealt with unreasonable searches o f one’s person and belongings, and one unique case
involved the use o f K 9 ’s for a search.
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Juran v. Independence Or Central School Disrtict, 898 F. Supp. 728 (D.Or. 1995)
FACTS
On May 27, 1994, Plaintiff, Timothy Juran, and 72 other students departed for a
school sanctioned senior field trip. Soon after leaving town one o f the students became ill
and admitted to the school’s vice-principal that he had been drinking. The school
administrator also noticed that another student appeared to have been passed out. One of
the students reported to the vice principal that several students including plaintiff had
been at a party the prior evening at which alcohol was consumed. The administrator
attempted to obtain the identity o f those students who had been drinking. When he was
unsuccessful, he ordered that the bus return to school and he notified the police. The
students were all taken to the police station and required to take a breathalyzer test to
determine who had been drinking. Plaintiff was tested and his blood-alcohol level was
.033. He was issued a citation by the police and suspended from school for three days.
Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit alleging that his rights were violated.
HOLDING
The district court ruled in favor o f the school.
REASONING
In determining whether or not the Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment right was violated,
the district court used the probable cause standard to decide if the search was reasonable
because law enforcement personnel conducted the search. The court reviewed the facts o f
the case and determined that school officials and police officers did have probable cause
to detain Plaintiff and subject him to a breathalyzer search. Justice Jones cited ten facts o f
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the case that were relevant to his decision that probable cause to conduct a search did
exist. The ten compelling issues were:
1. Shortly after the departure, one o f the buses had to stop because a student
became ill.
2. The vice-principal noticed a student smelled like alcohol and the student
admitted he had been drinking.
3. A former class president reported to the vice-principal that there had been a party
the prior evening at which alcohol had been consumed.
4. The former class president also indicated that the plaintiff had been drinking at
the party.
5. The informant, the former class president, was a highly reliable and credible
source o f information.
6. The vice-principal learned that the party occurred outdoors and many people
came directly from the party to school.
7. The plaintiffs jeans and boots were muddy.
8. Prior to the breathalyzer, the vice-principal detected the odor o f alcohol when he
was in the plaintiffs presence, as well as when he approached others who were
allegedly drinking at the party.
9. The vice-principal noticed the plaintiffs eyes were bloodshot, and he was
lethargic.
10. Prior to the breathalyzer, school officials informed police that several student,
including plaintiff, had been drinking.
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Judge Jones stated in his opinion, “ In light o f the totality o f the circumstances, and
the facts known to the school officials and the police officers prior to administering the
breathalyzer, 1 conclude that the search was supported by probable cause.” Because the
court held that probable cause existed to conduct the search. Judge Jones did not address
the potentially lower standard o f reasonable suspicion. The court did make reference to
Cason

V.

Cook, 810 F. 2d 188 (8^^ Cir. 1987), which involved a search by school officials

with the assistance o f police officers after the discovery o f physical evidence. In that case
the standard o f probable cause was not used because law enforcement personnel became
involved after school officials had already uncovered evidence o f wrongdoing. In
contrast, this case had law enforcement personnel summoned to prove wrongdoing based
on facts supplied by school officials.

Rasmus v. Arizona. 939 F. Supp. 709 (D. Ariz. 1996)
FACTS
Charles Rasmus, suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder and was diagnosed as
emotionally disabled. While in eighth-grade he was transferred to a special school for
students with unique needs. The school contained an “alternative classroom” where
students who misbehaved were sent. In the alternative classroom there was a closet where
students who misbehaved in the alternative classroom were sent for time-out. One day
Charles was sent by his teacher to the alternative classroom because he made a
derogatory comment to the teacher’s aide. While in the detention room Charles became
involved in a confrontation with another student. Mr. Rojas, the teacher’s aide in the
alternative classroom, was able to get the situation under control. Soon afterwards, in
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violation o f school policy, Charles began talking to another student. Mr. Rojas asked
them to stop talking but they chose not to. Mr. Rojas then ordered Charles into the time
out room. Charles emptied his pockets, took o ff his shoes and entered the room without
incident. After Charles entered the room, Mr. Rojas closed and locked the door. After
approximately ten minutes, Charles was let out o f the room. Charles’ parents were
notified about the incident the same day it happened. Plaintiff brought action claiming
that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure had been violated.
Defendants claimed they did not violate Charles’ Fourth Amendment right and if they did
they are entitled to qualified immunity.
HOLDING
The court held that the locking of Charles in a time out room was “excessively
intrusive’’, and did violate his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
The court also held that Mr. Rojas was entitled to qualified immunity.
REASONING
The court relied on T.L.O. and an Arizona Department o f Education publication
regarding treatment o f special education students when rendering the decision. The
publication produced by the Arizona Department o f Education (AZ-TAS) was
instrumental in the court’s decision. AZ-TAS contained guidelines governing the use o f
time-out rooms for special-needs students. Defendant’s actions violated many o f the
guidelines.
AZ-TAS stated that the Arizona Department o f Education does not advocate the use
o f time-out rooms. However, time-out rooms could be used for special needs students if
their Individual Education Plan called for it. Charles’ plan did not include the use o f time
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out rooms. In addition, AZ-TAS stated that institutions that used time-out rooms develop
policies and procedures regarding the use o f the rooms and get written consent o f the
parents to allow their child to be placed in one. The school involved in this case did not
have polices and procedures regarding the use o f time-out rooms, and failed to notify
Charles’ parents that he could be place in one. Most significantly, AZ-TAS included a
blanket prohibition on locked time-out rooms.
In her opinion. Judge Silver indicted that T.L.O.’s ruling advised, “Reasonableness
depends on all o f the circumstances.” As guided by AZ-TAS, placing Charles in a locked
time out constituted an unreasonable response to his behavioral problems. She went on to
say, “A reasonable factfinder could conclude that the defendants’ placement o f Charles in
a locked time out room was ‘excessively intrusive’ in light o f his age and emotional
disability” (p. 732).
With material facts present to question the reasonableness o f the seizure, the court
next looked at the issue o f qualified immunity. Justice Silver stated that the lack o f a
clearly established law entitled Mr. Rojas to qualified immunity.

Smith

V.

McGlothlin. 119 F. 3d 786 (9'*’ Cir. 1997)

FACTS
It started one morning before school when the principal, McGlothlin, and a security
guard traveled to a cul-de-sac by the school to investigate reports o f students smoking.
Neighbors had called to complain that students stop in the cul-de-sac on the way to
school to smoke. As McGlothin ^proached the 20 or so students, he noticed a cloud o f
smoke over their heads and furtive motions he associated with the discarding o f smoking
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materials. Because he could not see which o f the students had been smoking, he escorted
all o f them back to school where they were placed in the suspension room. He then had
each student searched individually, which took about two hours. When Beth Ann Smith
was searched she was found to be carrying a double-edged dagger with a four-inch blade,
a folding knife with a three-inch blade, and a smaller knife. School officials turned her
over to police. A juvenile court judge suppressed the evidence because there was no
individualized suspicion to search and dismissed the charges. Smith then brought suit
against McGlothlin, who ordered the search, which led to the discovery o f the knives.
The district court dismissed on grounds of qualified immunity. The lower court held
that it was not clearly established that the search was improper; McGlothlin, as a state
official, was therefore immune from suit. Smith appealed the fact that qualified immunity
applied. The court did not rule on whether or not the search was lawful, but did indicate
that there would be authority to conclude it was.
HOLDING
The lower court’s ruling on McGlothlin’s qualified immunity was affirmed by the
appellate court.
REASONING
The appellate court, in an opinion written by Justice Kozinski, held the search was
lawful and that the juvenile court erred in suppressing the evidence. The opinion found
that T.L.O left open whether individualized suspicion was an essential element o f the
reasonableness standard.
Justice Kozinski was highly critical o f the plaintiff, her parents, and their attorney for
bringing forth this action. He stated;
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Smith’s complaint is a triumph o f petulance over common sense. A teenager who
gets into trouble because she is caught bringing knives to school might, for a lack
o f mature judgment, feel that she is the one who has been wronged. But she can’t
turn such wishful thinking into a lawsuit without support from her parents and
the services of a lawyer - adults who do not have youth and inexperience as
excuses. Before bringing suit. Smith’s parents might profitably have pondered
their own culpability and considered what they might have done to prevent their
child’s misconduct. Smith’s lawyer might have thought about whether it was
right to impose the cost, risk and pain o f a lawsuit on a civil serv'ant who acted
reasonably under difficult circumstances. And Smith herself might have thanked
her lucky stars when she got o ff easy because her juvenile court judge misread
the law and suppressed the evidence. Smith and the adults that abetted her might
all have taken a lesson in common sense from the other students who were
subjected to the same search - and thus suffered the same “harm” - but did not
make a federal case out o f it. (p. 788)
In T.L.O. the Court left open whether individualized suspicion was an element o f the
reasonableness standard. By way o f Vem onia the Court approved a student search that
was not based on individualized suspicion, suggesting that individualized suspicion is not
a prerequisite to reasonableness. The a p e lla te court advised that if they were to rule on
whether or not the search in question was lawful, they believe it was. However, they felt
no need to make such a ruling because the district court dismissed on grounds o f
qualified immunity. The lower court held that it was not clearly established that the
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search was improper, therefore, vice-principal McGlothin, a state official, was immime
from su it It was that point that the appellate court agreed with and affirmed.

BC

V.

Plumas Unified School District, 192 F.3d. 1260 (9*** Cir. 1999)

FACTS
One day. Principal Spears and Vice Principal Barrera told plaintiff and his classmates
to exit their classroom. As they exited, the students passed a deputy sheriff and a drugsniffing dog stationed outside the door. The students were required to wait outside while
the dog sniffed backpacks, jackets, and other belongings that the students left in the
room. The students were never warned that a search was about to take place or that a
drug-sniffing dog was going to be used. No drugs were found that day at school.
Plaintiff brought action in district court claiming that the dog-sniff was an
unreasonable search that lacked individualized suspicion and his time confined to the
hallway, where he waited while the dog sniffed the classroom, was an unreasonable
seizure.
The district court ruled that the dog-sniff was an unreasonable search but determined
that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the parameters of permissible
dog sniff searches were not clearly established. The district court ruled in favor o f the
defendants on the seizure issue. The court determined school officials have jurisdiction
over where the students should be during the school day. I f school officials want to have
students in the hallway, that’s permissible. B.C. appealed his case to the Ninth Circuit
Appellate Court.
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HOLDING
The a p e lla te court agreed with the district court that the dog sn iff was a search and
the random and suspicionless search was unreasonable. They affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that there was no unreasonable seizure o f person or property in this case and the
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
RE.A.SONING
The appellate court first had to decide if the dog sniff constituted a search. Justice
Pregerson, who wrote the opinion, indicated that a search occurs when an expectation o f
privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed. Neither the Supreme
Court nor the Ninth Circuit had addressed the use o f K ’9 ’s to assist in searching students
in the past, which makes this case important. The court held that the dog sniff infringed
B.C.’s reasonable expectation of privacy, thereby concluding it was a search. After that
question was answered, the Court moved to decide if the search was constitutional. A
search that lacks individualized suspicion could still be a valid search when the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal and an important governmental interest
furthered by the search would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement o f individualized
suspicion. The court noted that deterring drug use by students is important, but there was
no indication of a drug crisis or even a drug problem at the school where the dog sniff
took place. The court stated that the precedent case regarding suspicionless searches was
Vemonia. The school where this search took place was not experiencing a drug crisis or
problem like Vemonia was. Therefore, there was no need for a suspicionless search. In
the absence of a drug crisis or problem, the school’s interest in deterring drug use would
not have been jeopardized by an individualized suspicion requirement. In addition, the
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district court stated that there was no indication a search based on suspicion had been
tried and was proven ineffective. These facts were in contrast to those in Vemonia, where
dmg use at the school had sharply increased. For these reasons the appellate court held
that the random and suspcionless dog-sniff was unreasonable.
DISSENT
Justice Brunetti, concurred with most of the opinion, but wrote separately because he
felt the Supreme Court and circuit court precedent did not support the majority’s
conclusion that an unreasonable search occurred. Referring to an earlier case he wrote;
This court concluded that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment if;
(1) it discloses only the presence or absence o f a contraband item, and (2) its use
ensures that the owner o f the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative
methods, (p. 1265)
Justice Brunetti, also indicated that even if the dog sniff in this case constituted a
search, the majority failed to conduct the proper balancing test to determine whether the
search was unreasonable. The majority concluded that the search was unreasonable
because the school district’s interest in deterring dmg abuse would not be jeopardized by
requiring individualized suspicion, basing its conclusion on the fact that the record does
not disclose a dmg problem or crisis at the school. Justice Brunetti indicated;
This analysis is problematic. The majority fails to explain how the school district’s
important - if not compelling - interest in keeping its schools and students free from
dmgs is not jeopardized if, as the majority concludes, the school district must wait
until a known dmg problem or crisis exists before the district can conduct preemptive
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and protective drug searches. Under the majority’s reasoning, school districts must
wait until they experience an actual drug epidemic before they can conduct
preemptive searches for illegal drugs. The Fourth Amendment does not support such
a rule. (p. 1267)
Justice Brunetti agreed with the majority in the decision to affirm the lower court’s
ruling, but was sharply critical o f the reasoning used to determine if the search was
reasonable. The majority relied on the fact that there was no existing drug problem at the
school and therefore, a suspcionless search was unreasonable. Justice Brunetti stated that
Supreme Court decisions and prior circuit court decisions do not support that premise. He
indicated that he did not think a school should have to wait until they were in a crisis state
to try and deter drug use.

There were no other cases from the 9^ circuit that contained relevant to contribute to
the body o f this study. Next, a review o f cases from the 10^ circuit.

10* Circuit
The 10* circuit provided three suitable cases for this study. None o f the cases went to
the appellate court One case involved a strip search, the other a search o f a car driven to
school by a student, and the most recent questioned a drug-testing policy
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Singleton v. Board O f Education USD 500. 894 F. Supp 386 (D. Kan. 1995)
FACTS
An adult woman, Ms. Vivian Williams, advised Assistant Principal, Bernice Contrell,
that Darrell Singleton had stolen S i50.00 from her car. Williams also indicated to
Contrell that the student’s mother sold drugs and that Singleton was in trouble with the
police. Wiliams failed to elaborate as to what kind o f trouble with the police Singleton
was in or how she had that information. Contrell notified Assistant Principal Jim Antos of
the situation and he notified Principal Thomas Barry.
Plaintiff, Singleton, was a thirteen-year-old male student at Central Middle School
when he was summoned to the assistant principal’s office. Antos and Barry took the
Plaintiff into Barry’s office for questioning. Singleton claimed that while in the office
Antos reached into his jean pockets and turned them inside out. He then had Plaintiff take
off his shoes and socks and searched them. Antos then patted Singleton in the crotch area,
lowered his pants to his knees, and searched the inside waistband of his boxer shorts. The
searches uncovered no money or contraband. Singleton brought action claiming his
constitutional rights were violated. Defendants filed motion for summary judgment.
HOLDING
The district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment.
REASONING
The district court indicated that the law regarding the constitutionality o f student
searches was clearly established. Based on the facts o f the case, the court found that the
search was justified because the administrator believed a search would turn up evidence
that the student had violated the law. The test focused on the level o f suspicion required
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to determine that Singleton had violated either the law or school rules. The statements o f
Ms. Williams, alleging that the plaintiff had stolen a large sum o f money from her and
that plaintiff had been in trouble with the police, provided reasonable suspicion for
suspecting that a search would turn up evidence of such a violation. Courts have held that
information provided to school officials can serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion that
a student has engaged in illegal activity, as seen previously in Williams v. Ellington, 936
F. 2d 881,887-89 (6‘^Cir. 1991).
The court held that reasonable grounds to justify a search did exist. In addition, the
scope of the search was appropriate in light o f the plaintiff's age and sex and the nature
of the suspected infraction. The search was conducted in the privacy o f the principal’s
office with only two male administrators present. Plaintiff was never required to remove
his underwear, and was never touched in an inappropriate manner. The search was
justified at inception and the scope o f the search was reasonably related to the
circumstances that necessitated the search.

James v. Unified School District No. 512, 959 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Kan. 1997)
FACTS
One evening Mark Hotzel, a police officer assigned to Northwest High School,
received an anonymous call indicating that a student, Charlie James, carries a gun in his
car, even when he goes to school. The next day, Hotzel advised associate principal,
Harlan Hess, o f the anonymous tip. Hotzel and Hess then met with Hank Goodman, a
campus police officer assigned to Northwest High School. The three then went to Jam es’
class, escorted him to an office, and advised him of the tip. The plaintiff asked for and
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was granted permission to call his father. James’ father indicated that the car was his,
there was a gun in it, and they had permission to search it to remove the gun. Hotzel,
Hess, Goodman, and James went to car, Hotzel located the gun, and James was arrested.
He was later expelled from school.
James filed suit alleging that there was no probable cause to search his vehicle and no
search warrant. He also claimed that he was seized when Hess and Hotzel questioned him
in the auto-tech office. The defendants claimed they were entitled to qualified immunity.
HOLDING
The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
REASONING
In deciding the case, the court was not persuaded that T.L.O. precedent applied
because o f the police involvement. It was law enforcement that conducted the search not
school officials. The court held that there was no incident o f unreasonable seizure and
that the school administrator was only present for the search, so he did nothing
inappropriate. Since Hess was present, but did not participate in the search the court held
he did not violate James’ Fourth Amendment right and granted his motion for summary
judgment.
With respect to Hotzel, who acted on behalf o f law enforcement, the court held he
needed probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, to search the car. Without rendering a
decision whether or not he thought probable cause did exist to conduct a search. Judge
Van Bebber granted Hotel’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds o f qualified
immunity. When a defendant raises the defense o f qualified immunity, plaintiff must
show the law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred and must come
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forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show the official violated the clearly
established law. The court held that it was not the defendants’ burden to demonstrate that
the law was not clearly established. James had the heavy burden o f demonstrating that the
defendants knew they were doing wrong and did so anyway. The district court reasoned
that James did not meet that burden o f proof and held in favor o f the defendant.

Earls

V.

Tecumseh School District. 242 P. 3d 1264 (10*Cir. 2001)

FACTS
This case involved a drug-testing policy for all high school students that desired to
participate in any extracurricular activity. Students seeking to participate in such
activities must sign a written consent agreeing to submit to drug-testing. Drug-testing was
done prior to and during participation o f the extracurricular activity. The test detected
amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates, barbiturates, and benzodiazepines. It did not
detect alcohol or nicotine. The policy indicated as follows:
The students to be tested are called out o f class in groups of two or three. The
students are directed to a restroom, where a faculty member serves as a monitor. The
monitor waits outside the closed restroom stall for the student to produce the sample.
The monitor pours the contents o f the vial into two bottles. Together, the faculty
monitor and the student seal the bottles. The student is given a form to sign, which is
placed, along with the filled bottles, into the mailing pouch in the presence o f the
student. Random drug-testing was conducted in this manner on approximately eight
occasions during the 1998/99 school year. Approximately twenty students were tested
each time. (p. 1272)
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Students who refused to submit to the drug-testing were by policy prohibited from
participating in any extracurricular activity. There were no academic sanctions imposed.
Plaintiff Lindsey Earl, was a member o f the show choir, marching band, and the
academic team. Earl and her parents challenged the ^ p licatio n o f the policy to them as a
condition to participation in those activities. She did not challenge the policy as it applied
to athletes. Earl challenged on the basis she did not believe that random suspicionless
drug-testing was constitutional as a prerequisite for students that desired to participate in
extracurricular activities other than sports.
The district court held that the policy did not violate Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches. The case was then appealed.
HOLDING
The appellate court applied the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Vemonia
and concluded the testing policy was unconstitutional. The case was reversed and
remanded back to the district court for further proceedings.
REASONING
A split 2-1 vote held that the policy was unconstitutional. The majority opinion is
quite different from the dissenting opinion, which is also included in this study.
In his opinion Justice Anderson acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment usually
required some level o f individual suspicion before a search may constitutionally proceed.
He stated that the Supreme Court has recognized a reducible requirement o f suspicion.
The ultimate measure o f the constitutionality o f a government search is '^reasonableness."
The opinion mentioned the fact that the Supreme Court has deemed the collection and
testing o f urine to be a search and subject to the reasonableness standard. Anderson stated
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that Vemonia was used as the primary guide for analysis in this case because it involved
an allegation o f special need for a suspicionless search in a public school environment.
In the opinion for the majority Justice Anderson cited Vemonia when he indicated
that “reasonableness" was the ultimate constitutionality measurement o f a governmental
search. The deciding factor in this case was the fact that the school district was not able to
show a special need for the policy. In Vemonia. the school district was able to show that
a special need existed, drug-abuse problem in the district that compelled school officials
to institute the drug-testing policy. The majority in this case did not feel that the school
district had a drug-abuse problem. Records reflected that the school district, per their own
admission in federal applications, did not have a drug-abuse problem. Testimony from
teachers and other school officials indicated minimal incidents or concern regarding drug
usage. O f the 243 students tested during the 1998-99 school year only three tested
positive for use o f drugs. The majority held that the policy was unconstitutional because
there was no special need to create such a policy. Justice Anderson indicated that, unlike
in Vemonia. there was no drug “epidemic" or “immediate crisis" that would warrant a
drug-testing policy. The evidence of actual drug-use especially among those tested, was
minimal.
The court considered the character o f the particular intrusion involved. The drugtesting process was deemed relatively unintrusive after considering that the physical
process by which the urine was collected for testing was similar to conditions typically
encountered in public restrooms. The court also examined whether the testing was unduly
intrusive because o f the information it revealed about the individual’s body. The court
determined the test to be minimally intrusive in that regard because it disclosed the
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existence of drugs, not medical or other physical conditions. Tests were all standardized,
and the information revealed was disclosed to school personnel on a need to know basis,
not law enforcement. Thus, the court concluded the invasion o f privacy was not
significant.
While there was clearly som e drug use at the Tecumseh schools such use among
students subject to the testing policy was negligible. It was vastly different fi-om the
epidemic of drug use and discipline problems exhibited fi-om the groups subject to testing
in Vemonia. With those details in mind the privacy interests o f the students was balanced
against the District’s interest in testing pursuant to the policy.
Applying factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Vemonia the appellate court
concluded that the testing policy was unconstitutional because the need did not exist for
it. The court also indicated that a school need not wait until a drug-problem o f epidemic
proportion exist before it may drug test groups o f students. Justice Anderson went on to
say that in order for a district to impose a random suspicionless drug testing policy as a
condition for extracurricular participation there must be evidence o f some identifiable
drug abuse problem. In addition, the district must show how testing the group o f students
being tested will actually redress the drug problem. The opinion stated that the justices
realized that their conclusion was in direct conflict with some courts, yet in complete
agreement with two fellow circuits.
DISSENT
In contrast. Circuit Judge Ebel, wrote a dissenting opinion. He indicated that drugs
are a serious problem in our public schools just because o f alarming rates o f drug usage
among school-age children. Included in the opinion were statistics fi-om recent surveys
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that were published regarding school-age children’s drug-usage. Ebel cited T.L.O. when
he wrote that search warrants and probable cause are impractical in the school setting.
Vemonia was cited when Justice Ebel stated that suspicion-based testing changes the
relationship between student and teacher from one o f trust and cooperation to one o f
distrust and adversarial interactions. In addition. Justice Ebel wrote that drug use by
students in the closed environment o f a public school interferes with the rights o f other
students to learn and grow in an educational environment. He indicated that
extracurricular activities were a privilege afforded the students, not a guaranteed right.
Since participation was on a volunteer basis students who chose to not submit to a drug
test could refrain from extracurricular activities.
Justice Ebel stated that by reimposing a special needs requirement in its opinion and
thereby requiring a school district to demonstrate a drug problem among a sufficient
number o f those subject to testing, the majority both reneged on its earlier holding that a
school district need not demonstrate special need for random, suspicionless drug testing
in public school and required more o f the school district in this case than was ever
required o f Vemonia. The dissent opinion indicated that Justice Ebel agreed with Justice
Anderson in that the majority opinion is concurrent with some courts while contradicting
other courts’ past decisions on similar cases. In addition, he felt the decision was
inconsistent with earlier rulings by the same body o f justices. He closed by encouraging
the school district to pursue the fight to the United States Supreme Court if necessary.

The 10*^ circuit included cases involving a strip search, a drug-testing policy, and the
search o f a student’s car.
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il'*’ Circuit
Four cases from the il'*' circuit contributed to the body o f this study. Three o f the
four cases went to the ap ellate level. Two o f the cases involved strip searches, one
pertained to an unreasonable seizure, and the other case dealt with the search o f one’s
person.

Edwards v. Rees. 883 F. 2d 882 (11* Cir. 1989)
FACTS
This case originated when a bomb threat was called into a junior high school where
Dale Rees was the Assistant Principal. Two students advised Rees that Plaintiff, Craig
Edwards, a high school student, made the call. Rees went to Edward’s school and
removed him from class and took him to an office for questioning. Rees interrogated
Edwards for twenty minutes, in what was described as an intimidating and coercive
manner. Edwards brought action against Rees and the school district for violating his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.
The trial court ruled in favor o f the defendants, which prompted an appeal by the
plaintiff.
HOLDING
The trial court’s decision was affirmed in the ap ellate court.
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REASONING
The a p e lla te court relied on the standards set forth in T.L.O. when they determined
school officials had the right to detain and question Edwards. Appellate court Justice
Seth, wrote in his opinion, that Rees’ conduct was justified at its inception by the
statements made to him by two students, both o f which implicated Edwards as the
individual who called in the bomb threat. He indicated that the same relaxed standards in
cases involving school searches support applying the same standard in school seizure
cases. The appellate court held that Edwards was seized, but the seizure was reasonable.
Judge Seth said, “Given the seriousness o f the suspected offense, questioning Craig
Edwards in an office in the school building for twenty minutes was reasonably related in
scope to determining whether he had indeed called in the bomb threat.’’ The opinion went
on to say that the interrogation did not even come close to violating Plaintiffs Fourth
Amendment right. The legality o f a search o f a student should only depend o f the
reasonableness o f the search. The statements made to Rees implicating the high school
student made it reasonable to believe that evidence regarding the bomb threat might turn
up by questioning Edwards.

C.B.

V.

Driscoll. 82 F. 3d 383 (11* Cir. 1996)

FACTS
This case began when a student notified assistant principal Johnson that CB was
going to make a drug sale at school later in the day. The drugs were believed to have
been hidden in CB’s coat. Principal Driscoll and Assistant Principal Johnson went to
CB’s class, asked him to follow them into the hallway, and informed him that it had been
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reported that he was in possession o f drugs. They asked him to empty his pockets, and he
removed two plastic packets containing what appeared to be marijuana. The packets
contained a substance that looked like marijuana, but was not marijuana. School policy
prohibited students from possessing drugs or “look-alikes.” The student was punished
according to the standards o f the school district and then brought action against the
principal for conducting an illegal search. The district court held the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment The Plaintiff then qjpealed.
HOLDING
The appellate court indicated that reasonable grounds did exist for the search and
affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
REASONING
CB argued that there were no reasonable grounds for him to be searched because no
administrator observed him with drugs, or acting strangely. Referring to the Supreme
Court ruling in T.L.O., the appellate court held that school officials only needed
reasonable suspicion to believe a search would turn up evidence of wrongdoing in order
to make the search constitutional. School officials were not required to have certainty of
wrongdoing, merely sufficient probability.
The appellate court reasoned that the tip given provided the sufficient probability to
justify the search. A fellow student provided the information to the administrator directly
and thus was more likely to be reliable than an anonymous tip. It was more reliable
because the informant could face disciplinary repercussions if the information is
misleading.
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Jenkins v. Talladega City Board Education. 115 F. 3d 821 ( I I * Cir. 1997)
FACTS
Cassandra Jenkins and Oneika McKenzie were eight-year-old second graders in Hilda
Faimin’s classroom. One o f their classmates reported to Fannin that 57.00 was missing
from her purse. Several students accused Plaintiffs, Jenkins and McKenzie, as well as
another student, o f taking the money. Fannin initially searched McKenzie’s backpack but
failed to find the money. The students were taken into the hallway by Farmin where they
were questioned about the missing money. After the interrogation failed to produce any
positive results, Fannin, at the request o f another teacher, Susatmah Herring, had the
students remove their shoes and socks. When these efforts failed to reveal the allegedly
stolen money, Herrinh, along with guidance counselor, Melba Sirmon, directed the
Plaintiffs to the girls’ restroom. The girls were asked to remove their clothes while in the
restroom. Having once again failed to find the money Herring and Sirmon brought the
Plaintiffs to the office o f school principal, Crawford Nelson. The money was never
located. Jenkins and McKenzie filed a complaint against the school board claiming that
their Fourth Amendment right had been violated. The district court held that the searches
were uimeasonable. In addition, the district court concluded that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity.
The Plaintiffs disagreed with the qualified immunity claim and filed an appeal.
HOLDING
The appellate court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and
the decision o f the district court was affirmed.
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REASONING
The district court held that because there was not even reasonable suspicion to believe
the girls possessed contraband, because the teachers ignored less intrusive means, and
because the personal invasion was extreme, the searches were not justifiable. A less
intrusive means might have been to first question whether the money was actually stolen
as opposed to misplaced or spent The a p ellate court reviewed the issue o f whether or
not the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity in this case. The court chose not to
discuss the wisdom o f the defendant’s conduct in this matter. In his opinion. Justice Birch
did indicate that the defendants exercised questionable judgment given the circumstances
with which they were confronted. Despite that, the court was forced to focus on the
narrow legal issue o f whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The
court had to decide if the law was clearly established when the incident took place, such
that reasonable teachers standing in the defendants place reasonably should have known
that the search to locate the allegedly stolen money violated Jenkins’ and M ckenzie’s
Fourth Amendment rights. Justice Birch stated that school officials could not possibly
have been able to decide whether a search was reasonable or not based on the decision o f
T.L.O. Phrases that referred to the age and sex of the student or referred to more or less
intrusive means, were to broad. As o f the date o f the search. May 1,1992, neither the
Supreme Court nor any eleventh circuit court defined a reasonable search in context to
the facts outlined in T.L.O. Justice Birch went on to state that school officials should not
have to draw conclusions from previously decided cases. Therefore, the motion to grant
summary judgment for the defendants on grounds o f qualified immunity was affirmed.
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Thomas v. Clayton County Board O f Education. 94 F. Supp 2d 1290(N.D.Ga.I999)
FACTS
On the morning o f October 31,1996 a fifth grade elementary school student brought
an envelope containing S26.00 to school. He placed the envelope on a desk in the
classroom. Within minutes the envelope disappeared. The teacher, Tracey Morgan,
conducted a search o f all students’ personal belongings. She looked through bookbags,
desks, decorations, and had each student remove his or her shoes. Morgan patted down
each student’s socks, checked girl’s purses, and had students turn their pockets inside out.
When her initial search failed to produce the envelope she solicited the help o f Officer
Billingslea who was in her class to teach a drug-resistance lesson. Officer Billingslea took
the male students into the boy’s restroom and had them lower their pants and raise their
shirts so he could check for the missing envelope. Morgan took the female students into
the girl’s restroom where they were subjected to a search. The girls were required to lower
their pants, raise their dresses and shirts, and pop up their bras. The missing envelope o f
money was never found. Several o f the students brought action against the teacher, police
officer, principal, and school district claiming that their Fourth Amendment right had been
violated. Defendants filed a qualified immunity defense.
HOLDING
The court concluded that the searches were illegal. However, defendant’s motions for
summary judgment were granted on grounds o f qualified immunity.
REASONING
As the Supreme Court in T.L.O. did not determine the boundaries for strip searches in
schools, the district court was forced to review circuit court cases for help in settlement o f
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the current action. In Jenkins v. Talladega City Board o f Education, 115 F. 3d 821, (11*
Cir. 1997), the eleventli circuit had an opportunity to determine the proper standards for
determining when a strip search o f a student in a public school violated the Constitution.
In that case the court did not reach the question o f the constitutionality o f the search,
because even if the search was unlawful, school officials were entitled to qualified
immunity. In Jenkins the court chose not to rule on the legality o f the search, and was
fully sympathetic towards the task o f school officials in trying to maintain order. Judge
Carnes concluded fi-om those two facts that the circuit court was not convinced that the
strip search in Jenkins was unconstitutional.
Justice Cames applied the two-prong test finm T.L.O. when making her decision
regarding the constitutionality o f the searches. Applying the first prong o f the test the
teacher had the necessary suspicion to conduct some type o f search for the missing
money. The teacher had reason to believe the money was missing because a student
advised her that the money was on his desk a short time ago and then it was gone. The
deterrence value o f a search could deter future thefts. The first prong o f the test was met.
The teacher had reasonable suspicion that someone had violated a school rule or had
broken a law.
Next, Judge Camnes analyzed the second prong o f the test, scope o f the search. The
teacher would have fully been within a reasonable scope for a search if she had searched
desks, book bags, and purses. The court stated that looking into a fifth graders personal
belongings was not overly intrusive. In the present case the teacher went beyond those
boundaries and imposed a strip search. Judge Cames indicated that strip searches are only
reasonable for school officials to conduct if those officials have reasonable suspicion that
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a particular student may be in possession o f dangerous items, drugs, contraband, stolen
items, or the like.
Judge Cames concluded that the search in this case was not reasonable under the
circumstances. The scope o f the search was unreasonable in light o f what was being
searched for. Therefore, the search was unreasonable.
After the searches were deemed to be unconstitutional, the court was forced to review
the qualified immunity defense filed by the defendants. Qualified immunity places the
burden o f proof on the Plaintiffs. They must proof that the law regarding strip searches
was clearly established at the time and that a reasonable person would have known that
the strip searches violated the students’ constitutional rights. In her opinion. Justice
Cames indicated that the doctrine o f qualified immunity protects a teacher who made a
mistake in judgment, even when a federal court determined that the teacher’s acts
exceeded a judicially set standard. Conflicting rulings from other circuits led the court to
find that the law on the matter had not been clearly established and found the defendants
entitled to qualified immunity.

Nevada State Constitution Issues
There is one state case that provided relevant information for this study. The case is
from Indiana and questions whether residents o f the state o f Indiana gamer more
protection from the Indiana Constitution search and seizure provisions than they receive
from the United States Constitution Fourth Amendment.
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Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., 734 N.E. 2d. 252 (2000)
FACTS
This case involved two high school girls, R osa Linke and Reena Linke. They were
both students at Northwestern School Corporation (NSC) and involved in extracurricular
activities. A committee, which comprised o f parents and school employees, was formed
after three students died in two separate drug and alcohol related incidents. NSC was
mostly concerned with preventing future tragedies. On January 12, 1999 NSC
implemented a drug-testing policy for students that participated in sports or other
extracurricular activities.
The policy applied to all students in seventh through twelfth grade. The policy
indicated that students wishing to participate in athletics, certain extracurricular activities,
or certain co-curricular activities must consent to random drug testing. In addition,
students that desired to drive to school must also subject themselves to testing. All
students desiring to participate in activities outlined in the policy were required to sign a
consent form agreeing to random drug testing.
The drug testing was accomplished through urinalysis and students were chosen at
random. Once a randomly chosen to be tested, he/she was taken by the school principal to
a trailer containing restroom facilities. The student then produced a urine sample, which
was taken to a laboratory to be tested for prohibited substances. Substances included in
the policy were alcohol, amphetamines, steroids, barbiturates, cocaine, LSD, marijuana,
methadone, nicotine, opiates, and other specified drugs. A positive result would be re
tested and if positive again the results would be sent to the school. Next, a conference
was held with the student’s parent or guardian where the student was given an
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opportunity to explain the positive test results. The positive test results were never made
part o f the student’s academic record, and penalties depended on the circumstances. The
student could be banned from participating in extracurricular activities or from driving to
school for a specified period o f time. After enough time has passed to allow the substance
to be eliminated from the student’s body, a re-test may be conducted. If the re-test came
back negative, the student could then resume participation in extracurricular activities or
driving to school. A positive re-test meant the school could subject the student to
subsequent tests throughout the rest o f the school year.
Two girls and their parents believed that the drug-testing policy enacted by NSC
violated both the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 o f the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 o f the Indiana Constitution is
identical to the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution.
The trial court denied the Linkes’ motion for summary judgm ent and issued findings
o f fact and conclusions of law. Concluding that the NSC drug-testing was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11
o f the Indiana Constitution, the trial court denied the Linkes’ request for injunctive and
declaratory relief and entered a final judgment in favor o f NSC. The case was appealed to
the Court o f Appeals o f Indiana.
HOLDING
The Court o f Appeals held the drug-testing policy was contrary to Article 1, Section
11 o f the Indiana Constitution. The trial court judgment was reversed and remanded to
the trial court with instruction to enter summary judgment for the Linkes.
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During a conversation with NSC Superintendent, Ryan Snoddy, it was learned that
NSC has filed an appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. A phone call to the clerk o f the
Indiana Supreme Court on 6/5/01, revealed that the Supreme Court o f Indiana agreed to
review the transcripts o f the case, but a decision was still pending.
REASONING
In the majority opinion for the Indiana intermediate court o f appeals written by Judge
Sullivan, the Vemonia v. Acton case was cited on several occasions. Justice Sullivan
focused primarily on the dissenters and the dissenting opinion in the Vemonia v. .Acton
case. Supreme Court Justice O ’Cotmor, citing TLO., who was joined by two other
Justices, maintained that the level o f suspicion in the school context is “objectively
reasonable suspicion.” Judge Sullivan’s opinion, which was joined by Justice Bailey and
Justice Vaidik, went on highlight Justice O ’Cormor’s dissent opinion o f Vemonia. The
opinion indicated that the Indiana Supreme Court had explained that when examining
constitutional issues, claims based upon the Indiana Constimtion should be analyzed
separately from those based upon their federal couterpart in the United Stated
Constitution. The Court noted that even in cases where the Indiana Constitution and the
United States Constitution are substantially and textually parallel, Indiana Courts are not
obligated by interpretations o f the United States Supreme Court or any other court based
on the elaboration o f the rights guaranteed under the Indiana Constitution.
Justice Sullivan reasoned that Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana constitution,
provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution.
The opinion went on to indicate that Article 1, Section 11 should be analyzed under an
independent reasonableness standard. The court held that Article 1. Section 11 had an
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implicit general requirement o f individualized suspicion with regard to searches o f school
children. The court chose to not depart from the practice o f requiring individualized
suspicion with respect to searches. This was an attempt to protect against the abuses
associated with blanket suspicionless searches o f school children. The Indiana test
regarding search and seizure has always been one o f reasonableness. When the Court
focused on the reasonableness o f the behavior o f school officials in the Linkes’ case, it
held that the NSC policy o f conducting suspicionless drug-testing was unconstitutional.
The court acknowledged that Vemonia and its successors created justifications to
extend the Fourth Amendment analysis beyond requiring individualized suspicion. The
opinion o f Judge Sullivan indicated that the Indiana Court o f Appeals saw no reason to
similarly extend their analysis o f Article I, Section II o f the Indiana Constitution. The
opinion noted that the school system’s goal was to prevent future tragedies and NSC was
unable to show a direct correlation between drug use and its need to randomly test the
majority of the student population. The court considered the drug testing policy a move
toward testing all students for drugs. The court did not agree with the federal court
decisions in Todd, Willis, and Joy. Those cases were all from Indiana and all involved a
random drug testing policy. In wishing to not create the same chaos in Indiana state court
that Todd, Willis, and Joy caused in federal court, the Indiana appellate court held the
NSC policy was contrary to Article 1, Section 11, o f the Indiana Constitution.
Question two of this study addressed the impact the Nevada Constitution has on
search and seizure in public schools. This question became urgent based on the Linke
case in the Indiana State Court. As seen, the state of Indiana case involved a school
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district and a civil action that claim ed a drug testing policy at the school violated an
article in the Indiana Constitution.
In addition, in recent years the American Civil Liberties Union in New Jersey brought
action against a New Jersey public school claiming that a district policy violated
students’ New Jersey Constitutional rights. That case was settled prior to it being argued
in court.
Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada Constitution protects as follows:
The right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, particularly
describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or persons, and
thing or things to be seized (NRS, 1998, pg.57).
The Nevada Constitution Article 1, Section 18, and the United States Constitution
Fourth Amendment are identically worded. There have been no state cases relating to
search and seizure in public schools in Nevada. Search and seizure cases in general have
indicated that the Nevada Constitution and the United States Constitution are coexistent.
A search and seizure case regarding the search of a burglary suspect. Dean v. Fogliani,
407 P.2d. 580, 81 Nev. 541, (1965), contained a passage in District Judge Zenoffs
opinion that implied the Nevada Constitution Article 1, Section 18, and the United States
Constitution Fourth Amendment are parallel. With respect to the seizure of evidence.
Judge Zenoff stated, “ .. .and contrary to the Fourth Amendment o f the United States
Constitution and Article 1, Section 18, o f the Nevada Constitution” (Dean v. Fogliani,
407 P. 2d 581). As a foomote to that case, both the entire identical texts o f the United
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States Constitution Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 18, o f the Nevada
Constitution were included.
A later case, Luciano v. Marshall, 593 P.2d 751,95 Nev. 276, (1979), another search
and seizure case in state court also referenced the coexistence o f the protection offered
under the United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution. A portion o f the text o f
that case reads, “ .. .the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures found in the United States and Nevada constitutions” (Luciano v. Marshall, 593
P.2d 752).
In Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010, 112 Nev. 833, (1996), the state court was more
direct with the correlation between the Nevada Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The case involved search and seizure during a traffic stop. A segment o f the
text in Gama indicated, “ .. .we now conclude that the Nevada Constitution’s search and
seizure clause provides no greater protection than that afforded under its federal
analogue...” Gama v. State, (920 P.2d 1013).
Unlike the situation in Indiana, justices in Nevada have decided that the Nevada
Constitution does not offer greater protection than the United States Constitution. If a
case similar to Linke arose in Nevada where an individual argued that the Nevada
Constitution provides more protection than the United States Constitution, a look at
Gama v. State would prove otherwise.
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Summary
Chapter four consisted o f a collection o f cases that involved Fourth Amendment
issues in the public school. Briefs were presented for forty-five primary data cases. One
case was from the United States Supreme Court, forty-three cases were from the eleven
federal circuit courts, and one case from the Indiana State Court. The United States
Supreme Court case was presented first, the federal circuit court cases next, and the state
case last. The briefs from the federal circuit courts were arranged in chronological order.
The concern most often presented involved drug-testing policies. Twelve of the fortyfive cases reviewed were issues brought forth due to drug-testing policies at public
schools. Seven cases involved strip searches o f students and three cases were included
that involved searches during school sponsored field trips. The data presented in chapter
four will be used to answer the questions o f the study, which is included in chapter five.
Chapter five will also contain a conclusion and recommendations for further study.
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CHAPTERS

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER STUDY

Summary
O f the 45 cases discussed in this study, students’ actions prevailed 19 times while
losing 26 cases. This information suggests that the chances o f school administrators
ultimately prevailing against students in similar circumstances are a mere 58 percent.
Considering that fact, administrators must have a firm understanding o f the Constitutional
law regarding search and seizure o f students in public schools in order for them to fair
well in the federal court system.
O f the cases reported on in this study one was a United States Supreme Court case
where the school district prevailed. Forty-three cases were heard in federal court and
school districts came out on top 25 times while students were victorious 18 times. The
final case was a case heard in state court. In that case, Linke v. Northwestern, the district
won at the lower level, but the students won at the a p e lla te level. The state supreme
court will hear the case sometime in the future.
To begin, let us address the study questions in turn;

1. How has T.L.O. been interpreted and applied?
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T.L.O. has been cited in many search and seizure cases involving public school
students. The holding in T.L.O. applies only to searches o f students that were conducted
by public school officials. Officials are persons who have a primarily educational
function, including administrators, teachers, and others with similar duties. Justices in the
federal court system overseeing litigation involving; dog-sniffs, locker searches, strip
searches, drug-testing policies, vehicles searches, seizures, and searches o f one’s person
have all applied guidelines set forth in T.L.O. to determine the outcome o f their
respective case. T.L.O. has been interpreted and applied in such a way that allows school
officials reasonable intrusions on students as long as legitimate govenunental interests
are served. Any government conduct that intrudes on a justified expectation o f privacy is
considered to be a search or seizure and must be reasonable according to Fourth
Amendment standards.
Certain categories o f individuals are afforded less than full protection under the
Fourth Amendment; students in public schools are one such group. The Supreme Court
held in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that public school officials do not need search warrants or
probable cause before searching students under their authority. The High Court held that
such legal restrictions would unduly burden teachers and school officials and hinders
their attempts to maintain order and discipline and would ultimately interfere with their
effectiveness as educators. The Court concluded that a reduced standard was justified for
searches and seizures in school settings because o f the substantial government interest in
maintaining a proper learning environment for educating children. Students are accorded
reduced Fourth Amendment protection mainly because o f their membership in a specific
class-public school children-and not because o f the age. The reduced standards as
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provided for in T.L.O usually applies only to searches and seizures conducted by public
school officials under whose authority the student falls. In Edwards v. Rees. 883 F. 2d
882 (11'*’ Cir. 1989), the court held that a vice-principal from one school could seize a
student from another school.
The court stated that student searches must be “reasonable” within their context for
them to be lawful. While the standards set in T.L.O. have been used in search and seizure
cases, court decisions have varied as to how those standards should be applied and
interpreted. All courts have recognized that children in schools do have legitimate
expectations o f privacy, which are protected by the Fourth Amendment. To determine
whether a privacy expectation is reasonable, the Supreme Court weighs the likely impacts
of a governmental intrusion on individual privacy and freedom against the interests
served by such intrusion. Some courts are less rigid in requiring a logical link between
the object o f a search and the manner in which it was conducted. In Thompson v.
Carthage. 87 F. 3d 979 (8'*’ Cir. 1996), for example, the court o f appeals permitted a
search where school officials reached in and pulled out small soft objects from the jacket
of a male high school student. The student was searched as part o f a mandatory
suspicionless search for knives and other metal weapons. The conclusion was justified by
the court by quoting from New Jersey v. T.L.O., “ in a school setting. Fourth Amendment
reasonableness does not turn on ‘hairsplitting argumentation.”’469 U.S. 325 (1985).
In general, courts have not allowed the doctrine o f in loco parentis to serve as a viable
defense when educators are responsible for violating Fourth Amendment rights o f
students. Public school officials act as representatives o f the government Consequently,
they must comply with Fourth Amendment restrictions when conducting student searches
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and seizures. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion that public school
officials are exempt from these restrictions because they act as surrogates for the parents
o f students rather than as government agents. Public school officials do not need search
warrants or probable cause to search or seize evidence from students under their
authority. Since warrants and probable cause are not required, the legitimate privacy
interests of public schoolchildren are protected by requiring that searches and seizures
must be “reasonable” under all circumstances. In order to be “reasonable” the student
search must be justified at its inception. School officials must “reasonably” suspect that
the search of a particular place will uncover evidence to indicate that the student has
violated or is violating the law or a school rule. Absolute certainty is not a requirement;
“reasonable suspicion” requires only sufficient probability. The requirement for at least a
reasonable suspicion applies to any student search regardless o f the seriousness of the
suspected violation. Student searches are also gauged in relation to the circumstances that
initially justified them. The scope, intensity, and methods o f each student search as it is
conducted must be consistent with its initial objective and not be excessively intrusive to
the student in relation to the violation or the suspect’s age and sex.
.Application of the standards set forth in T.L.O. extends to all persons enrolled in the
public schools as students, regardless o f whether they are a juvenile or not. However,
there are different standards that apply to adult education students, university students,
and other persons o f similar status. The holdings in T.L.O. apply to student searches
conducted only by public school officials. These officials are those who have primarily
an educational function. That would include; administrators, teachers, counselors, nurses,
and others that perform similar functions within the school environment.
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Courts within the federal court system have uniformly looked to the T.L.O. precedent
when deciding cases that involve search and seizure issues o f public school students. The
issue o f the case most frequently was whether or not a particular search or seizure w as
reasonable according to the Fourth Amendment. A school official needs to have
“reasonable suspicion” that a student is violating or has violated a school rule or law in
order to justify a search. The courts were often called upon to determine what was
“reasonable suspicion”.
The issue of whether or not T.L.O. is applicable in search and seizure cases off school
grounds has been addressed thoroughly in this study. On three separate occasions the
federal courts reviewed cases that involved searches o f hotel rooms during field trips,
Ricci

V.

Guarricino 54 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D. N.Y., 1999), Webb v. McCullough 828 F.

2d 1151 (6'*’ Cir. 1987), and Juran v. Independence Or. Central School District 898 F.
Supp. 728 (D.Or., 1995). All three cases appeared in different circuits, 2"**, 6'*’, and 9*,
yet the outcome was the same. The courts held that T.L.O. is the ^plicable standard to be
used when considering search and seizure cases o f public school students by school
officials during field trips. Reasonable suspicion was required prior to the search and the
administrator must act with the same level of care as if the search was being conducted
on school grounds. Another case that originated o ff school grounds was Edwards v. Rees
883 F. 2d 882 (11* Cir. 1989). The principal o f a middle school went to a neighboring
high school to interview a student about an incident. The court concluded that the middle
school principal’s interrogation o f the high school student was reasonable. The court
reasoned that the T.L.O. ruling did not limit school officials to searches and seizures on
their own school property. One final case o f the study involving activities that occurred
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o ff campus was Smith v. McGlothlin 119 F. 3d 786 (9* Cir. 1997). Acting on a tip from a
neighbor o f the school, a high school principal traveled to a nearby cul-de-sac to
investigate allegations o f students smoking on their way to school. The principal escorted
all the students back to school where they were searched. The 9* circuit court found the
searches to be reasonable.
The issue o f drug-testing policies was a major component o f this study. The Vemonia
case, which was handed down by the United States Supreme Court, is the standard that
federal courts are obligated to adhere to with respect to drug-testing policies at public
schools. The High Court decided that student athletes had a lower expectation to privacy
and the governmental interest to deter drug problems outweighed the minimal intrusion
caused by urinalysis. In addition to the Vemonia case, there are eight federal cases and
one state case included in this study regarding drug-testing policies. The decisions varied
not only by circuit but from case to case as well. Three o f the federal cases were decided
prior to Vemonia. In Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District
730 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Tex., 1989) and in Pless v. Ford 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark.,
1985), the courts ruled that drug-testing policies established by the schools were
unconstitutional because they tested students without having individualized suspicion.
Another case prior to Vemonia, Schaill v. Tippecanoe School District 864 F. 2d 1309 (7*
Cir. 1988), involved a dispute regarding a dmg-testing policy. The outcome o f that case
was quite different. The court held that the school was allowed to randomly test student
desiring to participate in sports because the mission o f the school to deter drug use
outweighed the minimal intrusion caused by the urinalysis.
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There were six cases decided after Vemonia included in this study. Five o f those
cases were argued on the federal level and one was heard in state court. The first case
decided after Vemonia was Todd v. Rush 133 F. 3d 984 (7* Cir. 1998). The case was
similar to Vemonia in that it required students who participated in sports to submit to
random drug-testing. The district court upheld the school’s drug-testing policy. The
following year in the same circuit a similar case had an opposite mling. W illis v.
Anderson Community School Corporation 158 F. 3d 415 (7* Cir. 1998), involved a drugtesting policy for students having disciplinary problems. School officials believed that
growing disciplinary problems was the result o f increased dmg and alcohol use among
their students. The district court ruled the policy reasonable, but that decision was
overturned at the appellate level. The appellate court indicated that boundaries were
needed and because those being tested were not identified based on individualized
suspicion, the policy was unconstitutional. Miller v. Wilkes 172 F. 3d 574 (8* Cir. 1999),
involved drug-testing for all students who wanted to participate in any extracurricular
activity. The appellate court relied heavily on Vemonia and decided the policy met
constitutional standards. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation 212 F. 3d 1052
(7* Cir. 2000), was the next federal case included in this study regarding drug-testing
policies. Like the drug-testing policy in Miller, Joy’s dmg-testing policy required any
student desiring to participate in extracurricular activities to submit to random urinalysis.
The court relied on the Vemonia case and the precedent set by the seventh circuit in Todd
to hold the dmg-testing policy was constitutional.
In 2001 courts began to interpret Vemonia differently. Earls v. Tecumseh 242 F. 3d
1264 (10* Cir. 2001), was like many of the cases heard by federal courts in recent years.
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A school district instituted a drug-testing policy to randomly test any student that wanted
to participate in extracurricular activities. The district court held the policy was
constitutional. The appellate court relied on Vemonia and decided the policy was
unconstitutional. In Vemonia, the school district claimed, and supported with evidence,
drug use was causing discipline problems and creating injuries to athletes. The United
States Supreme Court, in Vemonia, indicated that because o f the dmg problem the school
district was having it was constitutional for school officials to randomly dmg-test student
athletes. In Earls, the appellate court concluded that the school district had not shown
evidence to support the conclusion that a dmg problem existed in the district. Therefore,
the lower court’s decision, which supported the dmg-testing policy, was reversed.
The final dmg-testing policy action examined in this study was a case heard in state
court, Linke v. Northwestem 734 N.E. 2d 252 (2000). The policy required students
wishing to participate in athletics and certain extracurricular activities to subject
themselves to random dmg-testing. The case was brought in state court and argued the
policy violated Article 1, Section 11 o f the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11 o f
the Indiana Constitution is written word for word the same as the Fourth Amendment o f
the United States Constitution. Concluding the policy was constitutional, the district court
mled in favor of the school district. The state a p e lla te court held that citizens o f Indiana
are afforded greater protection under the Indiana Constitution than they are given by the
United States Constitution. The Indiana appellate court mled the policy violated Article
1, Section 11 o f the Indiana Constitution because students were not tested based on
individualized suspicion.
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A. What is meant by ^treasonable suspicion’' as referred to in T.L.O.?
In order for reasonable suspicion to exist, a person conducting a search must have
sufficient information to support a belief that evidence o f illegal or in^propriate conduct
will be found in a particular place. A person can meet this requirement when he/she can
relate what specific facts and observations are known and explain how realistic inferences
from that information provide an objective basis for the belief. There must be a logical
relationship between the objects sought, an illegal or in^propriate activity, and the place
to be searched. It is not necessary to rule out every possible contradictory belief. It is
entirely possible to reasonably suspect something to be true even if you wonder that there
might be a perfectly legitimate explanation to the observed behavior. Reasonable
suspicion is present when there is sufficient evidence to believe that a person has
committed or is committing a crime or when it is believed that a school rule has been
broken or in the process o f being violated. Although it is not possible to formulate a
general set o f rules, school officials can suspect students o f past, present, or imminent
infractions based on their conduct, appearance, or location.
School officials can legitimately conduct a reasonable search for reasons o f caution.
If they believe the safety o f the students would be jeopardized without the search, then a
search is permissible. The fact that a dangerous item is believed to be in the possession o f
a student could be “reasonable suspicion” to conduct a search as the courts held in
Brousseau v. Westerly. 11 F. Supp. 2d 177(D.R.l., 1998) and Thompson v. Cathage
School District. 87 F. 3d 979 (8* Cir. 1996).
Anonymous informants are considered to be viable examples o f how reasonable
suspicion can be created. School officials will receive anonymous tips from time to time.
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While the anonymous tip can provide the basis for a valid reasonable suspicion, caution
is advised. The informant should stand nothing to gain by providing the tip and the
information should be plausible because it relates to a suspected or ongoing problem. The
tip should be detailed and not a vague blanket accusation. An anonymous tip has served
effectively as “reasonable suspicion” as evident in the following cases: Greenleaf v. Cote,
77 F. Supp 2d 168 (D. Me., 1999), Williams v. Ellington. 936 F. 2d 881(6* Cir. 1991),
Martens v. District No. 220 Board o f Education, 620 F. Supp 1282 (D.C.Ill. 1985),
Smith

V.

McGlothlin. 119 F. 3d 786 (9* Cir. 1997) and C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F. 3d 383

(11* Cir. 1996).
The official’s personal observation and knowledge can serve as a source o f
reasonable suspicion. Perhaps the most reliable basis for reasonable suspicion is
something the official observes directly and interprets in light o f knowledge and
experience. This direct approach assures an accurate recounting o f what facts were
known and how they were interpreted to arrive at any suspicions motivating a search.
Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35 (S.D. Ohio 1992), and Cornfield v. Consolidated High
School District No. 230 991 F. 2d. 1316 (7* Cir. 1993) are examples o f how personal
observation can warrant reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.
Suspicious behavior was held by some courts to meet the “reasonable suspicion”
standard as evident in Ricci v. Guarricino, 54 F. supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), Hedges v.
Musco. 204 F. 3d 109 (3"* Cir. 2000), Bridgman v. New Trier High School District No.
203, 128 F. 3d 1146 (7* Cir. 1997), and Juran v. Independence Or Central School
Ditrict 898 F. Supp. 728 (D.Or. 1995).
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In contrast, the federal district court in Michigan, ruled in Cales v. Howell Public
Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 1985), that suspicious behavior alone was not
sufficient to indicate that “reasonable suspicion” existed to conduct a search. In Cales, a
student was searched by school officials because she was seen by a security officer
ducking behind a parked car and then gave a bogus name. School officials believed that a
search for drugs was in order based on her actions. The court held that her actions could
have been the result of many things and not necessarily because she was in possession o f
drugs. That 1985 decision held the search to be unconstitutional. Another example o f an
unreasonable search was shown in Burnham v. West 681 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D.Va. 1987).
In that case a school principal discovered defacement o f school property and directed all
teachers to search each student’s bookbags, pockets, and pocketbooks for magic markers.
He ordered another search when he was informed by a teacher that a student was seen
with a “Walkman” or radio, which violated school rules. When a teacher reported the
smell o f marijuana in a hallway, another broad search was ordered. The three “sweep
searches” were held to have violated the students’ Fourth Amendment rights.

B. Does the “reasonable suspicion” standard articulated in T.L.O. apply to
school police?
The ruling in T.L.O. did not clarify whether or not the “reasonable suspicion”
standard applied to school police. The T.L.O. decision has been interpreted to apply only
to student searches that were conducted by public school officials. Three cases from the
study included law enforcement involvement.
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Federal courts have ruled differently on this issue. Whether “probable cause” or
“reasonable suspicion” is the standard used for searches o f students when law
enforcement personnel are involved depends largely on the extent o f their involvement.
In James v. Unified School District No. 512. a Tenth Circuit case, school officials
believed that a student had a gun in his car and called local law enforcement officers to
investigate the matter. The police officers in that case arrested the student for the weapon
violation. The court ruled that T.L.O. was not ^ p lic a b le in this case because school
officials did not conduct the search. A Seventh Circuit case. Martens v. District #220,
also involved police personnel, but had a different ruling. A school administrator had a
student in his office for questioning regarding possession o f drugs. The school official
was trying to get the student to empty his pockets when a law enforcement officer
happened to stop by the office. The police officer was at the school for another reason
and went to the principal’s office without being requested. The officer advised the student
that it would be in his best interest to cooperate and empty his pockets. The court in that
case held that the school official conducted the search and therefore, T.L.O. applied. The
search was held to be constitutional because school officials conducted the search,
therefore the standard of reasonable suspicion was the ^p ro p riate standard to govern the
search.
A third case relevant to this issue was Juran v. Independence Or Central School
District 898 F. Supp. 728 (D.Or. 1995). A busload o f students on their way out-of-town
on a field trip contained several students suspected o f being under the influence o f
alcohol. The school administrator contacted local law enforcement and had the bus taken
to the police department. Once at the police station, the students were each given a
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breathalyzer test by police so they could determine who had been drinking. The court
indicated that probable cause was the appropriate standard to use in this case because the
search, breathalyzer, was conducted by law enforcement officials.

C. Has the court’s interpretation of T.L.O. changed over time? What is the
current status of school searches?
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, searches o f students by school officials need not adhere to the
standard o f “probable cause” imposed upon law enforcement officers. Instead, the
legality of student searches depends on the “reasonableness” o f the search in light o f the
circumstances. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the search will reveal a
violation o f a school rule or produce evidence o f unlawful activity. The states remain free
to provide greater protection for students.
The interpretation o f T.L.O. by the courts has varied over time. However, the
standards themselves are the same today as they were when the case was handed down in
1985. “Reasonable suspicion” is still needed to justify a search and the search must still
be restricted to an area within scope relatively related to the circumstances that justified
the search originally. The governmental interest in the outcome o f the search must
outweigh the individual’s expectation to privacy interest. W hether referring to
breathalyzer tests, locker searches, K-9 sniffs, or searches o f one’s person or belongings,
courts have consistently relied upon the standards set in T.L.O when deciding search and
seizure cases involving students.
WTiat constitutes reasonable suspicion and what lies within the limit o f scope for a
search was addressed earlier. The one area that has continued to be debated in various
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circuits is “individualized suspicion”. The courts have decided several cases where
“individualized suspicion” was raised as an issue. In the landmark case o f Vemonia v.
Acton, the United States Supreme Court held that “individualized suspicion” was not a
prerequisite to a valid search. Civil rights leaders viewed that decision as a blow to the
constitutional rights o f school children while school officials applauded the Supreme
Court for recognizing the unique challenges school officials face. That decision granted
schools broader discretion with respect to student searches.
Courts before and since Vemonia have differed on the question o f “individualized
suspicion.” In C.B. v. Driscoll 82 F. 3d 383 (11* Cir. 1996), a student received
disciplinary consequences for possessing a drug “look-a-like”, which was a violation o f a
school rule. Another student advised school administrators that C.B. possessed the “looka-like” drug. Appellate Judge Edmonson indicated, “The tip in this case provided
sufficient probability, viewed against the reasonable grounds standard, to justify the
search here. C.B. v. Driscoll, 82 F. 3d 383, 385(11* Cir. 1996).
Decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court are frequently analyzed
and interpreted by lower courts. Unless the details o f the lower court’s case are identical
in every way to the precedent case the justices will have to use some discretion with
respect to how they mle. Cases very similar in nature have been presented in this study
with opposite decisions. Sometimes the reason for the discrepancy was because the cases
were in different circuits. However, we have even seen similar cases within the same
circuit that have had different decisions rendered. In Comfield v. Consolidated High
School District No. 230. 991 F. 2d 1316 (7* Cir. 1993), school officials strip searched a
student on mere suspicion that he was carrying drugs. The court held the search to be
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constitutional because school officials had reasonable suspicion to believe he was
concealing drugs in his pants, even though he was not. In contrast, in Oliver v. McClung.
919 F. Supp 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995), middle school girls were strip searched in an attempt
to find $4.50 that was missing from a locker. It was held that the search o f the students
violated their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Justice
Stevens in his opinion indicated that no matter what standard is applied, shocking strip
searches have no place in the schoolhouse. Those two cases are example o f how two
cases from the same circuit with similar circumstances, both involving strip searches, can
have different results.
Another example o f how the standards can be ^ p lie d differently can once again be
found in decisions rendered in the 7* circuit. Todd v. Rush, 133 F. 3d.984 (7* Cir. 1998),
involved the constitutionality o f a school’s drug-testing policy. The appellate justices
upheld the drug-testing indicating that Vemonia v. Acton 515 U.S. 646 (1995) governed
the outcome o f that case. That same year in the same circuit a similar dmg-testing policy
upheld at the district court level was overtumed at the appellate level. In Willis v.
Anderson, 158 F. 3d 415 (7* Cir. 1998), a school’s dmg-testing policy was challenged in
court. The district court upheld the policy and the appellate court reversed. That body o f
justices, while making reference to Vemonia v. Acton, indicated the policy and privacy
interest o f the individual were different. Just two years later, Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison
School Corporation, 212 F. 3d 1052 (7* Cir. 2000), was before the appellate court. This
case once again challenged a school’s dmg-testing policy. Once again the appellate
justices allowed Vemonia, and this time Todd, to govern their decision. The court upheld
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the school’s drug testing policy and indicated the United States Supreme Court needs to
address this matter so clarification can be provided.
The standards for search set in T.L.O. have not changed. The interpretation o f those
standards has varied greatly over time and across circuits. The current status is that courts
use T.L.O and Vemonia as guides, but then interpret them based on their analysis o f their
respective case. Courts are anxiously awaiting the United States Supreme Court’s ruling
in the Earl v. Tecumseh School D istrict 242 F. 3d 1264 (10* Cir. 2001) so that consistent
decisions can be rendered.

D. What guidelines should school officials follow regarding the search of
students?
In Justice W hite’s opinion in T.L.O. it was learned that school searches needed to be
justified at inception and the search related in scope to the objectives that justified the
intrusion in the first place. As indicated in T.L.O.’s ruling and seen applied many times,
the age and sex o f the student coupled with the infraction also play a vital role in the
determination o f a valid search. Searches o f school students by school officials can only
be conducted if there is “reasonable suspicion” that the search will uncover evidence
related to criminal activity, in^propriate school conduct, or an emergency situation. In
the previous cases we saw various types o f searches: searches o f one’s person or
belongings; personal item searches; automobile searches; and locker searches, Oliver v.
McClung. 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995). This study advises that breathalyzer tests
and urinalysis examinations are also considered searches for Fourth Amendment
purposes, Juran v. Independence Or. Central School District, 898 F. Supp. 728
(D. Or. 1995). Regardless of the type o f search being conducted the standard is the
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same. There must be “reasonable suspicion” present to justify the search at its inception.
Once the search is justified it must be conducted relatively within the scope o f the
circumstances that prompted the search in the first place. The violation o f the student’s
reasonable expectation o f privacy must be weighed against the state’s interest for the
intrusion. This relates to the intrusiveness o f the search versus the infraction o f the
student. When students are not subjected to excessive intrusion courts had generally ruled
in favor of the school. When students are strip searched in an attempt to find missing
money, courts usually find that to be unreasonable and generally rule against the school,
Oliver v. McClung. 919 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D.Ind. 1995), Konop v. Northwestem School
District 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D.S.D. 1998), and McKenzie v. Talladega City Board o f
Education 115 F. 3d 821 (11* Cir. 1997). The one exception to that identified in the study
was Singleton v. Board o f Education 894 F. Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1995). A high school
student was accused by an adult o f having stolen SI 50.00 from her car. In that case the
search by school officials, which included the student being required to lower his pants,
was deemed reasonable.
In order to justify a search as intrusive as a strip search the school official needs to be
protecting the health and welfare o f the student. As seen in the ruling in Sostarecz v.
Misco and Konop v. Northwestern. 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. S.D. 1998) school officials
cannot legitimately subject students to a search as intrusive as a strip search simply to
prove they may have broken a school rule or law. Unless a strip search will uncover
evidence that the student is an immediate threat to him self or others it is probably best for
school officials to not conduct strip searches.
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As indicated by the number o f times school officials prevailed in search and seizure
cases. Courts generally support the efforts of school leaders that are trying to maintain
order in their educational environment. When bad judgment is used and school officials
excessively invade a student’s legitimate expectation o f privacy, as seen in a couple o f
cases, the courts rule in favor of the student.

2. What, if any, impact does the Nevada State Constitution forbidding
unreasonable search and seizures have on school searches?
Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada Constitution is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment o f the United States Constitution and identically worded with respect to
searches and seizures. As written. Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but on probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, and the person or
persons, and thing or things to be seized.
This study was unable to produce any federal student search or seizure case that
originated in Nevada. In addition, the only relevant state case included. Linke v.
Northwestem 734 N.E 2d 252 (2000), was from Indiana. That case was relevant and
included because it challenged Article 1, Section 11 o f the Indiana Constitution. That
article is also worded exactly the same as Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution. The Indiana
appellate court, in Linke. held that the citizens o f Indiana are afforded greater protection
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under the Indiana Constitution then they are afforded under the United States
Constitution. Nevada state courts has disagreed with that premise.
In Gama v. State 112 Nev. 833 (1996), the court held that the Nevada Constitution on
search and seizure does not offer greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In one additional case. Dean v. Fogliani 81 Nev. 541 (1965),
the action brought into question the legality o f a search with respect to the Fourth
Amendment o f the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada
Constitution. The judge’s decision failed to indicate any particular hierarchy that would
have given a ranking preference o f one over the other. Instead Nevada courts have
consistently held that Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment o f the United States Constitution are coexistent and equal in authority.
Article 1, Section 18 o f the Nevada Constitution is no more restrictive and offers no
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment o f the United States Constitution, so there
is no impact on searches. The same guidelines and restrictions regarding the search of
public school students by school officials that applies in the federal court also applies in
state court.

Matrix o f Cases Studied
Table 1 lists the student search and seizure cases this study has reviewed, the year the
case was decided, the geographical circuit, the level o f jurisdiction, the issue involved,
and the outcome-whether favoring the school district or the student.
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Table 1.
Matrix o f Student Search and Seizure Cases
f -----------------------

------------------------

CASE

YR

cm

LVX

ISSUE

ST

sc
!

Vemonia v. Acton
Brousseau v. Westerly
Greenleaf v. Cote
Ricci V. Guarricino
Sostarecz v. Misko
Gruenke v. Seip
Hedges v. Musco
Bumham v. W est
Caviness v. Duriiam
Desroches v. Caprio
Austin V. Lambert
Brooks V. East Chambers
Kelly V. Orleans
Cales V. Howell
Webb V. McCullough
Williams v. Elington
Widener v. Frye
Martens v. District No. 220
Schail V. Tippecanoe
Cornfield v. Consolidated
Oliver v. McClung
Wallace v. Batavia
Bills V. Homer

95
98
99
99
99
00
00
87
96
98
98
89
98
85
87
91
92
85
88
93
j 95
95
97

9
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
4
4
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7

SUP
D
D
D
D
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
C
C
C
D
C
C
D
C
D

Drug testing athletes
Search to find knife
Search for alcohol
Field trip room search
Strip search for drugs
Forced pregnancy test
Forced drug test
Search o f students
Search and seizure
Student search
Strip search for drugs
Drug-testing policy
Strip search for money
Search o f person
Field trip room search
Strip search for drugs
Strip search for drugs
Search o f student
Drug testing policy
Strip search for drugs
Strip search for money
Seizure o f student
Seizure o f student
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X
X
X
X
X I
X 1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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YR CIR

LVL

Bridgman v. New Trier
Todd V. Rush
Willis V. Anderson
Hilton V. Lincoln-Way
Joy V. Penn-Harris-Madison
Anabel, Balch and Pless v. Ford
Cason V. Cook
Thompson v. Carthage
Konop V. Northwestem
Miller v. Wilkes
Juran v. Independence
Rasmus v. Arizona
Smith V. McGlothlin
BC V. Plumas
Singleton v. Board o f Ed. USD
James v. Unified
Earls V. Tecumseh
Edwards v. Rees
C.B. Driscoll
Jenkins v. Talladega
Thomas v. Clayton County

97
98
98
98
00
85
87
96
98
99
95
96
97
99
95
97
01
89
96
97
99

C
c
c
D
C
D
C
C
D
C
D
D
C
C
D
D
C
C
c
c
D

Linke v. Northwestem

00

CASE

ISSUE

ST

sc

!
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
9
10
10
10
11
11
11
11
1

Search for dmg usage
Dmg testing policy
Dmg testing policy
Seizure o f student
Dmg testing policy
Dmg testing policy
Search o f students
Search o f students
Strip search for money
Dmg testing policy
Field trip/breathalyzer
Seizure o f student
Search o f students
Dog-sniff o f students
Strip search for money
Search o f student’s car
Dmg testing policy
Seizure o f student
Student search
Strip search for money
Strip search for money

X
X

X
X

Dmg testing policy

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

1
^

j STATE
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Conclusions
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the Federal
Government insure “ [t]he right o f the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,...’"T his restraint on government
conduct generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent
individualized suspicion.” Chandler v. Miller, (1997). The Fourteenth Amendment
extends this guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers, including public school
officials. New Jersey V. T.L.O.. (1985). As evident in Vemonia School District v. Acton.
the ultimate measure o f the constitutionality o f a government search is “reasonableness.”
Ordinarily, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment the search must be based on
individualized suspicion. Courts evaluate the facts o f a particular case and determines
whether or not it meets the reasonableness standard by balancing two factors: the search’s
intrusion on the Fourth Amendment privacy interest o f the individual and its promotion
o f legitimate governmental interests. Vemonia v. Acton at 653-54
The Supreme Court ruled in T.L.O. that public schools generally have “special needs”
that justify modifying the normal law-enforcement procedures. Due to the unique
environment that schools provide, courts have recognized that the need to establish a safe
learning environment renders certain kinds o f searches constitutional even though the
search would be considered unconstitutional in other settings. Evidence presented in this
study indicates that when issues of safety are involved, the courts are more likely to rule
that a search is justified, even if it invades the privacy rights o f the student. With respect
to obtaining a warrant prior to conducting a search, the Supreme Court found that the
warrant requirement “would unduly interfere with the maintenance o f the swift and
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informal disciplinary procedures that are needed,” in addition, “strict adherence to the
requirement that searches be based on probable cause” would undercut “the substantial
need o f teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.” T.L.O.
at 340-41.
The Supreme Court has placed practical limits on the scope, intensity, and methods o f
a search. When a search does not meet the requirements set by the Supreme Court it will
be considered unreasonable. The initial infraction that brings about the original
reasonable suspicion determines the limits o f the search. The scope o f a search is where
officials can search and is determined by the description o f the suspected location o f
items sought-after. For example, if officials have reasonable suspicion to suspect that
illegal drugs are being stored in a student’s locker they could search the locker and open
anything in the locker that could conceivably contain contraband. This suspicion would
allow officials to open any box, container, tin, book, bag, or other containers found
within the locker that could hold drugs. In contrast, if school officials were searching for
a baseball bat used in assault they would only be able to search areas that would be large
enough to store a baseball bat. Glove compartment o f a car, purses, bookbags, personal
papers, and small bags would be o ff limits because they could not conceal a baseball bat.
School officials must make sure that when conducting searches they limit the search to
areas within an appropriate scope o f authority.
The data revealed that pat-down searches were quite common and used in many o f
the cases that were reviewed. The primary purpose o f a pat-down search is to obtain
tactile information that would justify further searching beneath the surface o f the outer
garments. School officials may invade the surface below outer garments when they seek
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to retrieve any object revealed by a pat-down if the size, shape, and density are consistent
with those o f the item being sought They may also retrieve, open and examine any
container that might plausibly contain the item. Cason v. Cook, at 193 (a pat-down search
for stolen currency was not excessively intrusive when a stolen coin purse was already
found in the student’s purse).
As violence and drug use has increased in public schools, administrators have been
prompted to implement policies to counter unacceptable student behaviors. School
officials have conducted searches o f lockers and personal property with greater frequency
(Foley and Ling, 1995). Some administrators have resorted to strip searches in order to
locate drugs or contraband. Administrators that conduct strip searches o f students risk
great legal consequences when those searches are carried out.
With respect to strip searches, school officials must be very familiar with the law and
make sure they find themselves in an unavoidable situation. School leaders may
constitutionally conduct strip searches in unique situations involving threats to health and
safety. School officials that search should not be “excessively intrusive in light o f the age
and sex of the student and the nature o f the infi-action’’ (New Jersey v. T.L.O., at 342).
“In fact, strip searches are probably only permissible in the school setting, if permissible
at all, where there is threat of imminent serious harm” (Jenkins v. Talladega City Board
of Education, at 1047 n.20). The data indicated that in order for strip searches to be legal
reasonable suspicion must exist that the student possesses a weapon or contraband. In
addition, the reasonable suspicion standard with respect to scope and governmental
interests should be strictly applied. Examples o f strip searches that were conducted at
school where the courts held that reasonable suspicion did not exist include requiring two
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eight-year old girls to strip twice because they were accused o f stealing S7 from another
student (Jenkins v. Talladega City Board o f Education), requiring a 15 year-old girl who
was hiding behind a parked car during school to remove her jeans (Cales v. Public
School), requiring a student to undress down to his underwear so a search for drugs could
be conducted (Austin v. Lambert), requiring fifth grade student to be strip searched in an
attempt to find an envelope that contained S26 (Thomas v. Clayton County Board o f
Education), conducting a strip search o f seventh-grade girls in an effort to find S4.50 that
had been stolen (Oliver v. McClung), requiring two eighth-grade girls to be strip searched
in order to find S57 stolen from a locker (Konop v. Northwestem School District), and
requiring a female high-school student to remove her pants so her legs could be checked
for signs o f drug use (Sostarecz v. Misko). In his dissenting and concurring opinion in
T.L.O., Justice Stevens indicated that “strip searches have no place in the school house”.
A strip search was held to be reasonable in Singleton v. Board o f Education. A school
official searched a student for $150 the student allegedly had stolen. Despite the fact the
student’s crotch area was patted and he was required to lower his cut-offs, the district
court found the search to be reasonable because it was conducted in private and the
student was not required to remove his underwear. Another example where a student was
required to remove his clothes and the search was deemed reasonable was Comfield v.
Consolidated High School. School officials were trying to find a large quantity o f drugs
the student supposedly had in his pants. The court indicated that requiring the student to
remove his clothes was the least intrusive means and the decision was affirmed in the
appellate court. Other decisions permitting a strip search are Williams v. Ellington, where
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the court permitted a search o f a high school student’s undergarments by school officials
looking for a vial of cocaine based on an allegation by a fellow student, and Widener v.
Frye, where school officials were allowed to remove the jeans o f a 15-year old male
thought to be in possession o f marijuana. The research indicates that strip searches for
illegal drugs can be defended more easily that a strip search for a modest sum o f money.
Testing for illegal drugs and alcohol by means or urinalysis has become increasingly
common because of concerns o f drug use in public schools. The court held in Schaill v.
Tippencanoe County School District, that any program involving drug testing o f students,
which is usually student athletes, must take into consideration the privacy, due process,
and equal protection rights o f the student. Courts have examined the constitutional
validity o f urinalysis testing on a case-by-case basis. The United States Supreme Court
held in Vemonia v. Acton, that testing o f a selected subgroup o f students was considered
a reasonable search. State and Federal courts that have reviewed cases involving the urine
testing o f the general student body in a public school has found it to be unconstitutional.
Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Odenhemim v. Carlstadt-East
Rutherford Regional School District, 510 A 2d 709 (N.J. Super. 1985); Brooks v. East
Chambers Consolidated Independent School District. As learned from Vemonia v. Acton,
the intrusiveness of urinalysis testing o f a student’s privacy rights must be weighed
against the governmental interests sought to be furthered by the testing. In order to
evaluate the government’s interest, three factors must be looked at: (1) the nature o f the
concern, (2) the immediacy o f the problem, and (3) the efficacy o f the policy in
addressing the problem. The Supreme Court rejected the notion that drug testing must be
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based on individualized suspicion and indicated that drug use by schoolchildren is an
important state interest that warrants governmental concern and action.
The Supreme Court has twice addressed the issue o f drug searches in public schools.
Those two cases. New Jersev v. T.L.O. and Vemonia v. Acton, could signal the start o f a
trend toward expanding the scope o f constitutionally permissible drug searches to include
suspicionless searches of all students (Bradfield, 1997). In New Jersey v. T.L.O the
Supreme Court held that individualized suspicion is usually required for a search o f a
student to be considered reasonable. In Vemonia v. Acton, the High Court indicated that
individualized suspicion is not required for a drug testing program for student athletes,
and concluded suspicionless testing is generally preferable to individualized suspicion
based testing.
Dog sniff searches are important consideration for school districts contemplating drug
detection programs. Courts have reached different conclusions on the constitutionality o f
suspicionless dog sniffs o f students’ lockers and students’ persons.
Suspicionless dog sniffs have typically been upheld by state and federal courts. The issue
has not been heard at the United States Supreme Court level. W hether a dog sniff is
actually a search under the requirements o f the Fourth Amendment depends on the
particular circumstances in each case. Courts are more likely to find a dog sniff was a
search when the dogs were used to sniff the individual rather than possessions (Van Dyke
and Sakurai, 1999). The Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals held that lack o f individualized
suspicion makes a dog sniff o f a student’s person unconstitutional Horton v. Goose Creek
Independent School District. The court was concerned that dogs touched students during
the search and that was considered offensive and personally intrusive. The Fifth Circuit
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also held that the school officials were not solely acting in loco parentis when carrying
out the search. The school leaders were acting as agents of the government, and therefore
the Fourth Amendment ^ p lie d to their actions.
In a more recent Ninth Circuit Case, Powers v. Plumas Unified School District, the
court held that a dog sniff o f a student’s person was considered a search. In addition, the
court indicated that a random and suspicionless search was unreasonable in this case. The
appellate court noted that a search that lacks individualized suspicion could still be a
valid search if the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and an
important governmental interest will be furthered by the search. In Powers v. Plumas, the
court acknowledged that deterring drug use was an important function, but there was no
indication of a drug crisis or even a drug problem when the search took place.
It is well understood, or should be well understood, that students are not stripped o f
their constitutional rights upon entering the schooUiouse. The United States Supreme
Court recognized that students are protected by the Amendments o f the United States
Constitution. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In T.L.O. the Court rejected
the premise that school officials act in loco parentis and are not subject to dictates o f the
Fourth Amendment. The Court held the Fourth Amendment does apply to searches by
school officials. 105 S. Ct. at 740-41. The Court did make a concession when they
rejected the standard of “probable cause” for school officials when conducting a search.

Id., at 743. The legality o f the search depends on reasonableness. When determining the
reasonableness o f a search, the search must be justified at inception, and reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that initially prompted the search. Id., at 744. As
seen in cases presented, when school officials are not familiar with the constitutional law
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involving searches and seizures they subject themselves and the school district to possible
litigation. By being knowledgeable o f what is and is not acceptable, educators can save
themselves a great deal o f time, effort, and money.
The two areas that seem to cause the greatest degree o f litigation are strip searches
and drug-testing policies. While earlier cases involving strip searches usually ended
favorably for the schools, the trend has since shifted. Unless the student is being searched
for a safety or health reason, courts have most recently concluded that these searches go
beyond the limits of legality. These searches are deemed to be excessively intrusive, and
the results o f this study indicate that school officials should avoid them when student
safety is not a concern. As Justice Stevens was quoted as saying in his separate opinion in
T.L.O., dissenting in part and concurring in part, “One thing is clear under any standardthe shocking strip searches that are described in some case have no place in the school
house.” 469 U.S. 325, 382. These deeply intrusive searches should only be considered
reasonable outside the custodial context when they are “to prevent imminent, and serious
harm.” M . at 383.
The issue of drug-testing policies became a controversial topic as o f late. As seen
through the results of this study circuits have not always been in agreement as to how the
case precedent, Vemonia, should be interpreted. Vemonia, has made it clear that school
districts that can prove a drug problem exists can randomly and without individualized
suspicion drug-test it’s athletes. What is unclear is how much proof must a school district
exhibit to qualify as ample indication that the school district has a drug problem. In
addition, is it permissible to test all students participating in extracurricular activities, or
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just athletes? These are a couple o f questions where the answer varies depending on the
circuit.
In closing, it is imperative to reiterate the importance o f educators knowing the
constitutional law with respect to student searches. This study provides a concise
summary o f how search and seizure cases involving students in public schools have been
resolved over the past sixteen years. The data presented here is intended to help teachers,
administrators, and other school officials avoid the unpleasant process o f a lawsuit.

Recommendations For Further Study
With one exception, the cases that were presented in this study represent rulings
within the federal court system. An examination o f state cases that deal with search and
seizure in public school would be an interesting study. As seen in Linke v. Northwestern,
unlike in Nevada, courts may hold that state constitutions offer more protection that the
United States Constitution. There are many cases that involve search and seizure o f
public school students that were never heard at the federal level, yet are worthy of
review. An example is found in Coffinan v. State, 782 S. W. 2d 249, (Texas App. 1989).
Usually, a student’s behavior cannot in itself be grounds for reasonable suspicion and
therefore justify a search. In the state court case o f Coffinan v. State a student, out o f
class without an excuse, first ignored an assistant principal and then became excited and
aggressive. The student clutched his book bag behind him as if he was trying to prevent
the administrator to see what was in it. The school official gained control o f the book bag
and did proceed to search it. The court held that the student’s behavior was enough for
reasonable suspicion.
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State Courts have reviewed T.L.O. and have interpreted it differently in some
instances. One prime example is the issue o f a student’s expectation to privacy with
respect to school property. State courts that decided public school students do have an
expectation to privacy in lockers and other school property include M ississippi (In re S.C.
V.

State, 583 So. 2d 188,1991). The court did indicate that a student would have less o f a

privacy interest at school then they would at home or in an automobile. Other states that
have ruled similarly are; New Jersey (State v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, A.2d 934, 1983),
New Mexico (State v. Michael G., 748 P.2d, N.M. App. 1987), Washington (State v.
Brooks, 718 P.2d 837, Wash. App. 1986), and West Virginia (State v. Joseph T .. 336 S.E.
2d 728, W.Va. 1985). Hawaii’s Department o f Education Regulation, Chapter 19,
Subchapter 4, subsection 8-19-14 (1986) indicates that student do have an expectation o f
privacy in individually assigned school property. A Wisconsin court ruled that students
have a minimal expectation o f privacy in their jackets hanging in school cloak rooms, and
that an undifferentiated pat-down search o f all jackets to try and find a missing portable
radio was constitutional. In re L.J., 468 N.W. 2d 211 (Wis. App. 1991). In a separate
Wisconsin case, the state court held that students had no reasonable expectation o f
privacy in their lockers when the school system had a written policy retaining ownership
and control o f school lockers as long as students were made aware o f the policy. In re
Isiah B.

V.

State. 500 N. W. 2d 637 (Wis. 1993). In Commonwealth v. Cass, 709 A2d 350

(Pa. 1998), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that public school students possess
only a minimal expectation o f privacy in their lockers.
The Earls case from the lO'^ circuit has been granted certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case on appeal from the
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school district. The case originated when the school district instituted a drug-testing
policy for all students that participated in extra-curricular activities. The district court
held the policy to be constitutional. A 2-1 vote in the appellate court held the policy
unconstitutional because, unlike in Vemonia. the school district was not able to prove a
special need existed to initiate the drug-testing policy. In his dissenting opinion Justice
Ebel encouraged the school district to pursue this case to the United States Supreme
Court if necessary because he so strongly opposed the decision. This case is worth
watching because the findings o f the Supreme Court will have significant impact on
which students schools are able to drug-test The Vemonia decision allowed schools to
drug-test athletes, the Tecumseh school district is asking that all students involved in
extracurricular activities be subject to drug-testing. A study regarding the impact o f the
decision may be worthwhile.
A study to identify how well informed school leaders are with respect to search and
seizure could prove to be beneficial. Administrators and policy makers could be
presented with a survey that contains a variety o f hypothetical situations to analyze based
on their understanding o f school law. In addition, a similar study could be conducted with
classroom teachers. Courts hold teachers, administrators, and policy makers accountable
for what they should know with respect to students’ constitutional rights. A study o f how
up to date educators are on current federal law regarding search and seizure could prove
to be beneficial. Results o f the study could be used by school districts to determine if
additional training is needed in that area. The potential savings created by avoiding
litigation could well be worth the cost. Board members and superintendents could review
the results to see how they could better prepare educators in their districts.
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The following issues were covered in this study. However, the questions this
study sought answers to did not fully explain answers to some key concerns. While the
United States Supreme Court decision in T.L.O and Vemonia answered some questions,
there are still some issues left unanswered. The student’s expectation o f privacy with
respect to school property is one such issue. Which standard applies when law
enforcement is involved is another issue. If school police is involved in the search is
“probable cause” always required instead o f reasonable suspicion? The final matter left
unanswered by the T.L.O. and Vemonia decisions is the question o f “individualized
suspicion”. Is “individualized suspicion” an essential element o f the reasonable suspicion
standard that was articulated in T.L.O ? This study had found cases where courts have
indicated it is, and some courts that have held that it is not. Undoubtedly, the final word
has not been written on this subject. It is just a matter o f time before the United States
Supreme Court is faced with another Fourth Amendment issue involving public school
students. At that time they will hopefully clear up some o f the unanswered questions
regarding this matter.
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APPENDIX A

THE SUPREME COURT T.L.O. CASE

On March 7,1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, N.J.,
discovered two girls smoking in a school lavatory. One o f the two girls was the
respondent T.L.O., who at that time was a 14-year old high school freshman. Because
smoking in the lavatory was a violation o f a school rule, the teacher took the two girls to
the Principal’s office, where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick.
In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick, T.L.O.’s companion admitted that she had
violated the rule. T.L.O., however denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory and
claimed that she did not smoke at all.
Mr. Choplick asked T.L.O. to come into his private office and demanded to see her
purse. Opening the purse, he found a pack o f cigarettes, which he removed from the purse
and held before T.L.O. as he accused her o f having lied to him. As he reached into the
purse for the cigarettes, Mr. Choplick also noticed a package o f cigarette rolling papers.
In his experience, possession o f rolling papers by high school students was closely
associated with the use of marijuana. Suspecting that a closer examination o f the purse
might yield further evidence o f drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to search the purse
thoroughly. The search revealed a small amount o f marijuana, a pipe, a number o f empty
plastic bags, a substantial quantity o f money in one-dollar bills, an index card that
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appeared to be a list o f students who owed T.L.O. money and two letters that implicated
T.L.O. in marijuana dealing.
Mr. Choplick notified T.L.O.’s mother and the police, and turned the evidence of
drug dealing over to the police. At the request o f the police, T.L.O.’s mother took her
daughter to police headquarters, where T.L.O. confessed that she had been selling
marijuana at the high school. On the basis o f the confession and the evidence seized by
Mr. Choplick, the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court o f Middlesex County. Contending that Mr. Choplick’s search
o f her purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence
found in her purse as well as her confession, which, she argued was tainted by the
allegedly unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to suppress. Although
the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by
school officials, it held that a school official may properly conduct a search o f a student’s
person if the official has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process
o f being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to
maintain school discipline or enforce school policies. Id., at 341, 428 A2d, at 1333.
.Applying this standard, the court concluded that the search conducted by Mr.
Choplick was a reasonable one. The initial decision to open the purse was justified by
Mr. Choplick’s well-founded suspicion that T.L.O. had violated the rule forbidding
smoking in the lavatory. Once the purse was open, evidence o f marijuana violations was
in plain view, and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct a thorough search to determine
the nature and extent o f T.L.O.’s drug-related activities. Having denied the motion to
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suppress, the court on March 23,1981, found T.L.O. to be a delinquent and on January 8,
1982, sentenced her to a year’s probation.
On appeal from the final judgement o f the Juvenile Court, a divided Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court’s findings that there had been no Fourth Amendment
violation, but vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for a determination
o f whether T.L.O. had knowingly and voluntarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights
before confessing. State ex rel T.L.O., 185 NJ Super 279,448 A2d 493 (1982). T.L.O.
appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
the judgement of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression o f the evidence
found in T.L.O.’s purse. State ex rel T.L.O., 94 NJ 331,463 A2d 934(1983).
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the Fourth
Amendment applies to searches conducted by school officials. The court also rejected the
State o f New Jersey’s argument that the exclusionary rule should not be employed to
prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of evidence unlawfully seized by school officials.
Declining to consider whether applying the rule to the fruits o f searches by school
officials would have any deterrent value, the court held simply that the precedents o f this
Court establish that “if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not
admissible in criminal proceedings.”
With respect to the question o f the legality o f the search before it, the court agreed
with the Juvenile Court that a warrantless search by a school official does not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as the official “has reasonable grounds to believe that a
student possesses evidence o f illegal activity or activity that would interfere with school
discipline and order.” However, the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed
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with the Juvenile Court’s conclusion that the search o f the purse was reasonable.
According to the majority, the contents o f T.L.O.’s purse had no bearing on the
accusation against T.L.O., for possession o f cigarettes (as opposed to smoking them in
the lavatory) did not violate school rules, and a mere desire for evidence that would
impeach T.L.O.’s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the search.
Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse would
justify a search, Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished him with
any specific information that there were cigarettes in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the
question whether Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the
evidence o f drug use that he saw inside did not justify the extensive “rummaging”
through T.L.O.’s papers and effects that followed.
Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the issue o f the appropriate
remedy in juvenile court proceedings for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding
the wisdom o f deciding that question in isolation from the broader question o f what
limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities o f school authorities
prompted us to order reargument on that question. ‘ Having heard argument on the
legality o f the search o f T.L.O.’s purse, we are satisfied that the search did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.

' “ State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest o f the States in providing a safe environment
conducive to education in public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by
giving full force to one or the other side o f the balance. Thus, in a num ber o f cases courts have held that
school officials conducting in-school searches o f students are private parties acting in loco parentis and are
therefore not subject to the constraints o f the Fourth Amendment” (83 L.Ed., pg. 728).
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The Court’s Analysis
In determining whether the search at issue in this case violated the Fourth
Amendment, we are faced initially w ith the question whether that Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by
public school officials. We hold that it does.
It is now beyond dispute that “the Federal Constitution, by virtue o f the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers.” Equally
indisputable is the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights o f
students against encroachment by public school officials:
“The Fourteenth Amendment, as now ^ p lie d to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all o f its creatures-Boards o f Education not excepted.
These have, of course, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they
may not perform within the limits o f the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the
young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection o f Constitutional fi-eedom o f
the individual, if we are not o strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles o f our government as mere platitudes.” West Virginia
State Bd. o f Ed. V. Barnette, 319 US 624,637, 87 L Ed 1628, 63 S Ct 1178, 147 ALR
674(1943).
On reargument, however, the State o f New Jersey argued that the Fourth
Amendment’s history indicated that the Amendment was intended to regulate only
searches and seizures carried out by law enforcement officers; accordingly, although
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public school officiais are concededly state agents for the purpose o f the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them .'
This court has never has never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has long
spoken o f the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon “governmental
action”-that is, “upon the activities of sovereign authority’’ Burdeau v McDowell. S Ct
574 (1921). Accordingly, we have held that the Fourth Amendment ^ p lic a b le to the
activities o f civil as well as criminal authorities; building inspectors. Occupational Safety
and Health Act inspectors, and even firemen entering privately owned premises to battle
a fire, are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.
Today’s public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred
on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance o f publicly mandated
educational and disciplinary policies. In carrying out searches and other disciplinary
functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives o f the State, not
merely as surrogates for the parents and they carmot claim the parents’ immunity from
the strictures o f the Fourth Amendment.. .[T.L.O.] at 934, 940.
To hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school
authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches.
Although the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and
seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search
takes place. The determination o f the standard o f reasonableness governing any specific

- Ingraham v. W rieht. 430 US 651, 51 L Ed 2d 711,97 S C t 1401 (1977) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment’s pnahibidon o f cruel and unusual punishment applies only to punishments imposed after
criminal convictions and hence does not apply to the punishment o f schoolchildren by public school
officials).
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class o f searches requires ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.’^ On one side o f the balance are arrayed the individual’s legitimate
expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government’s need for
effective methods to deal with breaches o f public order.
We have recognized that even a limited search o f the person is a substantial invasion
o f privacy."* O f course the Fourth Amendment does protect subjective expectations o f
privacy that are unreasonable or otherwise “illegitimate.” To receive the protection o f the
Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that society is “prepared to
recognize as legitimate.” The State of New Jersey has argued that because o f the
pervasive supervision to which children in the schools are necessarily subject, a child has
virtually no expectation o f privacy in articles o f personal property “unnecessarily” carried
into a school.
Although this Court may take notice o f the difficulty o f maintaining discipline in the
public schools today, the situation is not so dire that students in the schools may claim no
legitimate expectations o f privacy. We have recently recognized that the need to maintain
order in a prison is such that prisoners retain no legitimate expectations o f privacy in their
cells, but it goes almost without saying the “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts o f criminal conviction and
incarceration” [Ingraham] at 669. We are not yet ready to hold that schools and prisons
are equated for purposes o f the Fourth Amendment
Nor does the State’s suggestion that children have no legitimate need to bring
personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum

^ Camara v. Municipal, at 536-537, 87 S Ct 1727.
'■Terry v. Ohio. 392 US 1 24-25,20 L Ed 2d 889, 88 S Ct 1868,44 Ohio ops 2d 383 (1968).
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must bring to school not only the supplies needed for their studies, but also keys, money,
and the necessaries o f personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on
their persons or in purses or wallets such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as
photographs, letters, and diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons
to carry with them articles o f property needed in connection with extracurricular or
recreational activities. In short, schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry with them a
variety o f legitimate, noncontraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they
have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto
school grounds.
.A.gainst the child’s interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest o f teachers
and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds.
Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school
disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms; drug use and violent crime in the schools
have become major social problems. Even in schools that have been spared the most
severe disciplinary problems, the preservation o f order and a proper educational
en\ ironment requires close supervision o f schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement o f
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.
‘Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate
effective action.’^ Accordingly, we have recognized that maintaining security and order
in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures,
and we have respected the value o f preserving the informality of student-teacher
relationships.

' Goss V. Lopez. 419 US at 580,42 L Ed 2d 725,95 S Ct 729.
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How, then, should we strike the balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate
expectations o f privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an
environment in which learning can take place? It is evident that the school setting
requires some easing o f the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school
environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected o f
an infraction o f school rules (or o f the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
maintenance o f the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Just
as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant requirement when ‘the burden o f
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search’. . .[Camara] at 532-533 we hold today that school officials need not obtain a
warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.
The school setting also requires some modification o f the level o f suspicion o f illicit
activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search -even one that may permissibly be
carried out without a warrant- must be based upon ‘probable cause’ to believe that a
violation o f the law has occurred. However, ‘probable cause’ is not an irreducible
requirement o f a valid search. The fundamental command o f the Fourth Amendment is
that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although “both the concept o f probable
cause and the requirement o f a warrant bear on the reasonableness o f a search,.. .in
certain limited circumstances neither is required.” Almeida Sanchez v. United States 413
U.S. 266 at 277. Thus we have in a number o f cases recognized the legality o f searches
and seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonableness,” do not rise to the level
o f probable cause. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
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654-655. Where a careful balancing o f governmental and private interests suggests that
the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard o f reasonableness that
stops short o f probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
We join the majority o f courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the
accommodation o f the privacy interests o f schoolchildren with the substantial need o f
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the school does not require
strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe
that the subject o f the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality o f a
search o f a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness o f any search involves a
twofold inquiry; first, one must consider “whether the...action was justified at its
inception,” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place” ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search
o f a student by a teacher or other school official^ will be “justified at its inception” when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules o f the school. Such a search
will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives o f the search and not excessively intrusive in light o f the age and sex o f the
student and the nature o f the infraction.

" We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority.
This case does not present the question o f the appropriate standard for assessing the legality o f searches
conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest o f law enforcement agencies, and we
express no opinion on that question.
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This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the efforts o f school authorities to
maintain order in their school nor authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy o f
schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question o f reasonableness, the standard will
spare teachers and school administrators the necessity o f schooling themselves in the
niceties o f probable cause and permit them to regulate their conduct according to the
dictates o f reason and common sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard
should ensure that the interests o f students will be invaded no more than is necessary to
achieve legitimate end o f preserving order in the schools.
There remains the question o f legality o f the search in this case. We recognize the
“reasonableness grounds” standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in its
consideration o f this question is not substantially different from the standard that we have
adopted today. Nonetheless, we believe that the New Jersey court’s implication o f the
standard to strike down the search o f T.L.O.’s purse reflects a somewhat crabbed notion
o f reasonableness. Our review o f the facts surrounding the search leads us to conclude
that the search was in no sense unreasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes.^
The incident that gave rise to this case actually involved two separate searches, with
the first-the search for cigarettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second-the
search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits o f the second search that are at issue here,
the validity o f the search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of the initial
search for cigarettes, as there would have been no reason to suspect that T.L.O. possessed
marihuana had the first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search for
cigarettes that we first turn our attention.
O f course. New Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own Constitution or statues. In
that case, its courts would not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a
search.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds for its holding that the search
for cigarettes was unreasonable. First, the court observed that possession o f cigarettes
was not in itself illegal or a violation o f school rules. Because the contents o f T.L.O.’s
purse would therefore have ‘no direct bearing on the infraction’ o f which she was
accused (smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there was no reason to
search her purse.* Second, even assuming that a search o f T.L.O .’s purse might under
some circumstances be reasonable in light o f the accusation m ade against T.L.O., the
New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick in this particular case had no reasonable
grounds to suspect that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, according to the court,
Mr. Choplick had “a good hunch.” 94 N.J., at 347,463 A. 2d, at 942.
Both these conclusions are implausible. T.L.O. had been accused o f smoking, and had
denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not
smoke at all. Surely it carmot be said that under these circumstances T.L.O.’s possession
o f cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her or to her response to those
charges. T.L.O.’s possession o f cigarettes, once it was discovered, would both
corroborate the report that that she had been smoking and undermine the credibility o f her
defense to the charge o f smoking. To be sure, the discovery o f cigarettes would not prove
that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily
be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally
recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the
ultimate fact in issue, but only have “any tendency to make the existence o f any fact that
is of consequence to the determination o f the action more probable or less probable than
* Justice Stevens interprets these statements as a holding that enforcement o f the school’s smoking
regulations was not sufficiently related to the goal o f maintaining discipline o r order to justify a search
under the standard adopted by the New Jersey co u rt
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it would be without the evidence.” The relevance o f T.L.O.’s possession o f cigarettes to
the question whether she had been smoking and to the credibility o f her denial that she
smoked supplied the ‘nexus’ between the item searched for and the infraction under
investigation. Thus, if Mr. Choplick in fact had a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had
cigarettes in her purse, the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if
found, would constitute “mere evidence” o f a violation.
O f course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no
reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling.
A teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the lavatory. Certainly this report
gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes with her; and if
she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place in which to find them. Mr.
Choplick’s suspicion that there were cigarettes in the purse was not an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or [ hunch, ]’ rather, it was the sort o f ‘common-sense
conclusion about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people’-including government
officials-are entitled to rely. O f course, even if the teacher’s report were true, T.L.O.
might not have had a pack o f cigarettes with her, she might have borrowed a cigarette
from someone else or have been sharing a cigarette with another student. But the
requirement o f reasonable suspicion is not a requirement o f absolute certainty: ‘sufficient
probability, not certainty, is the touchstone o f reasopnableness under the Fourth
Amendment....’’ Because the hypothesis that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes in her purse
was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other hypotheses were also consistent with
the teacher’s accusation. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted
unreasonably when he examined T.L.O.’s purse to see if it contained cigarettes.
' Hill

V.

California. 401 US 797, 804,28 L Ed 2d 484,91 S Ct 1106 (1971).
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Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick’s decision to open T.L.O’s purse was reasonable
brings us to the question o f the further search for marihuana once the pack o f cigarettes
was located. The suspicion upon which the search for marihuana was founded was
provided when Mr. Choplick observed a package o f rolling papers in the purse as he
removed the pack o f cigarettes. Although T.L.O. does not dispute the reasonableness o f
Mr. Choplick’s belief that the rolling papers indicated the presence o f marihuana, she
does contend that the scope o f the search Mr. Choplick conducted exceeded permissible
bounds when he seized and read certain letters that implicated T.L.O. in drug dealing.
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. The discovery o f the rolling papers concededly gave
rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in
her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration o f T.L.O.’s purse, which turned up
more evidence of drug-related activities: a pipe, a number o f plastic bags o f the type used
to store marihuana, a small quantity o f marihuana, and a fairly substantial amount o f
money. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to extend the search to a
separate zippered compartment o f the purse; and when a search of that compartment
revealed an index card containing a list o f ‘people who owe me money’ as well as two
letters, the inference that T.L.O. was involved in marihuana trafficking was substantial
enough to justify Mr. Choplick in examining the letters to determine whether they
contained any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the search for
marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.
Because the search resulting in the discovery o f the evidence of marihuana dealing by
T.L.O. was reasonable. The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision to exclude the
evidence fi-om T.L.O’s juvenile delinquency proceedings on Fourth Amendment grounds
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was erroneous. Accordingly, the judgement of the Supreme Court o f New Jersey is
reversed.
Justice Powell, with whom Justice O’Connor joins, concurring.
I agree with the Court’s decision, and generally with its opinion. I would place greater
emphasis, however, on the special characteristics o f elementary and secondary schools
that make it unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections granted
adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.
In any realistic sense, students within the school enviroiunent have a lesser
expectation of privacy than members o f the population generally. They spend the school
hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and during recreation
periods. The students in a particular class often know each other and their teacher quite
well. O f necessity, teachers have a degree o f familiarity with, and authority over, their
students that is unparalleled except perhaps the relationship between parent and child. It
is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same subjective expectation o f
privacy as the population generally. But for purposes o f deciding the case, 1 can assume
that children in school -no less than adults-have privacy interests that society is prepared
to recognize as legitimate.
However one may characterize their privacy expectations, students properly are
afforded some constitutional protections. In an often quoted statement, the Court said that
students do not shed their constitutional rights... at the schoolhouse gate.” ‘° The Court
also has “emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority o f the states
and o f school officials... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,104 (1968). The Court has balanced the interests o f the students
See Tinker v. Des Moines
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against the school officials’ need to maintain discipline by recognizing qualitative
differences between the constitutional remedies to which students and adults are entitled.
In Goss

V.

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). the Court recognized a constitutional right to

due process, and yet was careful to limit the exercise o f this right by a student who
challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process found to be “due” was notice and
a hearing described as “rudimentary”; it amounted to no more than “the
disciplinarian.. .informally discussing the alleged misconduct with the student minutes
after it occurred.” Id. 581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), we declined
to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use o f corporal punishment o f
schoolchildren as authorized by Florida law. We emphasized in that opinion that familiar
constraints in the school, and also in the community, provide substantial protection
against the violation o f constitutional rights by school authorities. “ [A]t the end o f the
school day the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child
brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely ^ a r t from teachers and
other pupils who may wimess and protest any instances o f mistreatment.” Ibid.
The special relationship bet^^'een teacher and student also distinguishes the setting
within which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers have the responsibility to
investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to
facilitate the charging and bringing o f such persons to trial. Rarely does this type o f
adversarial relationship exist between school authorities and pupils. Instead, there is a
commonality o f interests between teachers and their pupils. The attitude o f the typical
teacher is one o f personal responsibility for the student’s welfare as well as for his
education.
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In sum, although I join the Court’s opinion and its holding,' ' my emphasis is
somewhat different.
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgement.
I join the judgement o f the Court and agree with much that is said in its opinion. 1
write separately, however, because I believe the Court omits a crucial step in its analysis
of whether a school search must be based upon probable cause. The Court correctly states
that we have recognized limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement “[w]here a
careful balancing o f governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is
best served” by a lesser standard. 1 believed that we used such a balancing test, rather
than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable Cause Clause, only
when we were confronted with a “special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.”
“While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms o f freedom from
unreasonable [searches], the Amendment does not leave the
reasonableness of most [searches] to the judgment o f courts or government
officers; the Framers o f the Amendment balanced the interests involved
and decided that a [search] is reasonable only if supported by a judicial
warrant based on probable cause. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744-745
(1983).
The Court’s implication that the balancing test is the rule rather than the exception is
troubling for me because it is unnecessary in this case. The elementary and secondary
school setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from the
balance struck by the Framers. As Justice Powell notes, “[w]ithout first establishing
‘ ‘ The court’s holding is that ’when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules o f the school,’ a search o f
the student’s person or belongings is justified.
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discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”
Maintaining order in the classroom can be a difficult task. A single teacher often must
watch over a large number o f students, and, as any parent knows, children at certain ages
are inclined to test the outer boundaries o f acceptable conduct and to imitate the
misbehavior o f a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly. Every adult
remembers from his own school days the havoc a water pistol or pea shooter can wreak
until it is taken away. Thus, the Court has recognized that “[e]vents calling for discipline
are frequent occurrences and sometimes require immediate, effective action.” Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). Indeed because drug use and possession o f weapons
have become increasingly common among young people, an immediate response
frequently is required not just to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to
protect the very safety o f students and school persormel.
Such immediate action obviously would not be possible if a teacher were required to
secure a warrant before searching a student. Nor would it be possible if a teacher could
not conduct a necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable cause for the
search. A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the
complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is illequipped to make a quick judgement about the existence o f probable cause. The time
required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to
turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other
students, are diverted from the essential task o f education. A teacher’s focus is, and
should be, on teaching and helping students, rather than on developing, evidence against
a particular troublemaker.
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Education “is perhaps the most important function” o f government,'^ and government
has a heightened obligation to safeguard students whom it compels to attend school. The
special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety o f
schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in
excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirement, and in
applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests. 1 agree with the
standard the Court has announced, and with its application o f the standard to the facts o f
this case. 1 therefore concur in its judgment.
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and dissenting
in part.
1 fully agree with Part II o f the C ourt’s opinion. Teachers like all government
officials, must conform their conduct to the Fourth Amendment’s protections o f personal
privacy and personal security. As Justice Stevens points out, this principle is o f particular
importance when applied to schoolteachers, for children learn as much by example as by
exposition. It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers with the task o f
embuing their students with an understanding o f our system o f constitutional democracy,
while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect
constitutional protections.
I do not, however, otherwise join the Court’s opinion. Today’s decision sanctions
school officials to conduct full-scale searches on a “reasonableness” standard whose only
definite content is that it is not the same text as the “probable cause” standard found in
the text o f the Fourth Amendment. In adopting this unclear, unprecedented, and

Brown v. Board o f Education. 347 US 4 8 3 ,4 9 3 , 98 L Ed 873, 74 S Ct 6 8 6 ,5 3 Ohio Ops 326,38 ALR2d
1180(1954).
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unnecessary' departure from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court
carv es out a broad exception to standards that this Court has developed over years of
considering Fourth Amendment problems. Its decision is supported neither by precedent
nor even by a fair application o f the “balancing test” it proclaims in this very opinion.
I agree that schoolteachers or principals, when not acting as agents o f law
enforcement authorities, generally may conduct a search o f their students’ belongings
without first obtaining a warrant. To agree with the Court on this point is to say that
school searches may justifiably be held to that extent to constitute an exception to the
Fourth .Amendment’s warrant requirement. Such an exception, however, is not to be
justified, as the Court apparently holds, by assessing net social value through application
o f an unguided “balancing test” in which “the individual’s legitimate expectations of
privacy and personal security” are weighed against “the government’s need for effective
methods to deal with breaches o f public order.”
To require a showing o f some extraordinary governmental interest before dispensing
with the warrant requirement is not to undervalue society’s need to apprehend violators
o f the criminal law. To be sure, forcing law enforcement personnel to obtain a warrant
before engaging in a search will predictably deter the police from conducting some
searches that they would otherwise like to conduct. But this is not an unintended result o f
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy; rather, it is the very purpose for which
the Amendment was thought necessary.
1 emphatically disagree with the Court’s decision to cast aside constitutional
probable-cause standards when assessing the constitutional validity o f a schoolhouse
search. The Court’s decision jettisons the probable-cause standard-the only standard that
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finds support in the text of the Fourth Amendment-on the basis o f its Rohrshach-Iike
“balancing test.” Use o f such a “balancing test” to determine the standard for evaluating
the validity of a full-scale search represents a sizable innovation in Fourth Amendment
analysis. This innovation finds support neither in precedent nor policy and portends a
dangerous weakening of the purpose o f the Fourth Amendment to protect the privacy and
security of our citizens. Therefore, because 1 believe that the balancing test used by the
Court today is flawed both in its inception and in its execution, 1 respectfully dissent.
.An unbroken line of cases in this Court have held that probable cause is a prerequisite
for a full-scale search. In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925), the Court
held that “[o]n reason and authority the true rule is that is the search and seizure .. .are
made upon probable cause.. .the search and seizure are valid.” Under our past decisions
probable cause-which exists where “the facts and circumstances within [the officials’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man o f reasonable caution in the belief’ that a criminal offense
had occurred and the evidence would be found in the suspected place, id., at 162-is the
constitutional minimum for justifying a full-scale search, regardless of whether it is
conducted pursuant to a warrant or, as in Carroll within one o f the exceptions to a warrant
requirement. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (Carroll “merely relaxed
the requirements for a warrant on grounds of practicality,” but “did not dispense with the
need for probable cause”); accord. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“ in
enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a
reasonable search permitted by the Constitution”)
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O ur holdings that probable cause us a prerequisite to a full-scale search are based on
the relationship between the two Clauses o f the Fourth Amendment. The first
Clause(“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...”) states the purpose o f
the Amendment and its coverage. The second Clause (“ ...and no Warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause...”) gives content to the word “unreasoanble” in the first Clause.
"For all but ...narrowly defined intrusions, the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed
in centuries o f precedent and is embodied in the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’
only if supported by probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York. 442 U.S., at 214.
I therefore fully agree with the Court that “the underlying command o f the Fourth
Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable.” Ante, at 337. But this
"underlying command” is not directly interpreted in each category o f cases by some
amorphous “balancing test.” Rather, the provisions o f the Warrant Clause-a warrant and
probable cause-provide the yardstick against which official searches and seizures are to
be measured. The Fourth Amendment neither required nor authorizes the conceptual freefor-all that ensues when an unguided balancing test is used to assess specific categories o f
searches. If the search in question is more than a minimally intrusive Terry stop, the
constitutional probable-cause standard determines its yalidity.
To be sure, the Court recognizes that probable cause “ordinarily” is required to justify
a full-scale search and that the existence o f probable cause “bears on” the yalidity o f the
search. Ante, at 340-341. Yet the Court fails to cite any case in which a full-scale
intrusion upon priyacy interests has been justified on less than probable cause. The line o f
cases begun by Terry y. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), proyides no support, for they applied a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

242
balancing test only in the context o f minimally intrusive searches that served crucial law
enforcement interests. The search in Terry itself, for instance, was a “limited search o f
the outer clothing.” Id., at 30. The type o f border stop at issue in United States v.
Brignoni-ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975), usually “consume[d] no more than a minute”;
the court explicitly noted that “any further detention ... must be based on consent or
probable cause.” Id., at 882.
Considerations of the deepest significance for the freedom o f our citizens counsel
strict adherence to the principle that no search may be conducted where the official is not
in possession o f probable cause-that is, where the official does not know o f “facts and
circumstances [that] warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been
committed.” Henrv v. United States, 361 U.S., at 102 (discussing history o f probable
cause standard). The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against
official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some “balancing test”
than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in addition to grant the individual
a zone o f privacy whose protections could be breached only where the “reasonable”
requirements o f the probable-cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary
evil has aroused their fears, officials-perhaps even supported by a majority o f citizensmay be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty o f each citizen to assuage
the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on the principle that a true balance
between the individual and society depends on the recognition o f “the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive o f rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
Olmstead v. Unites States. 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) That right protects the privacy and
security o f the individual unless the authorities can cross a specific threshold o f need.
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designated by the term “probable cause.” I cannot agree with the Court’s assertions today
that a “balancing test” can replace the constitutional threshold with one that is more
convenient for those enforcing the laws but less protective o f the citizens’ liberty; the
Fourth Amendments protections should not be defaced by “a balancing process that
overwhelms the individual’s protection against unwarranted official intrusion by a
governmental interest said to justify the search and seizure.” United States v. MartinezFuerte. supra, at 570.
I thus do not accept the majority’s premise that “[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment
applies to searches conducted by school authorities is only to begin the inquiry into the
standards governing such searches.” Ante, at 337. For me, the finding that the Fourth
Amendment applies, coupled with the observation that what is a full-scale search, is the
end o f the inquiry. But even if 1 believed that a “balancing test” appropriately replaces the
judgment o f the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, 1 would nonetheless object to the
cursory and shortsighted “test” that the Court employs to justify its predictable
weakening o f Fourth Amendment protections. In particular, the test employed by the
Court vastly overstates the social costs that a probable-cause standard entails and, though
it plausibly articulates the serious privacy interests at stake, inexplicably fails to accord
them adequate weight in striking the balance.
The Court begins to articulate its “balancing test” by observing that “the
government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches o f public order” is to be
weighed on one side o f the balance. O f course, this not correct. It is not the government”
need for effective enforcement methods that should weigh in the balance, for ordinary
Fourth Amendment standards-including probable cause-may well permit methods for
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maintaining the public order that are perfectly effective. If that were the case, the
governmental interest in having effective standards would carry no weight at all as a
justification for departing from the probable-cause standard. Rather, it is the costs o f
applying probable-cause as opposed to applying some lesser standard that should be
weighed on the government’s side.
As compared with the relative ease with which teachers can apply the probable-cause
standard, the amorphous “reasonableness under all the circumstances” standard freshly
coined by the Court today will likely spawn increased litigation and greater uncertainty
among teachers and administrators. O f course, as this Court should know, an essential
purpose o f developing and articulating legal norms is to enable individuals to conform
their conduct to those norms. A school system conscientiously attempting to obey the
Fourth .Amendment’s dictates under a probable-cause standard could, for example,
consult decisions and other legal materials and prepare a booklet expounding the rough
outlines o f the concept. Such a booklet could be distributed to teachers to provide them
with guidance as to when a search may be lawfully conducted. I cannot but believe that
the same school system faced with interpreting what is permitted under the C ourt’s new
“reasonableness” standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a search may be
permissible. The sad result o f this uncertainty may well be that some teachers will be
reluctant to conduct searches that are fully permissible and even necessary under the
constitutional probable-cause standard, while others may intrude arbitrarily and
unjustifiably on the privacy o f students.
One further point should be taken into account when considering the desirability o f
replacing the constitutional probable-cause standard. The question facing the Court is not
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whether the probable-cause standard should be replaced by a test o f “reasonableness
under all circumstances.” Rather, it is whether traditional Fourth Amendment standards
should recede before the Court’s new standard. Thus, although the Court today paints
with a broad brush and holds its undefined “reasonableness” standard applicable to all
school searches, I would approach the question with considerable more reserve. I would
not think it necessar}' to develop a single standard to govern all school searches, any more
than traditional Fourth .Amendment law applies even the probable-cause standard to all
searches and seizures. For instance, just as police officers may conduct a brief stop and
frisk on something less than probable-cause, so too should teachers be permitted the same
flexibility. .A teacher or administrator who had reasonable suspicion that a student was
carrying a gun would no doubt have authority under ordinary Fourth Amendment
doctrine to conduct a limited search o f the student to determine whether the threat was
genuine. The “costs’ of applying the traditional probable-cause standard must therefore
be discounted by the fact that, where additional flexibility is necessary and where the
intrusion is minor, traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence itself displaces probable
cause when it determines the validity o f a search.
A legitimate balancing test whose function was something more substantial than
reaching a predetermined conclusion acceptable to the Court’s impressions o f what
authority teachers need would therefore reach rather a different result than that reached
by the Court today. On one side o f the balance would be the costs o f applying traditional
Fourth Amendment standards-the “practical” and “flexible” probable-cause standard
where a full-scale intrusion is sought, a lesser standard in situations where the intrusion is
much less severe and the need for greater authority compelling. W hatever costs were
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toted up on this side would have to be discounted by the costs o f applying an
unprecedented and ill-defined “reasonableness under all circumstances” test that will
leave teachers and administrators uncertain as to their authority and will encourage
excessive fact-based litigation.
On the other side o f the balance would be the serious privacy interests o f the student,
interests that the Court admirably articulates in its opinion, ante, at 337-339, but which
the Court’s new ambiguous standard places in serious jeopardy. 1 have no doubt that a
fair assessment of the two sides of the balance would necessarily reach the same
conclusion that, as 1 have argued above, the Fourth Amendment’s language compels-that
school searches like that conducted in this case are valid only if supported by probable
cause.
Applying the constitutional probable-cause standard to the facts o f this case. I would
find that Mr. Choplick’s search violated T.L.O.’s Fourth Amendment rights. After
escorting T.L.O. into his private office, Mr. Chop lick demanded to see her purse. He then
opened the purse to find evidence o f whether she had been smoking in the bathroom.
When he open the purse, he discovered the pack o f cigarettes. At this point, his search for
evidence o f the smoking violation was complete.
Mr. Choplick then noticed, below the cigarettes, a pack of cigarette rolling papers.
Believing that such papers were “associated,” ante, at 328, with the use o f marijuana, he
proceeded to conduct a detailed examination o f the contents of her purse, in which he
found some marijuana, a pipe, some money, an index card, and some private letters
indicating that T.L.O. had sold marijuana to other students. The State sought to introduce
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this latter material in evidence at a criminal proceeding, and the issue before the Court is
whether it should have been suppressed.
On my view o f the case, we need not decide whether the initial search conducted by
Mr. Choplick -th e search for evidence o f the smoking violation that was completed when
Mr. Choplick found the pack o f cigarettes -w as valid. For Mr. Choplick at that point did
not have probable cause to continue to rummage through T.L.O.’s purse. Mr. Choplick’s
suspicion o f marijuana possession at this time was based solely on the presence o f the
cigarette papers. The mere presence without more o f such a staple item of commerce is
insufficient to warrant a person o f reasonable caution in inferring both that T.L.O. had
violated the law by possessing marijuana and that evidence o f that violation would be
found in her purse. Just as a police officer could not obtain a warrant to search a home
based solely on his claim that he had seen a package o f cigarette pzq)ers in that home, Mr.
Choplick was not entitled to search possibly the most private possessions o f T.L.O. based
on the mere presence of a package o f cigarette papers. Therefore, the fruits o f this illegal
search must be excluded and the judgment o f the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Marshall joins, and with whom Justice Brennan
joins as to Part I, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Assistant Vice Principal Choplick searched T.L.O .’s purse for evidence that she was
smoking in the girls’ restroom. Because T.L.O.’s suspected misconduct was not illegal
and did not pose a serious threat to school discipline, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that Choplick’s search o f her purse was an unreasonable invasion o f her privacy and that
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the evidence which he seized cound not be against her in criminal proceedings. The New
Jersey court’s holding was a careful response to the case it was required to decide.
The State o f New Jersey sought review in this Court, first arguing that the
exclusionary rule is wholly in^plicab le to searches conducted by school officials, and
then contending that the Fourth Amendment itself provides no protection at all to the
student’s privacy. The Court has accepted neither of these frontal assaults on the Fourth
Amendment. It has, however, seized upon this “no smoking” case to armounce “the
proper standard” that should govern searches by school officials who are confronted with
disciplinary problems far more severe than smoking in the restroom. I continue to believe
that the Court has unnecessarily and in^propriately reached out to decide a constitutional
question. More importantly, I fear that the concerns that motivated the Court’s activism
have produced a holding that will permit school administrators to search students
suspected o f violating the most trivial school regulations and guidelines for behavior.
The question the Court decides today-whether Mr. Choplick’s search o f T.L.O.’s
purse violated the Fourth Amendment -w as not raised by the State’s petition for writ o f
certiorari. That petition only raised one question: “Whether the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule applies to searches made by public school officials and teachers in
school.” The State quite properly declined to submit the former question because “ [it] did
not wish to present what might appear to be solely a factual dispute to this Court.” Since
this Court has twice had the threshold question argued, I believe that it should expressly
consider the merits o f the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling that the exclusionary rule
applies.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court’s holding on this question is plainly correct. As the
state court noted, this case does not involve the use of evidence in a school disciplinary
proceeding; the juvenile proceedings brought against T.L.O. involved a charge that would
have been a criminal offense if committed by an adult. Accordingly, the exclusionary rule
issue decided by that court and later presented to this Court concerned only the use in a
criminal proceeding o f evidence obtained in a search conducted by a public school
administrator.
Having confined the issue to the law enforcement context, the New Jersey court then
reasoned that this Court’s cases have made it quite clear that the exclusionary rule is
equally applicable “whether the public official who illegally obtained the evidence was a
municipal inspector. See v. Seattle 387 U.S. 541 [1967]; Camara [v. Municipal Court,]
387 U.S. 523 [1967]; a firefighter, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,506 [1978]; or a
school administrator or law enforcement official. It correctly concluded “that if an
official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not admissible in criminal
proceedings.”
When a defendant in a criminal proceeding alleges that she was the victim o f an
illegal search by a school administrator, the ^plication o f the exclusionary rule is a
simple corollary o f the principle that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, in a d m is s ib le in a state court.”
Mapp V. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961). The practical basis for this principle is, in part,
its deterrent effect, see id., at 656, and as a general matter it is tolerably clear to me, as it
has been to the Court, that the existence o f an exclusionary remedy does deter the
authorities from violating the Fourth Amendment by sharply reducing their incentive to
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do so. In the case o f evidence obtained in school searches, the “overall educative effect”
of the exclusionary rule adds important symbolic force to this utilitarian judgment.
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise
of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry. If the Nation’s students can be
convicted through the use o f arbitrary methods destructive o f personal liberty, they
cannot help but feel that they have been dealt with unfairly. The application o f the
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings arising from illegal school searches makes an
important statement to young people that “our society attaches serious consequences to a
violation of constitutional rights,” and that this is a principle o f “liberty and justice for
all.”
Thus, the simple and correct answer to the question presented by the State’s petition
for certiorari would have required affirmance o f a state court’s judgment suppressing
evidence. That result w ould have been dramatically out o f character for a Court that not
only grants prosecutors relief from suppression orders with distressing regularity, but also
is prone to rely on grounds not advanced by the parties in order to protect evidence from
exclusion. In characteristic disregard o f the doctrine o f judicial restraint, the Court
avoided that result in this case by ordering reargument and directing the parties, with
good reason, had not asked the Court to decide. Because judicial activism undermines the
Court’s power to perform its central mission in a legitimate way, I dissented from the
reargument order. I have not modified the views expressed in that dissent, but since the
majority has brought the question before us, I shall explain why I believe the Court has
misapplied the standard o f reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
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The search o f a young woman’s purse by a school administrator is a serious invasion
of her legitimate expectation o f privacy. A purse “is a common repository for one’s
personal effects and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation o f privacy.”
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 , 762 (1979). Although such expectations yield to the
legitimate requirements o f government, in assessing the constitutionality o f a warrantless
search, our decision must be guided by the language o f the Fourth Amendment: “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, p ^ e rs and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...” In order to evaluate the
reasonableness o f such searches, “it is necessary ‘first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionality protected
interests of the private citizen,’ for there is ‘no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion in which the
search [or seizure] entails.’” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,20-21 (1968).
The “limited search for weapons” in Terry was justified by the “immediate interest o f
the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him.” 392 U.S., at 23,25. When viewed from the institutional perspective, “the
substantial need o f teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the
schools, “ ante, at 341 (majority opinion), is no less acute. Violent, unlawful, or seriously
disruptive conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the principal function o f teaching
institutions which is to educate young people and prepare them for citizenship. When
such conduct occurs amidst a sizable group o f impressionable young people, it creates an
explosive atmosphere that requires a prompt and effective response.
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Thus, warrantless searches o f students by school administrators are reasonable when
undertaken for those purposes. But the majority ’s statement o f the standard for evaluating
the reasonableness o f such searches is not suitably adapted to that end. The majority
holds that “a search o f a student by a teacher or other school official will be ‘justified at
its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules o f the

school." Ante, at 341. This standard will permit teachers and school administrators to
search students when they suspect that the search will reveal evidence o f even the most
trivial school regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The Court’s standard
for deciding whether a search is justified “at its inception” treats all violations o f the rules
of the school as though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and
sunglasses in order to enforce the school dress code is apparently just as important as a
search for evidence of heroin addiction or violent gang activity.
The majority, however, does not content that school administrators have a compelling
need to search students in order to achieve optimum enforcement o f minor school
regulations. To the contrary, when minor violations are involved, there is every indication
that the informal school disciplinary process, with only minimum requirements o f due
process, can function effectively without the power to search for enough evidence to
prove a criminal case. In arguing that teachers and school administrators need the power
to search students based on a lessened standard, the United States as amicus curiae relies
heavily on empirical evidence o f a contemporary crisis o f violence and unlawful behavior
that is seriously undermining the process of education in American schools. A standard
better attuned to this concern would permit teachers and school administrators to search a
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student when they have reason to believe that the search will uncover evidence that the

student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school
order, or the educational process.
This standard is properly directed at “[t]he sole justification for the [warrantless]
search.” In addition, a standard that varies the extent o f the permissible intrusion with the
gravity of the suspected offense is also more consistent with common-law experience and
this Court’s precedent. Criminal law has traditionally recognized a distinction between
essentially regulatory offenses and serious violations o f the peace, and graduated the
response o f the criminal justice system depending on the character o f the violation. The
application o f a similar distinction in evaluating the reasonableness o f warrantless
searches and seizures “ is not a novel idea.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,750
(1984).
In Welsh, police officers arrived at the scene of a traffic accident and obtained
information indicating that the driver o f the automobile involved was guilty o f a first
offense of driving while intoxicated - a civil violation with a maximum fine o f S200. The
driver had left the scene o f the accident, and the officers followed the suspect to his home
where they arrested him without a warrant. Absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless
invasion of the home was a clear violation o f Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
In holding that the warrantless arrest for the “noncriminal, traffic offense” in Welsh was
unconstitutional, the Court noted that “application o f the exigent-circumstances exception
in the context o f a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause
to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed.” 466 U.S., at 753.
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The logic o f distinguishing between minor and serious offenses in evaluating the
reasonableness of school searches is almost too clear for argument In order to justify the
serious intrusion on the persons and privacy o f young people that New Jersey asks this
Court to approve, the State must identify “some real immediate and serious
consequences.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,460 (1948). While school
administrators have entirely legitimate reasons for adopting school regulations and
guidelines for student behavior, the authorization o f searches to enforce them “display a
shocking lack of all sense o f proportion.” Id., 459.
The majority offers weak deference to these principles o f balance and decency by
announcing that school searches will only be reasonable in scope “when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives o f the search and not excessively
intrusive in light o f the age and sex of the student and the nature o f the infraction." Ante,
at 342. The majority offers no explanation why a two-part standard is necessary to
evaluate the reasonableness of the ordinary school search. Significantly, in the balance o f
its opinion the Court pretermits any discussion o f the nature o f T.L.O ’s infraction o f the
“no smoking” rule.
The “rider” to the Court’s standard for evaluating the reasonableness o f the initial
intrusion apparently is the Court’s perception that its standard is overly generous and
does not, by itself, achieve a fair balance between the administrator’s right to search and
the student’s reasonable expectation o f privacy. The Court’s standard for evaluating the
“scope o f reasonable school searches is obviously designed to prohibit physically
intrusive searches by persons o f the opposite sex for relatively minor offenses. The
Court’s effort to establish a standard that is, at once, clear enough to allow searches to be
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upheld in nearly every case, and flexible enough to prohibit obviously unreasonable
intrusions o f young adults’ privacy only creates uncertainty in the extent o f its resolve to
prohibit the latter. Moreover, the majority’s ^plication o f its standard in this case - to
permit a male administrator to rummage through the purse o f a female high school
student in order to obtain evidence that she was smoking in a bathroom- raises grave
doubts in my mind whether its effort will be effective. Unlike the Court, I believe the
nature of the suspected infraction is a matter o f first importance in deciding whether any
invasion o f privacy is permissible.
The Court embraces the standard applied by the New Jersey Court as equivalent to its
own, and then deprecates the state court’s application o f the standard as reflecting “a
somewhat crabbed notion o f reasonableness.” Ante, at 343. There is no mystery,
however, in the state court’s finding that the search in this case was unconstitutional; the
decision below was not based on a manipulation o f reasonable suspicion, but on the
trivial character of the activity that promoted the official search. The New Jersey
Supreme Court wrote:
“We are satisfied that when a school official has reasonable grounds to believe
that a student possesses evidence o f illegal activity or activity that would interfere with

school discipline and order, the school official has the right to conduct a reasonable
search for such evidence.”
“ In determining whether the school official has reasonable grounds, courts should
consider ‘the child’s age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness o f

the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make the
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search without delay, and the probative value and reliability o f the information used as
justification for the search.’”
The emphasized language in the state court’s opinion focuses on the character o f the
rule infraction that is to be the object o f the search.
In the view of the state court, there is a quite obvious and material difference between
a search for evidence relating to violent or disruptive activity, and a search for evidence
o f a smoking rule violation. This distinction does not imply that a no-smoking rule is a
matter o f minor importance. Rather, like a rule that prohibits a student from being tardy,
its occasional violation in a context that poses no threat o f disrupting school order and
discipline offers no reason to believe that an immediate search is necessary to avoid
unlawful conduct, violence, or a serious impairment o f the educational process.

A correct understanding of the New Jersey court’s standard explains why that court
concluded in T.L.O.’s case that “the assistant principal did not have reasonable grounds
to believe that the student was concealing in her purse evidence o f criminal activity or
evidence o f activity that would seriously interfere with school discipline or order." The
importance of the nature o f the rule infraction to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
holding is evident from its brief explanation o f the principal basis for its decision:

".A student has an expectation of privacy in the contents o f her purse. Mere possession o f
cigarettes did not violate school rule or policy, since the school allowed smoking in
designated areas. The contents o f the handbag had no direct bearing on the infraction.”
“The assistant principal’s desire, legal in itself, to gather evidence to impeach the
student’s credibility at a hearing on disciplinary infraction does not validate the search.”
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Like the New Jersey Supreme Court, I would view this case differently if the Assistant
Vive Principal had reason to believe T.L.O.’s purse contained evidence o f criminal
activity, or o f an activity that would seriously disrupt school discipline. There was,
however, absolutely no basis for any such assumption - not even a “hunch.”
In this case, Mr. Choplick overreacted to what sp e a re d to be nothing more than a
minor infraction- a rule prohibiting smoking in the bathroom o f the freshmen’s and
sophomores’ building. It is, o f course, true that he actually found evidence o f serious
wrongdoing by T.L.O., but no one claims that the prior search m ay be justified by his
unexpected discovery. As far as the smoking infraction is concerned, the search for
cigarettes merely tended to corroborate a teacher’s eyewimess account o f T.L.O.’s
violation of a minor regulation designed to channel student smoking behavior into
designated locations. Because this conduct was neither unlawful nor significantly
disruptive o f school order or the educational process, the invasion o f privacy associated
with the forcible opening o f T.L.O .’s purse was entirely unjustified at its inception.
A review o f the sampling o f school search case relied on by the Court demonstrates
how different this case is from those in which there was a valid justification for intruding
on a student’s privacy. In most o f them the student was suspected o f a criminal violation;
in the remainder either violence or substantial disruption o f school order or the integrity
o f the academic process was at stake. Few involved matters as trivial as the no-smoking
rule violated by T.L.O. The rule the Court adopts today is so open-ended that it may
make the Fourth Amendment virtually meaningless in the school context. Although I
agree that school administrators must have broad latitude to maintain order and discipline
in our classrooms, that authority is not unlimited.
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The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power o f
government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to
policemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life.
One o f our most cherished ideals is the one contained in the Fourth .Amendment: that the
government not intrude on the personal privacy of its citizens without a warrant or
compelling circumstance. The Court’s decision today is a curious moral for the Nation’s
youth. Although the search of T.L.O.’s purse does not trouble today’s majority, I submit
that we are not dealing with “matters relatively trivial to the welfare o f the Nation. There
are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who acts under color o f law is
beyond reach of the Constitution.” West Virginia State Board o f Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 638(1943).
I respectfrxlly dissent.
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APPENDIX B

CASES CITING T.L.O (SHERPARDIZED LISTING)

The following pages contain a listing o f 475 o f the cases in the federal court system
which contain a reference to T.L.O. Counting state court entries (which were beyond the
scope of this study), there were 1076 total cases on record that have cited the T.L.O. case.
The federal cases in the following list are presented with Supreme Court cases first, then
entries by circuit. The cases in this study were drawn from this printout, which was
obtained from the Lexis/Nexis service available at the Lied School o f Business at the
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas. UNLV - The Lied Business Information Center
LEXIS/NEXIS

1076 Citing Refenences
Citation to: New Jersey v. T.L.O,, 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

CASE HISTORY
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331
<=10> Same case
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329
<=11> Same case
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 185 N.J. Super. 279
<=12> Same case
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327
<=13> Same case
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 448 A. 2d 493
<=14> Same case
New Jersey in the Interest o f T.L.O., 463 A. 2d 934
<=15> Same case

259
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U.S. Supreme Court
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305
<=16> p. 317
Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646
<=17> p. 652
<=18> Dissenting opinion p. 677
Wilson V. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927
<=19> p. 931
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661
<=20> p. 677
Soldai V. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56
<=21> p. 67
United States v. R. Enters. Inc., 498 U.S. 292
<=22> p. 299
Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
<=23> Dissenting opinion p. 460
McKoy V. North Carolina, 494 U.S.
<=24> p. 440
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325
<=25> p. 331
<=26> Dissenting opinion p. 340
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
<=27> p. 287
<=28> Dissenting opinion p. 287
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Rabb, 489 U.S. 656
<=29> p. 665
<=30> Dissenting opinion p. 681
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 489 U.S. 602
<=31> p. 619
<=32> p. 624
<=33> p. 631
<=34> p. Dissenting opinion p. 637
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
<=35> p. 823
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
<=36> p. 266
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868
<=37> p. 873
<=38> Dissenting opinion p. 881
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
<=39> p. 702
O ’Coimor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
<=40> p. 714
<=41> Followed p. 725
<=42> Different opinion p. 732
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<=43> Dissenting opinion p. 732
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
<=44> Dissenting opinion p. 338
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
<=45> p. 682
474 U.S. 1050
<=46>p. 1050
474 U.S. 953
<=47> Dissenting opinion p. 964
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531
<=48> p. 537
<=49> Dissenting opinion p. 553
Chandler v. Miller, 137 L. Ed. 2d 513
<=50> p. 525
Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564
<=51> p. 574
<=52> Dissenting opinion p. 590
Wilson V. Arkansas, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976
<=53> p. 980
Waters v. Churchill, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686
<=54> p. 700
Soldai V. Cook County, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450
<=55> p. 462
Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295
<=56>p. 1032
Vemonia School District 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386
<=57> p. 2390
<=58> Dissenting opinion
Wilson V. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914
<=59> p. 1916
Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878
<=60> p. 1889
Soldai V. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538
<=61> p. 546
<=62> p. 548
Chandler v. Miller, 65 U.S.L.W. 4243
<=63> 4246
57 U.S.L.W. 4295
<=64> p. 4328
<=65> Dissenting opinion p. 4333
<=66> p. 4341
<=67> Dissenting opinion p. 4345
56 U.S.L.W. 4892
<=68> p. 4894
56 U.S.L.W. 4026
<=69> P. 4081
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55 U.S.L.W. 5156
<=70> Explained p. 5157
<=71> Dissenting opinion p. 5160
55 U.S.L.W. 4890
<=72> p. 4893
O’Connor v. Ortega, 55 U.S.L.W. 4405
<=73> p. 4407
<=74> Different opinion p. 4412
<=75> Dissenting opinion p. 4412
55 U.S.L.W. 4251
<=76> Dissenting opinion p. 4263
54 U.S.L.W. 5054
<=77> p. 5056
Chandler V. Miller, 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1233
<=78>p. 1238
Waters v. Churchill, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 801
<=79> p. 806
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2065
<=80>
<=81 > Dissenting opinion
Skinner v. Railway Labor Exectutives Assoc., O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) P28476
—p. 2070
-- Dissenting opinion p. 2077
- Dissenting opinion p. 2078
l “ Circuit
United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, Ct. App.
Dkt. No. 92-1385
Ahera v. O ’Donnell, 109 F. 3d 809
<=86> p. 817
Rossetti V. Curran, 80 F. 3d 1
<=87> p.5
McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv. Inc., 77 F. 3d 540
<=88> p. 544
Wojcik V. Town o f N. Smithfield, 76 F. 3d 1
<=89> p. 3
United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F. 3d 15
<=90> p.23
United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F. 2d 8
<=91> p. 21
Cochane v. Quattrocchi, 949 F. 2d 11
<=92> p. 13
United States v. Russell, 919 F. 2d 795
<=93> p. 798
Bums V. Loranger, 907 F. 2d 233
<=94> p. 236
United States v. Cardona, 903 F. 2d 60
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<=95> p. 62
<=96> Dissenting opinion p. 71
Cruz V. Savage, 896 F. 2d 626
<=97> p. 632
<=98> p. 633
Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F. 2d 189
<=99> p. 193
Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F. 2d 111
<=100>p. 118
Alinovi v. Worchester School Committee, 777 F. 2d 776
<=101>p. 782
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F. 2d 556
<=102> p. 562
<=103> p. 563
Alinovi v. Worchester School Committee, 766 F. 2d 660
<=104> p. 666
Ahem v. O ’Donnell, 1997 U.S. App. Lexis 6383
<=105>
Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177
<=106> p. 180
Keaveney v. Town of Brookline, 937 F. Supp. 975
<=107> p. 984
McCabe v. City of Lyim, 873 F. Supp. 53
<=108> p. 60
Salas Garcia v. Perez, 777 F. Supp. 137
<=109>p. 149
Unites States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp. 1266
<=110>p. 1290
< = l l l > p . 1293
.Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56
<=112> Followed p. 60
Perez v. Autoridad de Energia Electrica de Puerto Rico, 741 F. Fupp. 23
<=113>p. 25
United States v. Giannetta, 711 F. Supp. 1144
<=114> p. 1147
Diaz Camacho v. Lopez Rivera, 699 F. Supp. 1020
<=115> p. 1025
Cruz V. Savage, 691 F. Supp. 549
<=116> p. 554
Guiney v. Roache, 686 F. Supp. 956
<=117> p. 958
Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8715
118>
Rossi V. Pelham, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 665
<=119> p. 668
Keaveney v. Town o f Brookline, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1838
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<=120> p. 1844, Headnote: student search balance o f interest
2"“ Circuit
United States v. Bianco, 998 F. 2d 1112
<=121>p. 1124
Coppinger v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 861 F. 2d 33
<=122> p. 35
United States v. Benevento, 836 F. 2d 60
<=123> p. 69
United States v. Reyes, 821 F. 2d 168
<=124> p. 170
Schwimmer v. Kaladjian, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24911
<=125>
Schwimmer v. Kaladjian, 988 F. Supp. 631
<=126> p. 644
United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50
<=127> p. 52
Hsu V. Roslyn Union Free School District No. 3, 876 F. Supp. 445
<=128>p. 457
Tenebaum v. Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962
<=129> p. 974
United States v. Santopietro, 809 F. Supp. 1001
<=130>p. 1007
Simpson v. Saroff, 741 F. Supp. 1073
<=131>p. 1078
Burka v. New York City Transit Authority, 739 F. Supp. 814
<=132> p. 828
Fowler v. New York City Dep’t o f Sanitation, 704 F. Supp. 1264
<=133> p. 1273
United States v. Chuang, 696 F. Supp. 910
<=134> p. 913
United States v. Gerena, 662 F. Supp. 1265
<=135> p. 1269
United States v. Gerena, 662 F. Supp. 1218
<=136> p. 1234
Wilkinson v. Forst, 639 F. Supp. 518
<=137> p. 526
3"* Circuit
D. R. V. Middle Bucks Area Voc. Tech. Sch., Ct. App. 3"* Dkt No. 91-1136
—Dissenting opinion
W ilcher v. City o f Wilmington, 139 F. 3d 366
<=139> p. 373
United States v. Ward, 131 F. 3d 335
<=140> p. 340
D.R. V. Middle Bucks Voc. Tech. Sch., 972 F. 2d 1364
<=141> Dissenting opinion p. 1380
United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F. 2d 136
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<=142> Distinguished p. 142
Good V. Dauphin County Soc. Srv. for Children and Youth, 891 F. 2d 1087
<=143> P. 1093
Transport Workers Union Local 234 v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation
Authority, 863 F. 2d 1110
<=144> Followed p. 1115
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F. 2d 594
<=145> p. 601
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police D ep’t, 840 F. 2d 1139
<=146> p. 1143
Wilcher v. City o f Wilmington, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4991
<=147>
United States v. Ward, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 32145
< = 148>
Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351
<=149> p. 355
Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533
<=150> p. 549
Picarella v. Terrizzi, 893 F. Supp. 1292
<=151>p. 1297
Patterson v. Board o f Probation and Parole o f the Commonwealth o f
Pennsylvania, 851 F. Supp. 194
<=152>p. 198
Fenstermaker V. Nesfedder, 802 F. Supp. 1258
<=153>p. 1262
In re Grand Jury Subpoena o f Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358
<=154> p. 367
Slotterback v. Interborro School District, 766 F. Supp. 280
<=155> p. 288
United States v. Ezeiraku, 754 F. Supp. 420
<=156> p. 430
Quitmeyer v. Southeastern Permsylvania Transportatio, 740 F. Supp. 363
<=157> p. 366
Henley v. Octorara Area School District, 701 F. Supp. 545
<=158> p. 551
Jarvis El v. Pandolfo, 701 F. Supp. 98
<=159> p. 100
Amalgamated Transit Union Division 1279 v. Cambria County Transit
Authority, 691 F. Supp. 898
<=160> p. 905
<=161> p. 906
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 689 F. Supp. 400
<=162> p. 411
Egloff V. New Jersey Air National Guard, 684 F. Supp. 1275
<=163> p. 1280
Transport Workers Union o f Philadelphia Local 234 v. Southeastern
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Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 678 F. Supp. 543
<=164> p. 549
Policemen’s Benevolent Association o f New Jersey Local 318 v.
Washington Gloucester County, 672 F. Supp. 779
<=165> p. 785
Capua V. Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
<=166> p. 1513
Gruenke v. Seip, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16439
<=167> Distinguished
Philadelphia Fed’n o f Teachers v. School Dist. o f Phila., 1998 U.S.
District LEXIS 5592
<=168>
Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep’t, 1 Am. Disabilities Cas (BNA)
1222

<=169> p. 1224
Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority, 72 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1027
<=170> p. 1029, Headnote: special needs analysis for searches
Ascolese v. Southeastern Pa. Transportation Authority, 70 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 325
<=171> p. 337, Headnote: probable cause requirement exception
Wilcher V. City o f Wilmington, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1345
<=172> p. 1349
4“' Circuit
Norwood V. Bain, 143 F. 3d 843
<=173> p. 853
United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F. 3d 1290
<=174> p. 1301
Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F. 2d 369
<=175> p. 372
United States v. Jenkins, 986 F. 2d 76
<=176> p. 78
United States v. Reid, 929 F. 2d 990
<=177> p. 992
DesRoches v. C ^ rio , 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 23361
<=178> Followed
Norwood V. Bain, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9566
<=179>
Phillips V. Anderson County School Dist. Five, 987 F. Supp. 488
<=180>p. 494
Andrews v. Crump, 984 F. Supp. 393
<=181>p. 409
DesRoches v. Caprio, 974 F. Supp. 542
<=182> Distinguished p. 545
Carboni v. Meldrum, 949 F. Supp. 427
<=183> Distinguished p. 434
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Jones V. Murray, 763 F. Supp. 842
<=184> p. 844
Pratt V. United States Parole Commission, 717 F. Supp. 382
<=185> p. 385
Thomson v. Weinberger, 682 F. Supp. 829
<=186>p. 831
Bumham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1169
<=187> p. 1173
Bumham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1160
. <=188> Followed p. 1164
DesRoches v. Caprio, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11218
<=189> Distinguished
5'" Circuit
,A.ubrey v. School Bd. o f Lafayette Parish, 148 F. 3d 559
<=190> p. 562
Pierce v. Smith, 117 F. 3d 866
<=191>p. 872
<=192> Dissenting opinion p. 887
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F. 3d 1006
<=193> Explained p. 1010
<=194> Dissenting opinion p. 1024
Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F. 3d 1075
<=195> p. 1079
Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38 F. 3d 198
<=196> Dissenting opinion p. 209
United States v. Pierre, 932 F. 2d 377
<=197> p. 384
United States v. Johnson, 862 F. 2d 1135
<=198> Dissenting opinion p. 1143
National Treasury Employees Union v. Raab, 816 F. 2d 170
<=199> p. 176
<=200> p. 179
<=201> Dissenting opinion p. 183
United States v. Borchardt, 809 F. 2d 1115
<=202> p. 1117
Aubrey v. School Bd. o f Lafayette Parish, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18361
<=203>
Pierce v. Smith, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698
<=204>
<=205> Dissenting opinion
United States v. Doe, 801 F. Supp. 1562
<=206> p. 1567
Bailey v. Baytown Tex., 781 F. Supp. 1210
<=207> Followed p. 1216
Brooks V. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School District,
730 F. Supp. 759
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<=208> Followed p. 763
<=209> p. 764
Weicks V. New Orleans Police Dept., 706 F. Supp. 453
<=210> p. 457
632 F. Supp. 203
<=211> Followed p. 212
Ringe v. Romero, 624 F. Supp. 417
<=212> p. 418
<=213> Distinguished p. 419
Kelly V. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11674
< = 214 >
Aubrey v. School Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 375
<=215> p. 377
Pierce v. Smith, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 8
<=216> p. 13
<=217> Dissenting opinion p. 25
6‘**Circuit
United States v. Rohrig, 98 F. 3d 1506
<=218> Followed p. 1512
Spear v. Sowders, 33 F. 3d 576
<=219> p. 581
<-220> Dissenting opinion p.584
Daugherty v. Campbell, 33 F. 3d 554
<=221 > Dissenting opinion p. 560
O ’Brien v. Grand Rapids, 23 F. 3d 990
<=222> p. 997
Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F. 2d 598
<=223> Followed p. 604
<=224> p. 605
Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F. 2d 693
<=225> Dissenting opinion p. 700
Williams v. Ellington, 936 F. 2d 881
<=226> Parallel
<=227> Followed p. 884
<=228> Followed p. 886
Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F. 2d 1563
<=229> p. 1566
<=230> p. 1568
L ow om V. Chattanooga Tennessee, 846 F. 2d 1539
<=231> p. 1543
<=232> Different opinion p. 1549
<=233> Different opinion p. 1550
Newsome v. Batavia Local School District, 842 F. 2d 920
<=234> p. 925
Webb V. McCullough, 828 F. 2d 1151
<=235>p. 1155
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<=236> Harmonized p. 1157
Knox County Education Association v. Knox County Board o f Education,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 24131
<=237>
United States v. Rohrig, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 28274
<=238> Followed
Swales V. Township o f Ravenna, 989 F. Supp. 925
<=239> p. 937
United States v. Shepard, 930 F. Supp. 1189
<=240> p. 1193
Miller v. City o f Columbus, 920 F. Supp. 807
<=241> p. 823
Widener v. Frye, 809 F. Supp. 35
<=242> Followed p.36
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon PHE Inc., 790
F. Supp. 1310
<=243> Followed p. 1313
Timberlake v. Benton, 786 F. Supp. 676
<=244> p. 690
Holloman v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 741 F. Supp. 677
<=245> p. 683
Tanks v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority, 739 F. Supp. 1113
<=246> p. 1118
Ensor v. Rust Eng’g Co., 704 F. Supp. 808
<=247> p. 813
Smith V. White, 666 F. Supp. 1085
<=248> p. 1089
Feliciano v. Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578
<=249> p. 582
L ow om V. City o f Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875
<=250> Followed p. 879
Cales V. Howell Public School, 635 F. Supp. 454
<=251 > Followed p. 455
7**' Circuit
Boucher v. School Bd. o f Greenfield Sch. Dist., 134 F. 3d 821
< 252> p. 827
Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No. 203, 128 F. 3d 1146
<=253> Followed p. 1149
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101,68 F. 3d 1010
<=254> Followed p. 1012
Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F. 3d 1040
<=255> p. 1045
Comfield v. Consolidated High School District 230, 991 F. 2d 1316
<=256> Followed p. 1320
Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F. 2d 679
<=257> p. 681
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<=258> Dissenting opinion p. 690
United States v. Chaidez, 919 F. 2d 1193
<=259>p. 1197
<=260> Dissenting opinion p. 1204
Chambers v. Maher, 915 F. 2d 1141
<=261>p. 1144
Shields v. Burge, 874 F. 2d 1201
<=262> p. 1203
Schail V. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 864 F. 2d 1309
<=263> Followed p. 1314
Torres v. Wisconsin Dept, of Health and Social Services, 859 F. 2d 1523
<=264> Dissenting opinion p. 1534
Pesce V. J. Sterling Morton High School District 201 Cook County
Illinois, 830 F. 2d 789
<=265> p. 798
Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F. 2d 893
<=266> p. 900
United States v. Martel, 792 F. 2d 630
<=267> p. 635
United States v. Pollard, 790 F. 2d 1309
<=268> p. 1312
Willis V. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 21923
<=269
United States v. Jones, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390
<=270>
Boucher v. School Bd. o f Greenfield Sch. Dist., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 453
<=271>
Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist. No. 203, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30434
<=272> Followed
Todd V. Rush County Schs., 983 F. Supp. 799
<=273> p. 804
Bills V. Homer Consol. Sch. Dist., 967 F. Supp. 1063
<=274> p. 1066
Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048
<=275> p. 1050
Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206
<=276> p. 1217
<=277> Followed p. 1218
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 870 F. Supp. 222
<=278> Explained p. 225
Edwards v. Cabrera, 861 F. Supp. 664
<=279> p. 670
Nelson v. Moline School District 40, 725 F. Supp. 965
<=280> p. 969
Dimeo v. Griffin, 721 F. Supp. 958
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<=281>p. 973
Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local 2 v. Chicago, 717 F. Supp. 1314
<=282>p. 1318
<=283> p. 1319
Landstrom v. Illinois Department o f Children and Family Services,
699 F. Supp. 1270
<=284>p. 1281
Schail V. Tippecanoe County School Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833
<=285> p. 848
<=286> p. 850
<=287> Followed p. 852
Taylor v. O ’Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422
<=288> p. 1435
<=289>p. 1436
Huskey v. National Broadcasting Company Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1282
<=290> Distinguished p. 1291
Martens v. District No. 220 Board o f Education, 620 F. Supp. 29
<=291 > Distinguished p. 31
<=292> p. 31
E.Z. V. Coler, 603 F. Supp. 1546
<=293> p. 1560
Johnson v. City o f Harvey, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9976
<=294>
Rosenthal v. United States, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8667
<=295>
Hilton v. Lincoln Way High Sch., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 508
<=296>
Todd V. Rush County Schs., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20483
<=297>
Dimeo v. Griffin, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P56789
<=298>
<=299> Dissenting opinion
8“*Circuit
Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist., 87 F. 3d 979
<=300> p. 981
Franklin V. INS, 72 F. 3d 571
<=301 > Dissenting opinion p. 586
United States v. Drinkard, 900 F. 2d 140
<=302> Distinguished p. 144
Rushton V. Nebraska Public Power District, 844 F. 2d 562
<=303> p. 566
Cason V. Cook, 810 F. 2d 188
<=304> Followed p. 191
<=305> p. 191
McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F. 2d 1302
<=306> p. 1305
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Woodis V. Westark Community College, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28212
<=307>
Rowe V. Carson, 911 F. Supp. 389
<=308> p. 393
United States v. Ingram, 797 F. Supp. 705
<=309> Distinguished p. 708
Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School Dist., 794 F. Supp. 1405
<=310>p. 1413
Bystrom v. Fridley High School, 686 F. Supp. 1387
<=311 > Followed p. 1391
Rushton V. Nebraska Public Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510
<=312> p. 1524
Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22
<=313> Harmonized p.34
<=314> p. 42
Rushton V. Nebraska Public Power District, 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1732
<=315>
9“*Circuit
Brewster v. Board of Education o f the Lynwood Unified School
District, 149 F. 3d 971
<=316> p. 987
Ortega v. O ’Connor, 146 F. 3d 1149
<=317>p. 1158
Smith V. McGlothlin, 119 F. 3d 786
<=318> p. 788
Yin V. California, 95 F. 3d 864
<=319> p. 869
Lovell V. Poway Unified School District, 79 F. 3d 1510
<=320> Dissenting opinion p. 1521
Rise V. Oregon, 59 F. 3d 1556
<=321>p. 1559
United States v. Barona, 56 F. 3d 1087
<=322> p. 1092
<=323> Dissenting opinion p. 1101
United States v. Gonzalez-Ringon, 36 F. 3d 859
<=324> Dissenting opinion p. 869
Chew V. Gates, 27 F. 3d 1432
<=325> Dissenting opinion p. 1463
Acton V. Vemonia School District 47J, 23 F. 3d 1514
<=326>p. 1522
<=327>p. 1525
Portillo V. United States, 15 F. 3d 819
<=328> p. 822
Plarmed Parenthood of Southern Nevada Inc. v Clark County
School District, 941 F. 2d 817
<=329> p. 822
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United States v. Becker, 929 F. 2d 442
<=330> p. 446
Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F. 2d 879
<=331>p. 885
United States v. Attson, 900 F. 2d 1427
<=332> p. 1430
United States v. Winsor. 846 F. 2d 1569
<=333> Explained p. 1575
<=334>p. 1577
Railway Labor Executives A ss’n v. Bumley, 839 F. 2d 575
<=335>p. 582
<=336> p. 583
<=337> p. Dissenting opinion p. 595
United States v. Robertson, 833 F. 2d 777
<=338> p. 781
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F. 2d 1413
<=339>p. 1417
United States v. Nates, 831 F. 2d 860
<=340> Dissenting opinion p. 864
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F. 2d 1328
<=341> p. 1336
United States v. Winsor, 816 F. 2d 1394
<=342>p. 1398
United States v. Salazar, 805 F. 2d 1394
<=343> p. 1396
United States v. Most, 789 F. 2d 1411
<=344>p. 1415
DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F. 2d 1505
<=345>p. 1506
Fraser v. Bethel School District No. 403, 755 F. 2d 1356
<=346> Dissenting opinion p. 1367
Hunter v. Board of Trustees, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16113
<=347>
Brewster v. Board o f Education o f the Lynwood Unified School
District, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15768
<=348>
Ortega v. O'Connor, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13573
<=349>
Smith V. McGlothlin, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17818
<=350>
Yin V. California, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 23903
<=351>
Rasmus v. Arizona, 939 F. Supp. 709
<=352> p. 713
Juran v. Independence Oregon Cent. Sch. Dist. 13J, 898 F. Supp. 728
<=353> P. 731
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Rupe V. Wood, 863 F. Supp. 1315
<=354>p. 1336
Acton V. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354
<=355> Explained p. 1361
Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Association o f America Inc. v.
Bumley, 705 F. Supp. 481
<=356> p. 483
National Air Traffic Controllers Association v. Bumley,
700 F. Supp. 1043
<=357> p. 1045
American Federation of Government Employees Council 33 v.
Meese, 688 F. Supp. 547
<=358> p. 551
<=359> p. 552
O ’Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997
<=360> Followed p. 1004
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Sunline
Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560
<=361> p. 1566
<=362> p. 1567
Yin V. Califomia, 3 Accom. Disabilities Dec. (CCH) P3-044
Yin V. Califomia, 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1487
<=364> p. 1490
Railway Labor Executives Association v. Bumley, 1 Am
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1188
<=365> p. 1192
<=366> p. 1193
<=367> Dissenting opinion p. 1203
Brewster v. Board o f Education o f the Lynwood Unified School
District, 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 195
<=368> p. 207
Ortega v. O ’Connor, 14 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 97
<=369> p. 104
Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. Bumley, 13 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1682
<=370>
<=371> Followed
<=372> Explained
<=373> Dissenting opinion
10'“ Circuit
United States v. Richardson, Ct. App. 10* Dkt. No. 95-4039
J.B. V. Washington County, 127 F. 3d 919
<=375> p. 929
United States v. Shareef, 100 F. 3d 1491
<=376> p. 1499
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Saavedra v. City o f Albuquerque, 73 F. 3d 1525
<=377>p. 1531
United States v. Lewis, 71 F. 3d 358
<=378> p. 361
Romo V. Champion, 46 F. 3d 1013
<=379>p. 1017
Doe V. Baganon, 41 F. 3d 571
<=380> Followed p. 575
Franz v. Lytle, 997 F. 2d 784
<=381> Distinguished p. 789
United States v. Franco, 981 F. 2d 470
<=382> p. 472
Snell V. Tunnell, 920 F. 2d 673
<=383> p. 698
Edwards v. Rees, 883 F. 2d 882
<=384> Followed p. 884
United States v. Carreon, 872 F. 2d 1436
<=385> P. 1439
J.B. V. Washington County, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 27629
<=386>
United States v. Shareef, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29483
<=387>
United States v. Phillips, 977 F. Supp. 1418
<=388> p. 1420
James v. Unified School District No. 512, 959 F. Supp. 1407
<=389> Distinguished p. 1413
Mood For A Day, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 953 F. Supp. 1252
<=390> p. 1262
Thompson v. Johnson County Community College, 930 F. Supp. 501
<=391>p. 507
Singleton v. Board o f Education USD 500, 894 F. Supp. 386
<=392> Followed p. 390
United States v. Santiago, 846 F. Supp. 1486
<=393> p. 1491
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 993 v. Oklahoma City,
710 F. Supp. 1321
<=394> Followed p. 1325
<=395> Followed p. 1327
United States v. Ospina, 682 F. Supp. 1182
<=396> p. 1184
Hayes v. Unified School District 377, 669 F. Supp. 1519
<=397> Followed p. 1528
Boster v. Philpot, 645 F. Supp. 798
<=398> p. 803
W est V. Derby Unified School District #260,1998 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 16961

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

276

<=399>
United States v. Phillips, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14866
<=400>
James v. Unified School Dist. No. 512,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4493
<=401> Distinguished
Thompson v. Johnson County Community College, 11 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1611
<=402> p. 1615, Headnote: reasonableness o f search
Saavedra v. City o f Albuquerque, 11 1.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 588
<=403> p. 592, Headnote: Fourth Amendment requirement o f probable cause
<=404> p. 5p2, Headnote: reasonable depends on context o f search
11* Circuit
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. o f Educ., 115 F. 3d 821
<=405> Distinguished p. 823
<=406> Dissenting opinion p. 828
Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. o f Educ., 95 F. 3d 1036
<=407> p. 1042
<=408> Followed p. 1043
<=409> Dissenting opinion p. 1048
C.B. V. Driscoll, 82 F. 3d 383
<=410> Followed p. 388
Lenz V. Winbum, 51 F. 3d 1540
<=411>p. 1551
Alabama Student Party v. Student Government Association o f
University o f Alabama, 867 F. 2d 1344
<=412>p. 1346
Everett v. Napper, 833 F. 2d 1507
<=413>p. 1511
United States v. McKermon, 814 F. 2d 1539
<=414> p. 1543
United States v. Hemandez-Salazar, 813 F. 2d 1126
<=415> p. 1136
United States v. Bruscantini, 761 F. 2d 640
<=416> Explained p. 640
United States v. Lopez, 761 F. 2d 632
<=417> p. 635
United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F. 2d 1232
<=418> p. 1236
<=419> Different opinion p. 1240
Jenkins v. Talladega City Board o f Education, 1996
U.S. App. LEXIS 24905
<=420> Followed
<=421> Dissenting opinion
Magill V . Lee County, 990 F. Supp. 1382
<=422>p. 1391
Kicklighter v. Evans County School District, 968 F. Supp. 712

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill

<=423> p. 719
Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550
<=424> p. 1560
Arrington v. Eberhart, 920 F. Supp. 1208
<=425> p. 1224
Craig V. Selma City School Board, 801 F. Supp. 585
<=426> p. 591
Beattie v. St. Petersburg Beach, 733 F. Supp. 1455
<=427> p. 1457
United States v. Blake, 718 F. Supp. 925
<=428> p. 927
AFGE V. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726
<=429> p. 733
United States v. Marrero, 644 F. Supp. 570
<=430> p. 574
United States v. Rodriguez, 616 F. Supp. 328
<=431> p. 329
Magill V. Lee County, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 577
<=432>
Chandler v. James, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4603
<=433>
DC Circuit
Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F. 2d 1185
<=434> p. 1188
<=435> Dissenting opinion p. 1198
Harmess v. Bush, 919 F. 2d 170
<=436> Dissenting opinion p. 177
American Federation o f Government Employees v. Skirmer,
885 F. 2d 884
<=437> p. 889
National Federation o f Federal Employees v. Cheney,
884 F. 2d 603
<=438> p. 609
Jones V. Jenkins, 878 F. 2d 1476
<=439> p. 1477
United States v. Coyler, 878 F. 2d 469
<=440> p. 478
Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F. 2d 1031
<=441> p. 1035
<=442> p. 1036
Jones V. McKenzie, 833 F. 2d 335
<=443> p. 338
National Federation o f Federal Employees v. Weinberger,
818 F. 2d 935
<=444> p. 942
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Slaby V. Fairbridge, 3 F. Supp. 2d 22
<=445> p. 29
Profitt V. District of Columbia, 790 F. Supp. 304
<=446> p. 306
Transportation Institute v. United States Coast Guard,
727 F. Supp. 648
<=447> p. 653
<=448> p. 654
American Federation o f Government Employees v. Cavazos,
721 F. Supp. 1361
<=449> p. 1366
<=450> p. 1367
National Treasury Employees Union v. Lyng, 706 F. Supp. 934
<=451> p. 940
<=452> p. 941
Bangert v. Hodel, 705 F. Supp. 643
<=453> Followed p. 647
Harmon v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 65
<=454> p. 67
<=455> p. 68
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Carlucci,
690 F. Supp. 46
<=456> p. 49
National Federation of Federal Employees v. Carlucci,
680 F. Supp. 416
<=457> p. 430
<=458> p. 431
Slaby V. Fairbridge, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4827
<=459>
Other Federal Citations
Ct. App. U'Dkt. No. 91-1493
In re Scrivener Oil Co., 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 962
<=461> p. 966
In re Rapid Robert’s Inc., 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 946
<=462> p. 954
Twigg V. Hercules Corp., 122 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P56983
<=463>
Secretary of Labor v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 15 O.S.H. Cas.
(BNA) 1433
<=464>
Secretary of Labor v. Wyman-Gordon Co., O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
P29550
<=465> p. 39934
Railway Labor Executives Ass’n v. Skirmer, O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
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P29383
<=466> p. 39519
Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., O.S.H. Dec. (CCH)
P29295
<=467> p. 39314
Willner v. Thornburgh, O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) P29280
<=468> p. 39276
<=469> Dissenting opinion p. 39285
Military Justice
United States v. Williamson, 28 M.J. 511
<=470> p. 516
United States v. Valenzula, 24 M.J. 934
<=471> p. 936
United States v. Lopez, 32 M.J. 924
<=472> p. 928
United States v. Taylor, 41 M.J. 168
<=473> p. 171
United States v. McCarthy, 38 M.J 398
<=474> p. 402
<=475> Different opinion p. 407
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